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Evidence-based practice (EBP) is a model for clinical decision-making, representing an 
interdisciplinary approach to clinical practice that aims to optimize clinical decision-
making by emphasizing the use of evidence from well-designed research. An evidence-
based decision is made by the individual clinician on basis of the best evidence available, 
in accordance with the patient’s preferences and circumstances. Since 1992, EBP has been 
a central concept within a growing range of professional fields of health care. At the same 
time, EBP has been subject to incessant criticism. EBP proponents have responded to 
criticism, and their responses have then become the object of further criticism. The basic 
principles of the EBP-model, along with the claims by proponents and opponents for and 
against these principles, which compose the EBP debate, are the main subjects of this 
thesis. 
The thesis has four chapters. In Chapter 1, the principles of Clinical epidemiology are 
presented as the main scientific framework of EBP. It is through this framework that 
epidemiologic, outcome-based data is considered the most reliable source of evidence for 
clinical interventions.  
In Chapter 2, the constitutive elements of EBP are analyzed, with particular attention to 
what kind of scientific knowledge (i.e., “research evidence”) and non-scientific knowledge 
and beliefs (i.e., “clinical expertise” and “patient preferences”) that are inherent in the 
concept of EBP. In addition, I differentiate between three theoretical concepts of EBP – 
“narrow”, “moderate”, and “maximal” – which differ relative to the degree to which 
“clinical expertise” and “patient autonomy” are included in the concept or not. I claim that 
only “moderate” EBP” is representative for an adequate understanding of the EBP model.  
Chapter 3 presents an analysis of central claims in the international EBP debate while 
Chapter 4 attends to central claims in the Norwegian EBP debate. I argue that the most 
relevant criticism pertains to the confidence in and the application of epidemiologic 
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evidence-sources. This kind of criticism must be distinguished from the claim that EBP 
represents a narrow scope of evidence. The latter claim is based on a misunderstanding 
about what “evidence” entails in EBP literature and is representative to a narrow concept 
of EBP. Yet another kind of criticism, claiming that the EBP model ignores clinical expertise 
and patient autonomy, is also based on misunderstandings, largely due to lack of clarity in 
the EBP literature.  
A general conclusion is that the tendency to imply a narrow interpretation of EBP in much 
of the criticism, as well as the tendency to conceptual unclarities in much EBP literature, 
contribute to a less constructive debate. The thesis concludes by suggesting 
recommendations to both proponents and opponents, which can contribute to a more 
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Since 1992, evidence-based practice (EBP) has been a central concept within a growing 
range of professional fields, especially within health care. EBP is a model for clinical 
decision-making, representing an interdisciplinary approach to clinical practice that aims 
to optimize clinical decision-making by emphasizing the use of evidence from well-
designed research. EBP is used both on the population level (typically labelled ‘evidence-
based policy’) and on the individual level, concerning individual decision-making, 
conducted by a single clinician in direct patient care, in accordance with the individual 
preferences of the patient. The following thesis is restricted to individual decision-making. 
Initially, EBP was limited to the medical profession, as evidence-based medicine (EBM). As 
more professions made use of EBP principles, terminological offsprings were formulated, 
such as evidence-based nursing, evidence-based dentistry, and evidence-based 
psychotherapy. While EBM is the most common term in the literature, it is, from a 
professional point of view, only one “evidence-based approach” among others. Thus, any 
principles inherent in specific evidence-based professions (such as EBM) coincide with and 
are equally relevant to EBP. This treatise is about evidence-based practice, which concerns 
the principles of evidence-based models in any evidence-based health profession. To 
maintain terminological rigour and readability throughout the treatise, I have chosen to 
refer to EBP as the main designator. This also pertains to cases when I am citing or 
referring to texts that explicitly make use of the term “EBM”. The alternative would be to 
remark on every singular occasion (of which there are many) that the principles I am 
addressing are equally relevant to EBP1 – an alternative I find both cumbersome and 
unnecessary.  
                                                          
1 The exception to this rule includes cases in which the professional literature in, for example, evidence-
based medicine refers specifically to scenarios or a specific scope of evidence-sources that are specific to 
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The main attraction of EBP is that it enables identification of effective clinical practice in a 
reliable way, both by promoting the use of research evidence and offering guidance on 
how to assess such evidence through clear and concise criteria. However, the confidence 
in and application of EBP principles have also been the object of incessant criticism both 
from health care professionals and philosophers of science. EBP proponents have 
responded to criticism, and their responses have then become the object of further 
criticism. The basic principles of the EBP-model, along with the arguments by proponents 
and opponents for and against these principles, which compose the EBP debate, are the 
main subjects of this treatise. 
The main controversy in the EBP debate concerns the justification and relevance of three 
basic principles: (1) Epidemiologic research results are applied as a basis for clinical 
decision-making; (2) Outcome-based research is considered superior to other kinds of 
research; (3) Evidence-sources are critically appraised according to epidemiologic criteria 
of validity, in particular with regard to risk of bias. 
In addition, there are several other non-controversial principles, such as (4) In clinical 
decision-making, research evidence is never sufficient; both personal experiences and the 
patient’s preferences are necessary elements in any clinical decision; and (5) what is 
considered “best evidence available” is relative to different clinical questions and 
circumstances. While the controversial principles are methodological, referring to 
scientific knowledge, the non-controversial principles are pragmatically oriented, based 
on non-scientific knowledge, and do not differ from non-EBP models of clinical practice. 
These non-controversial principles are equally essential to the EBP debate, most often 
referred to in combination with the controversial principles (e.g., that the attention to 
epidemiologic data minimizes the autonomy of the patient).  
                                                          
the profession alone. None of the citations or other references made in this dissertation address such 
specific references.  
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The degree of adequacy in the EBP debate has fundamentally to do with an understanding 
of the basic terminology in the EBP literature. The analysis of the EBP debate thus requires 
two important preliminary steps: Clarification of the scientific background of EBP and of 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for the EBP model. These clarifications provide the 
necessary basis for an adequate analysis of the EBP debate.  
Specifically, I address the following six questions: 
1. What are the main characteristics of clinical epidemiology, considered as the main 
scientific framework of EBP? 
2. What are the core elements of the EBP model, and what kinds of knowledge are 
necessary and sufficient conditions for a practice to be “evidence-based”? 
3. These questions provides the basis for treating questions concerning the EBP 
debate: 
4. What is the central and typical content of EBP criticism? 
5. To what extent are the different kinds of criticism relevant?  
On basis of answering these questions, the treatise concludes with a discussion of the 
future possibilities of the EBP debate:  
6. Is it possible to identify a better, more constructive basis for the EBP debate? 
 
Previous research on the subject and the original contributions of this treatise 
Earlier research on the subject of EBP is restricted primarily to discussing various aspects 
of “evidence” in EBP, mostly with regard to EBM (e.g. Ashcroft 2004; Cartwright 2007; 
2011; La Caze 2008; 2009; and Worrall 2002; 2007; 2010). There are, however, some 
philosophers who have conducted research on the multiple aspects of the EBP model as 
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well as of the EBP debate (in particular Howick 2011; Bluhm & Borgerson 2010; and 
Wieten 2018).  
The novel contributions this treatise provides is the in-depth analysis of clinical 
epidemiology and EBP, as well as of the EBP debate. In particular, the detailed analysis of 
EBPs scientific background in clinical epidemiology provides a basis for analysing the EBP 
debate in an extensive manner that has not been conducted earlier. When analysing the 
content of the EBP model, I provide an epistemological analysis of what characterizes 
scientific and non-scientific knowledge in EBP. The EBP literature has always 
acknowledged the occurrence of non-scientific knowledge, but has been subjected to 
scrutiny only to a lesser extent (in particular by Howick 2011, and Wieten 2018).  
With regard to identification of the specific kinds of criticism in the EBP debate, attempts 
have been made to categorize essential arguments. The most comprehensive 
categorizations to date are put forward by Cohen et.al. (2004) and Strauss & McAllister 
(2000). Both of these categorizations are very general, and lack substantial scrutiny. The 
innovative aspect of my categorization is the in-depth analysis and clarification of the basic 
terminology that is addressed in the criticism (chapter 1 and 2). In the absence of such a 
clarification, discussions of whether certain kinds of criticism are justified become 
superficial. The treatise also provides more nuanced descriptions of the categories of 
claims and arguments used in the debate (Chapters 3 and 4). 
 
Structure of the treatise 
The treatise consists of four main chapters, with several subsections in each, and a 
conclusion.  
 Chapter 1: Clinical epidemiology as the scientific framework of EBP 
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In chapter 1, I will examine clinical epidemiology as the scientific framework of EBP and 
identify the reasons why epidemiological, outcome-based data are considered the most 
reliable source of evidence for clinical interventions. I will also investigate the 
methodological features through which various kinds of evidence are assessed and viewed 
hierarchically, in accordance with the principles of validity in the field of clinical 
epidemiology.  
I present the core idea of clinical epidemiology thus: To apply epidemiologic research 
knowledge as a basis for clinical decision-making when recommending clinical 
interventions to individual patients. Together with the principles for assessing evidence 
sources, this constitutes the main scientific framework for EBP. I will argue that this 
framework constitutes the most characteristic and most controversial feature of EBP.  
 Chapter 2: The concept of evidence-based practice 
In Chapter 2, I will analyse the concept of EBP. The main aim is to clarify the necessary and 
sufficient elements inherent in the concept of EBP. In particular, I will analyse the kinds of 
scientific and non-scientific knowledge that are considered necessary within the EBP 
model. 
There are numerous definitions of EBP. Common to most of them is the notion that EBP 
clinical decision-making includes three elements: “evidence”, use of “personal 
experience” or “expertise”, and adherence to the principle that clinical decision-making 
must be in accordance with “patient preferences”. The main aim of Chapter 2 is to clarify 
what the main elements in EBP entail, and to identify the necessary and sufficient 
conditions when defining EBP.  
While ‘evidence’ to a large extent is related to knowledge generated through clinical 
epidemiology methods, the model of EBP also includes evidence sources from a broader 
professional field. In addition, knowledge and beliefs from personal experiences are 
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typically considered adequate evidence when scientific knowledge is unavailable. Due to 
its aim of practical decision-making, EBP also implies a non-scientific foundation in terms 
of the practical application of research evidence. It is through this foundation that EBP 
also includes incorporation of the clinician’s personal experiences and patient’s values. I 
argue that, in contrast to its clinical epidemiological framework, the non-scientific 
elements in EBP are uncontroversial, and may seem trivial – it is, after all, what any clinical 
practice entails. However, this is not the least trivial when it comes to understanding the 
scope and delineation of EBP. Both the scientific and the non-scientific elements are 
necessary for an adequate understanding of the EBP model. I also stress that the inclusion 
of non-scientific knowledge in EBP does not make the model any less “evidence-based”: 
the scientific dimension of clinical epidemiology entails a description of the most typical 
manner in which the EBM clinician retrieves and assesses the evidence for any clinical 
decision-making.  
After presenting four core principles common to various EBP definitions, I address the 
need for an extensive definition of EBP that includes the necessary elements of EBP, and 
I propose the following definition: “Evidence-based practice” is to be considered 
synonymous with (an) “approach to clinical decision-making, in which the clinician 
recommends clinical interventions to individual patients, based on the best evidence 
available, assessed according to methodological criteria of evidence quality, where the 
evidence is integrated into clinical practice by a clinician who, by making use of clinical 
experience, identifies, assesses and applies the evidence, in accordance with the patient’s 
preferences and circumstances.” 
While this extensive definition lacks the pragmatic brevity of most other EBP definitions, 
it includes all the elements necessary for a sufficient evidence-based practice. The 
elements of this definition are further examined through an epistemological analysis of 
the kinds of knowledge that are necessary for the model of EBP. In particular, I examine 
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what kind of knowledge ‘evidence’, ‘expertise’ and ‘patient’s preferences’ represent, and 
I examine how scientific and non-scientific knowledge are structured within the EBP 
model. 
Based on the possible combinations of scientific and non-scientific dimensions of 
knowledge, it is theoretically possible to differentiate between three theoretical concepts 
of EBP: “Maximal”, “minimal”, and “moderate” EBP, which differ relative to the extent to 
which non-scientific knowledge is taken into consideration. In light of the analyses in 
chapter 1 and 2, I argue that only a moderate concept of EBP is justifiable. 
The analysis in Chapters 1 and 2 will serve as a conceptual background for the examination 
of the EBP debate.  
 Chapter 3: Analysis of the EBP debate 
Measured in numbers of publications, the EBP debate is vast and encompasses assertions 
from proponents and opponents from health professions as well as from social and 
humanistic studies. At the outset, this literature may seem overwhelming in its multiple 
claims and nuances on the topic. A closer look, however, reveals that many of the critical 
arguments are rather similar, so that the quantification of arguments does not necessarily 
represent the same quantity of topics. Thus, the various claims can be categorized into a 
considerably smaller number.  
In Chapter 3, I will demonstrate that the most central arguments in the EBP debate can be 
categorized into four main topics:  
1. the conceptual unclarity of EBP definitions 
2. the scope and justification of evidence 
3. the role of expertise 
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4. patient preferences and autonomy 
In the analysis of the EBP debate, various kinds of criticism will be ascribed to one of these 
four main topics. In total, I identify and discuss ten specific kinds of criticism.  
I will also discuss whether each kind of criticism is adequate and relevant. A claim is 
considered adequate to the extent that it reflects a correct interpretation of its subject 
matter (i.e., EBP principles). Provided it is adequate, the same argument is relevant to the 
extent that it affects the justification of one or more EBP principles.  
I argue that the most relevant kinds of criticism target the most controversial elements of 
EBP, i.e., its view of evidence, based on clinical epidemiology principles. In particular, this 
has to do with specific presuppositions concerning the internal and external validity of 
evidence. On the other hand, criticism of non-scientific knowledge is to a large extent 
based on misunderstandings of the content of EBP. In particular, several critics seem to 
ignore the inclusion of non-scientific elements in the EBP definition, thereby aproximating 
a minimal concept of EBP. 
 Chapter 4: Analysis of the Norwegian EBP debate 
Chapter 4 is considered an extension of the previous chapter, aiming at a more detailed 
analysis of some of the main kinds of criticism categorized in Chapter 3, by addressing the 
Norwegian EBP criticism specifically. The Norwegian EBP debate is not categorically 
different from the international. However, there are fewer debating participants, and 
certain misinterpretations have developed into commonplace conceptualizations of EBP.  
The analysis of the Norwegian critics consists of two parts. Firstly, I address their specific 
claims and analyze their arguments and theoretical assumptions in support of these 
claims. This analysis entails a relatively detailed examination of each of the critics’ lines of 
arguments. As part of this analysis, I also identify which of their arguments that are 
comparable to the main kinds of criticism analysed in Chapter 3. Secondly, I conduct a 
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cricial analysis of the Norwegian criticism, by discussing the validity and relevance of the 
specific claims and arguments identified in the first part. This critical analysis includes a 
discussion of features in the Norwegian criticism that are not comparable to the 
international criticism, which I find problematic. In particular, I address what I consider a 
theoretical approach to interpreting EBP, which demonstrates a tendency to view EBP as 
a minimal concept, which excludes clincial expertise and patient preferences at the outset. 
I argue that such an argumentation is unnecessarily theory-laden, over-simplified and 
based on misinterpretations of several elements in the EBP model.  
 Conclusion  
The last part of this thesis consists of a summary of the central findings of the analyses 
presented in this treatise. Based on these findings, I will conclude by a short discussion of 
the future possibilities of the EBP debate, by addressing the question about whether it is 





Chapter 1: Clinical epidemiology as the main scientific 




Evidence-based practice (EBP) as a concept and a model for health care decision-making 
has its origin in clinical epidemiology, developed by David Sackett and his group at the 
Department of Clinical Epidemiology and Biostatistics at McMaster University in Canada 
in the 1990s. The clinical epidemiologists considered laboratory-based knowledge about 
biology insufficient as a basis for clinical decision-making. To reduce uncertainty in these 
decisions, a new basis was presented. This basis consists primarily in the application and 
assessment of epidemiologic studies as an efficient resource for clinical practice (cf. 
Sackett et.al. 1985; cf. Bohlin, I. & Sager, M.: 2011). 
In what follows, I will clarify the scientific background of EBP such as it is founded in clinical 
epidemiology. I will do so by describing the main characteristics of clinical epidemiology. 
The main attention in this chapter is clarification of the scientific framework of clinical 
epidemiology, with particular attention to what the concept of clinical epidemiology 
entails, its methodological framework, and its view on evidence. The chapter is divided 
into four main parts, with several subsections: Section 1.1. examines basic characteristics 
of the concept of clinical epidemiology. Section 1.2. undertakes an exposition of the 
clinical questions and methods of clinical epidemiology. Section 1.3 provides an 
examination of evidence in clinical epidemiology. In section 1.4., I will examine the basis 
on which evidence is assessed in clinical epidemiology, including the criteria of evidence 
quality, of Critical appraisal, and hierarchies of evidence. In the last subsection of 1.4., I 
present concluding remarks on clinical epidemiology’s view relating to evidence (1.4.4.). 
Finally, in section 1.5., I will explicate the concept of clinical epidemiology in relation to 
evidence-based practice, as the final evolution of clinical epidemiology. 
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My discussion in this chapter will provide the necessary background for my examination 
of the concept of EBP (Chapter 2) and for the analysis and discussion of central features 
in the criticism of EBP. 
 
 
1.1. The concept of clinical epidemiology 
In this section, I intend to clarify the concept of clinical epidemiology. I will do so in four 
steps; firstly, by way of a short exposition of its conceptual and historical background, with 
particular attention to what the reorientation from epidemiology to clinical epidemiology 
entails (1.1.1.). Secondly, by a conceptual clarification of its constitutive terms, “clinical” 
and “epidemiology” (1.1.2.). Thirdly, through an exposition of basic characteristics of 
clinical epidemiology (1.1.3.). Fourthly, in light of the previous steps, I will provide a 
definition of the term (1.1.4), to be used as a reference for the main features of clinical 
epidemiology in the following analysis and discussions of the thesis.  
 
1.1.1. The reorientation from epidemiology to clinical epidemiology 
Broadly described, clinical epidemiology is the application of epidemiologic knowledge2 in 
clinical practice. The core idea is that the clinician in her clinical practice should consider 
facts derived from population-based (i.e., epidemiologic) research as a basis for 
determining whether clinical interventions are effective or not. Thus, clinical epidemiology 
is clinical in that it aims to answer clinical questions and provide guidance for decision-
                                                          
2 The phrase “epidemiologic knowledge” means “knowledge derived from epidemiologic studies”. 
“Epidemiology” is typically defined as a “[b]ranch of medical science that deals with the incidence, 
distribution, and control of disease in a population” (merriam-webster.com), oriented towards “[t]he 
variation in disease occurrence and reasons for this variation” (Sørensen 2009: 17). In the following use of 
the term epidemiology, the orientation toward populations, in contrast to individual patients, is the main 
focus. Its attention to “incidence, distribution, and control of disease in populations”, will be generically 
abbreviated as “attention to disease in populations”.  
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making in clinical practice. On the other hand, clinical epidemiology is epidemiologic in 
that clinical considerations regarding the individual patient are based on population-based 
methods and research results. In essence, this is also what constitutes the controversial 
character of clinical epidemiology: the use of evidence from population research applied 
in a clinical setting regarding the patient. As such, the controversial character of clinical 
epidemiology is inherent in its title.  
Two essential characteristics of clinical epidemiology can be demonstrated by comparing 
it to the discipline of Epidemiology. The first characteristic concerns its subject matter: 
Epidemiology is mainly oriented toward disease (and other health states) in populations 
and public health (cf. Broadbent 2011: 215), primarily through preventive measures (cf. 
Cates: 1982). Clinical epidemiology, on the other hand, concerns interventions with 
individual patients, through interventional processes. The second characteristic concerns 
its main aim: Epidemiology aims at describing and improving population health, while 
clinical epidemiology aims at improving clinical decision-making with regard to individual 
patients.3  
Clinical epidemiology is a fairly new innovation, dating from 1938, when the term was 
introduced by John Paul, initially as a new basic science for preventive medicine (cf. Paul 
1938: 539). According to Sackett, one of the founders of both current clinical epidemiology 
and EBP, clinical epidemiology in its original form aimed at population orientation rather 
than at individual patient orientation, where the education of the student should “[s]tart 
[…] at the bedside and lead him gradually away from it” (Sackett 2002: 1161).  
Whereas the field of “classical” clinical epidemiology is “the clinicostatistical study of 
diseased populations” (Feinstein 1968; quoted in Sackett 2002: 1162), the emphasis in 
                                                          
3 A more precise, although more technical description may be suggested by comparing the object study 
object of epidemiology as the “distributions and determinants of disease” to the object of study in clinical 
epidemiology as the “determinants and effects of clinical decisions” (cf. Spitzer 1986; see also 1.1.2 below).  
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Sackett’s reorientation of clinical epidemiology4 is directed towards application of classical 
epidemiology and biostatistics to individual patients. In this way, the main focus shifts 
from the study of diseased populations as such, to evaluating clinical interventions, such 
as therapy, applied to individual patients, toward efficacious health care practice (cf. 
Sackett 2002: 1162). 
During the 1960s, Sackett presented a reorientation of clinical epidemiology, shifting 
attention from the object of populations – that is, epidemiology – to individual patients 
and defined the term thus:  
[t]he application, by a physician who provides direct patient care, of epidemiologic 
and biostatistical methods to the study of diagnostic and therapeutic processes in 
order to effect an improvement in health. (Sackett and Winkelstein 1967; quoted 
in Sackett 2002: 1162) 
 
The attention to “direct patient care” is a key element, referring to the clinical encounter 
between the clinician and the individual patient. Application of epidemiologic principles 
to patient-populations – even research on a small number of cases, such as in case-control 
studies – subsumes it under the heading of epidemiology alone (cf. Last 1988: 161).5  
Sackett’s definition from 1967 is still valid, except for two elements: Firstly, application of 
epidemiologic and biostatistical methods is not restricted to physicians exclusively but 
                                                          
4 Note that this difference between “original” and “new” clinical epidemiology is explained through 
Sackett’s narrative. It may be debatable whether the case is so clean-cut. Paul defined “clinical 
epidemiology” as "[a] marriage between quantitative concepts used by epidemiologists to study disease 
in populations and decision-making in the individual case which is the daily fare of clinical medicine". (Paul, 
J. R. I938; quoted in: Last 1988). On the other hand, Yale school of Epidemiology and Public Health [online] 
claims that Paul’s "clinical epidemiology concerns “[t]he study of diseases in small communities”. Thus, it 
is some ambiguity in Paul’s term of clinical epidemiology, and in the question of the difference between 
Paul’s and Sackett’s use of the term. In this treatise, I will not investigate this further, other than 
underlining that the current presentation of clinical epidemiology is based on Sacket’s narrative. 
5 Last considers this fact as an example of the oxymoronic character of the term “clinical epidemiology” 
and criticize clinical epidemiologists in general and Sackett in particular when stating that the term “clinical 




extends to any health care professional. It is also debatable whether clinical epidemiology 
can only be used by professionals in direct health care (cf. Spitzer 1986: 413). Secondly, 
the definition omits prognostic processes. In current clinical epidemiology, the scientific 
basis for determining prognosis is integral to its methodological literature (c.f., Haynes, R., 
et al. 2006). 
In the same vein as in the quote above, Sackett (1989b) explains the relation between 
(classical) epidemiology and clinical epidemiology: 
If I was correct that rational clinical practice requires the projection of diagnostic 
findings, prognoses, and therapeutic responses from groups of patients to the 
individual patient, it therefore followed that the strategies and tactics used to study 
groups of patients (housed in the discipline of epidemiology and the science of 
statistics) ought to be useful to me as an individual clinician dealing with my 
individual patient. Moreover, it should be possible for me to take a set of 
epidemiologic and biostatistical strategies developed to study the “distribution and 
determinants of disease” in groups and populations, recast them in a clinical 
perspective, and use them to improve my clinical performance. I therefore set 
about trying to do so. (Sackett 1989b: 309) 
 
In other words, the reorientation from classical epidemiology consists in the translation 
of epidemiological population data to a clinical perspective towards an improved basis for 
clinical decision-making regarding individual patient interventions.  
Its main idea is to adapt and expand scientific knowledge methods to health care practice, 
to improve clinical performance by providing a basis for clinical health care decision-
making in patient care. Formally, thus, the term “clinical epidemiology” is derived from a 
combination of scientific evidence, primarily from epidemiology, and clinical health-care 
decision-making. In essence, this is also what constitutes the controversial character of 
clinical epidemiology: the use of evidence from population research applied in a clinical 




1.1.2.  “Clinical practice” and “clinical research”  
Another way of describing clinical epidemiology is that it aims at the application of clinical 
research, primarily from epidemiologic studies, in clinical practice. The terms “clinical 
research” and “clinical practice”, and “epidemiology” are central in the following, and 
should be adequately explained. 
 
 “Clinical practice” 
“Clinical practice” has to do with the interaction between patients and health care 
providers. Due to its interference with a patient’s care, it is interventional, involving any 
clinical intervention in individual patients, including counselling, treatment, and testing. 
In most medical and philosophical literature on the subject, it is common to speak of 
treatment, and not intervention. However, treatment refers most often to therapeutic 
interventions exclusively, which implies a narrower scope than what the present 
description of clinical epidemiology aims at. In all further uses of the term “intervention”, 
I use it generically, while “treatment” refers only to “therapeutic procedures”. 
To avoid conceptual unclarity, I will suggest the following definition of “clinical practice”: 
“any health care-related intervention, including prognostic, diagnostic, and therapeutic 
procedures, provided by a clinician in patient care”.  
  
 “Clinical research”  
The term “clinical” in clinical epidemiology also concerns “clinical research”. This kind of 
research involves the generation and assessment of scientific investigations within health 
care, in order to determine the safety, efficacy, and effectiveness of health care 
interventions. The main concern of clinical research is to translate basic research (or 
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“bench science”, conducted in labs) into information and interventions that benefit 
patients. In general, the span of clinical research is wide and includes research in 
epidemiology, physiology and pathophysiology, health services, education, outcomes and 
mental health as well as clinical trials (cf. research.med.virginia.edu). What counts as 
clinical research in clinical epidemiology most often refers to a narrower scope of clinical 
research, based on population data (that is, epidemiology), with particular emphasis on 
outcomes, or effects, of interventions in clinical trials. The main aim of such studies is to 
determine whether an intervention is clinically effective or not – e.g., consisting of a 
randomized controlled trial on the effect of a specific clinical intervention. In turn, the 
results of these studies are used as clinical evidence in health care decision-making when 
recommending interventions for individual patients. 
 
  “Epidemiology” and “clinical epidemiology” 
“Epidemiology” is commonly defined as a “[t]he study of the distribution and 
determinants of health-related states or events (including disease), and the application of 
this study to the control of diseases and other health problems” (who.int 2019). Clinical 
epidemiology uses epidemiologic population research as basis for predicting how a clinical 
intervention is likely to have an effect when recommending a certain intervention to 
individual patients. 
What separates clinical epidemiology from Epidemiology is the focus on application of 
research data in a clinical setting. Thus, the reorientation from epidemiology to clinical 
epidemiology can be described in terms of a difference regarding their subject matters: 
While the subject matter of Epidemiology is the “determinants and distribution of 
disease”, the subject matter for clinical epidemiology can be described as “determinants 
and effects of clinical decisions” (cf. Spitzer 1986: 411). A “determinant” is a common 
construct in epidemiology, referring to any factor that may affect the health of individuals 
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and communities (cf. who.int 2019). Extended to the context of clinical epidemiology, 
“determinants and effects of clinical decisions” refer to any factor that may affect clinical 
decision-making, and the subsequent effects of such clinical decisions.  
With such a broad object of study, it is also important to note that clinical epidemiology is 
not exclusively restricted to epidemiology. Instead, clinical epidemiology makes use of a 
wide scope of scientific knowledge, consisting of multiple scientific disciplines. This is 
clearly stated in the introduction to the newest edition of Clinical Epidemiology (Haynes 
et al. 2006): 
We are clinical epidemiologists, those odd folks with one foot in clinical care and 
the other in clinical practice research. As clinical epidemiologists, we apply a wide 
array of scientific principles, strategies, and tactics to answer questions about 
health and health care, especially the latter. The principles we use are drawn most 
often from the discipline of epidemiology—but we purloin research principles from, 
and collaborate with, colleagues from any methodologically oriented, scientifically 
based, discipline—statistics, psychology, the social sciences, economics, health 
policy, health informatics, and beyond. (Haynes et al. 2006: x-xi) 
 
Thus, clinical epidemiology must be considered an interdisciplinary field, with the 
principles of epidemiology as its centre, aiming at application of research data in order to 
provide a scientific basis for clinical decision-making in patient-care. 
 
1.1.3. Basic characteristics of clinical epidemiology  
Fletcher et al. present a rather thorough description of clinical epidemiology, which also 
serves to sum up the main points above: 
[t]he science of making predictions about individual patients by counting clinical 
events in groups of similar patients and using strong methods to ensure that the 
predictions are accurate. The purpose of clinical epidemiology is to develop and 
apply methods of clinical observation that will lead to valid conclusions by avoiding 
being misled by systematic error and the play of chance […]. It is clinical because it 
seeks to answer clinical questions and to guide clinical decisions making with the 
best available evidence. It is “epidemiology” because many of the methods used to 
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answer questions about how to best care for patients have been developed by 
epidemiologists and because the care of individual patients is seen in the context 
of the larger population of which the patient is a member. (Fletcher et al. 2014: 4f)6 
 
The first sentence is essential, as it states three important features: (1) The main goal is to 
make predictions about individual patients, (2) on the basis of “[c]ounting clinical events 
in groups of similar patients”, by (3) “using strong methods to ensure that the predictions 
are accurate”.  
(1) is about the very object of clinical epidemiology: to make predictions about individual 
patients. Based on the above identification of the central attention to clinical 
interventions (1.1.2), I will suggest an extended description: The object of clinical 
epidemiology is to make predictions about whether the interventions provided to patients 
(typically, treatment) are effective. For the health care practitioner, knowledge of whether 
an intervention is effective or not is essential to enable the practitioner to recommend a 
specific treatment for the patient.  
(2) concerns how this object is enabled. Fletcher et al. describe this rather formally as 
“counting clinical events”. “Clinical event” is a general term, covering a broad range of 
occurrences, in principle referring to anything that a patient does, and anything that 
happens to a patient (cf. Hripcsak et al. 1996: 195).7 In the context of the description given 
                                                          
6 Following Fletcher et al., EBM (and EBP) may be considered as a sub-category of Clinical epidemiology, 
as “a modern term for the application of clinical epidemiology to the care of patients” (ibid.). As I will 
discuss in Chapter 2, such a view represents rather narrow scope on EBM. At the same time, however, 
Fletcher et al. point to an important difference between clinical epidemiology and EBM: Clinical 
epidemiology is involved in generation and assessment of epidemiological methods to health care, 
whereas EBM’s main concern is the actual application of research evidence, at the point of clinical patient-
care. 
7 WHO defines “clinical events” in line with Hripcsak et al.’s broad conception, but provides increased 
accuracy by specifying three different elements: “[1] Services provided to patients (history-taking, physical 
examination, preventive care, tests, procedures, drugs, advice) or [2] information on clinical condition or 
[3] on patient state used as a patient outcome” WHO Centre for Health Development 2004; numberings 
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by Fletcher et. al, “clinical event” refers to a more specific event of interest, i.e., the 
patient state used as a patient outcome (e.g., the occurrence of disease/not disease; 
pain/not pain; death/not death in the patient). The counting of clinical events, then, can 
be explained as having to do with quantifying clinical occurrences in patients and in 
patient’s outcome. This quantification is usually done through the use of large population-
based data, with a particular interest in the outcomes of these clinical occurrences. These 
quantifications are then used as basis for providing the predictions in (1). 
(3) has to do with the methods used in this quantification, aiming at determining whether 
interventions are effective. The definition given by Fletcher et al. is rather restrictive in 
that it only includes “strong”8 epidemiologic methods, excluding the inter-disciplinary 
scope of clinical epidemiology (cf. 1.2.). Methods in clinical epidemiology are quantitative 
and statistical, consisting of population-based studies. The outcomes of interventions are 
typically observed directly, usually by comparing patient groups who receive treatment 
with patient groups who do not receive the same treatment.  
In sections 1.2., I will examine the methodological features of clinical epidemiology in 
more detail. Before I turn to this, I will conclude these initial remarks on the concept of 
clinical epidemiology by providing a definition of the term. 
 
                                                          
are mine). My interpretation of the specific meaning in Fletcher et al’s use of “clinical event” is analogue 
to the third element in the WHO-definition. 
8 “Strong” methods refer to high standards of internal and external validity, ensuring that methods are 
conducted in a correct manner, with results that is clearly representative for a designated population. 
These methodological features will be discussed in section 1.2. and 1.3. below.  
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1.1.4. A definition of “clinical epidemiology” 
On basis of the above remarks, and for the convenience of the following analysis of clinical 
epidemiology and EBP, I will suggest the following four-partite definition of “clinical 
epidemiology”, of which it is to be considered synonymous with: 
 “The study of making predictions about whether interventions provided to patients 
are effective,  
 by producing and/or applying scientific research results and methods, primarily 
from epidemiology,  
 which are assessed for application in clinical health-care decision-making,  
 as evidence which justifies recommendations for or against clinical interventions 
concerning individual patients”. 
This extended definition is inspired by and comparable to the three definitions mentioned 
above (in 1.1.1. (by Sackett 1967), 11.2 (by Spitzer 1986), and 1.1.3. (by Fletcher et al. 
2014).  
The first part of my definition coincides with Fletcher’s definition. The two other 
definitions consider the decision-making in interventional processes to be the main 
object. The definition provided by Fletcher et al., as well as my own definition, replaces 
decision-making with a more technical and, in my view, more precise description of the 
aim of the decision-making process – i.e., prediction about the interventions provided to 
individual patients. 
The second part of my definition covers the kind of scientific knowledge upon which 
predictions are based – attentive to both production and application of research results, 
as well as to the inter-disciplinary scope of clinical epidemiology. In addition, this part 
includes both research activity and research application as potential activities for the 
clinical epidemiologist.  
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The third part of the definition represents an extension of the other definitions by 
explicitly including the assessments that are conducted when the quality of the scientific 
knowledge is considered. These assessments are essential elements in clinical 
epidemiology, commonly referred to as “Critical appraisal” (see section 1.4 and the 
subsequent subsections for further descriptions of this).  
The fourth and last part of the definition is also an important extension of the other 
definitions, describing the end objective of clinical epidemiology, i.e., the application of 
scientific knowledge as a source of evidence to justify recommendations for or against 
clinical interventions concerning individual patients. These are the justifications that are 
central to the EBP clinician at the actual point of patient care (cf. Chapter 2).  
In the analysis above, I have addressed the first part of the definition. In the following 
sections, I will provide a more detailed presentation of the subsequent three parts of the 
definition – as expositions of what is characteristic of clinical epidemiology’s research 
methods (1.2.); its view on evidence in general, evidence-assessment, and evidence 
hierarchies (1.3); and the relation to EBP (1.4.). Together, this presentation will provide an 





1.2. Methods of clinical epidemiology 
 
Clinical epidemiology represents a prioritization of quantitative methods. These methods 
are used to answer different kinds of clinical questions, in relation to therapy, diagnosis, 
or prognosis of the patient. Therapy concerns questions about treatment; diagnosis 
relates to questions of identification of a disease or disorder; while prognosis concerns 
questions about recovery and of estimating a patient’s future course (cf. Guyatt et al. 
2015: 22).9 There are different methods deemed optimal for different questions, each 
designed to predict as precisely as possible which intervention would be most appropriate 
to recommend to individual patients.  
Clinical research methods can be divided into two main categories, experimental studies 
and observational studies. In experimental studies, investigators assign exposures (e.g., a 
treatment intervention) to participants of a study. In observational studies, investigators 
observe participants in usual clinical practice (cf. Grimes and Schultz 2002: 58). There are 
different kinds of studies belonging to both categories. 
In experimental studies, an exposure is assigned to participants by the investigators of the 
study, who manipulates the exposure under carefully controlled conditions. The 
experimental procedure (of either diagnostic, preventive, therapeutic, or palliative kind) 
is then compared to a control procedure to identify differences in outcomes between the 
two groups.  
                                                          
9 Interestingly, when Guyatt et.al 2015, proponents of both clinical epidemiology and EBM, describe the 
different clinical questions, they focus on the patient: Therapy is explained as “determining the effect of 
interventions on patient-important outcomes” (ibid: 22); diagnosis as “establishing the power of a test to 
differentiate between those with and without a target condition or disease” (ibid.); and prognosis as 
questions about “estimating a patient’s future course” (ibid.). Perhaps a more common way of describing 
the questions are by way of the disease or the intervention. See e.g. Dahlgren’s clinical quick reference 
[online]: Therapy: Questions of treatment in order to achieve some outcome. […]. Diagnosis: Questions of 
identification of a disorder in a patient presenting with specific symptoms. Prognosis: Questions of 
progression of a disease or likelihood of a disease occurring”.  
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There are two kinds of experimental studies, randomized and non-randomized trials, 
distinguished by whether the allocation of participants to exposures is assigned by a 
random technique or not. If the participants are randomly allocated to different treatment 
groups, it is a randomized controlled trial (RCT). RCT’s are considered the most efficient 
way of minimizing risk of bias in clinical research (see 1.4.1.1. for a presentation of bias in 
clinical research). Because of this, the RCT is considered the most reliable method of 
determining the effects of interventions. The RCT is often referred to as the gold standard 
of clinical research, in particular regarding therapeutic questions.10  
Observational studies are non-interventional: Instead of researchers interfering with the 
patient interventions, they observe the patients’ outcomes. Observational studies are 
either analytical or descriptive, depending on whether the study is comparative – that is, 
has a control group for comparison – or not. Descriptive studies are the only kind of clinical 
method that is not comparative (cf. Grimes and Schultz 2002: 58). Instead, such studies 
describe the frequency, natural history, or possible determinants of a condition (cf. ibid.).  
Observational studies are non-interventional: Instead of researchers interfering with the 
patient interventions, they observe the patients’ outcomes. Observational studies are 
either analytical or descriptive, depending on whether the study is comparative – that is, 
has a control group(s) for comparison – or not. Descriptive studies describe (instead of 
comparing) the frequency, natural history, or possible determinants of a condition (cf. 
Grimes and Schultz 2002: 58).  
                                                          
10 Generally, “gold standard” is refers to a certain method, test, measure, or procedure that is considered 
the best available (cf. Oleckno 2008: 584), and functions as a criterion by which scientific evidence is 
evaluated. There are thus different gold standards for different types of evidence, answering different 
kinds of clinical questions. For instance, in dentistry, the gold standard for diagnosing proximal carious 
lesions of posterior teeth (i.e. demineralization of the visible part of molars and premolars) has 
traditionally been regular examination by the dentist. New technology of micro computed tomography 
provided a more accurate diagnostic procedure, and thus replaced regular examination as the gold 
standard for diagnosing the lesions (cf. Cardoso et al. 2014).  
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In analytical observational studies, the investigators observe – rather than conduct an 
experiment with – a large number of people, usually by comparing (records of) patients 
who have received an intervention with similar patients who have not received the 
intervention. Inferences regarding patient exposures or outcomes are then made on the 
basis of these passive11 observations (cf. Howick 2011: 40).  
Observational research designs are cohort, case control, or cross-sectional studies. These 
designs differ depending on how the relation between exposure and outcome is 
examined: In a cohort study, investigators observe two or more populations receiving 
different treatments, and then compare the outcomes to detect differences in the effects 
of the treatments. Thus, cohort studies proceed from exposure to outcome, where 
treatment exposure is identified at the outset. In a case-control study, investigators select 
two or more patient groups that differ in the outcome of interest and observe whether 
their outcomes correlate with some exposure. Case-control studies thus start with an 
outcome, e.g., a disease, and search for exposures that might have caused the disease. 
Cross-sectional studies examine the occurrence of outcome and exposure at the same 
time, in which data concerning the whole population of interest is analysed at one point 
in time. 
What both experimental and observational study designs (except for descriptive studies) 
share in common is that they study the relationships between exposure (e.g. smoking or 
vaccination) and outcome (e.g. occurrence of lung cancer or of smallpox), on a certain 
population, with primary attention on identification and quantification of the relationship 
between intervention and outcome. Such methods may thus be characterized as 
outcome-based methods, where the outcomes, or effects, of health interventions (most 
typically of treatments) are observed directly.  
                                                          
11 The investigators’ observations are passive in that they neither allocate the patients nor administer the 
intervention (cf. Howick 2011: 40). 
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These research results are then used as a basis for determining whether a particular 
treatment option is effective – as evidence justifying recommendation of a similar 
treatment in clinical practice.  
 
1.2.1. Outcome-based methods and the demarcation of clinical epidemiology from 
traditional medicine 
The use of outcome-based data in clinical decision-making entails a radical shift from the 
traditional attention to pathophysiologic reasoning – that is, mechanical reasoning, 
concerned with the underlying pathophysiological mechanisms. Pathophysiologic 
reasoning focuses on “[i]nferences from (supposed) facts about the underlying 
pathophysiological and physiological mechanisms of health or disease to conclusions that 
a treatment will or will not have effects” (Howick: 2011: 16). An outcome-based method 
on the other hand, “[i]nvolves directly observing the putative outcome relative to the 
putative outcome produced by a control treatment” (Howick 2011: 16). 
The main difference between the two approaches is that outcome-based methods provide 
a direct empirical link from the results of the research to the application in clinical practice, 
whereas the former, pathophysiologic approach suggests an indirect link between 
research results and practice. For example, a doctor who recommends a particular drug 
to a patient suffering from myocardial infarction (heart attack), based on the supposed 
causal relation between the mechanism that caused the myocardial infarction and the 
mechanism of the action of the drug, would be practising pathophysiologic reasoning. On 
the other hand, a doctor who recommends against the same drug, based on clinical 
research results which demonstrates that there is a negative outcome in clinical trials in 




In clinical epidemiology, the use of outcome-based research is considered more efficient 
than basing clinical practice on pathophysiological research (or personal experience, for 
that matter) and then to infer that this mechanism is operating in the patient and will have 
an effect on the actual clinical outcome of an actual patient.  
The reorientation of clinical epidemiology toward the use of outcome-focused methods 
in clinical research and practice, entails a radical shift from the traditional mechanistic 
view in that attention to outcomes in principle is independent of the underlying 
pathophysiological mechanisms.12 This means that one does not need knowledge of the 
causal mechanism to decide whether an intervention is effective or not (cf. Lie, R. 2011: 
160). The main reason for the preference of outcome-based methods, in particular 
through the use of experimental methods such as RCTs, is that they provide empirical 
findings with the least amount of worries about non-observable events (e.g. non-
observable mechanisms). The implicated detachment from causal explanations on how 
the outcome is produced implies an extreme version of empiricism (cf. Lie, R. 2011: 160). 
As will be discussed in Chapter 3 and 4, the principles and application of outcome-based 
methods are highly controversial matters. 
To sum up, the demarcation of clinical epidemiology from traditional medicine is 
expressed through the use of outcome-based research, primarily concerning clinical 
studies of the effect of interventions on populations, and on this basis determining 
whether clinical interventions are effective or not for an individual patient. In clinical 
epidemiology (and to a very large degree in EBP as well; see Chapter 2), clinical research 
                                                          
12 A clarification is needed here: Diagnosis has underlying disorders as its object, but what is “underlying” 
here is quite different from “underlying mechanisms” operating on another level of the underlying sickness 
or disease. While the pathophysiological understanding is related to a certain mechanistic (e.g. cellular) 
level, the main diagnostic question in clinical epidemiology is concerned with neither what the disease is, 
nor what constitutes its symptoms. Instead, the question is how the disease is best diagnosed, which has 
to do with the outcome of the diagnosis (cf. Guyatt et al., 2015: 26). Furthermore, the object of diagnosis 
in clinical epidemiology has primarily to do with the quantifiable frequencies of underlying disorders; not 
of the disorders themselves (cf. ibid., 2015: 22ff). 
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is considered superior to both clinical experience and to knowledge of biological causes 
and mechanisms, taught in traditional medical education. (cf. Bohlin, I. &Sager, M., 2011: 
39). Thus, the reorientation of clinical epidemiology implies a break with what traditionally 
has been considered clinically relevant knowledge in patient care. 
However, one should be careful in dichotomizing too much here. Of course, clinical 
epidemiology does not call for discarding the use of pathophysiological mechanistic 
explanations (in EBP, such explanations are referred to as “background information” (cf. 
sections 2.1. and 2.4.2. below).13 In clinical research (e.g. in descriptive studies) and 
practice (e.g., in a physical examination), such explanations are considered necessary in 
many cases, but insufficient. In other cases, it is not considered necessary, e.g. in the case 
of interventions based on several RCTs, demonstrating the same findings, applicable to 
the patient. Pathophysiological mechanistic explanations are not necessary to justify such 
interventions. The attention is instead exclusively on what works in terms of the outcome, 
and not on how the intervention might produce this outcome. 
From these descriptions, there are two features in particular that differentiate clinical 
epidemiology from other health care sciences: Its aim, and the methods to reach this aim. 
Firstly, clinical epidemiology is characterized using epidemiological data applied to patient 
health care, providing the clinician the means to recommend and conduct patient care on 
a scientific basis. Secondly, it is characterized through comparative, outcome-based 
methods through which the data to be used in clinical practice is generated.  
These two features provide a basic understanding of the systematic, methodological 
framework of clinical epidemiology. Through this framework, scientific evidence is 
generated, thereby equipping the clinician with sufficient tools for providing patient care, 
for both choosing intervention strategies and recommending treatment in individual 
                                                          
13 I discuss “background information” in more detail in Chapter 2, in the sections 2.1. and 2.4.2.  
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patient health care. In the following section, I will examine the view of evidence in clinical 
epidemiology, with attention to how evidence is assessed. 
 
 
1.3. Evidence in clinical epidemiology 
 
In this section, I will examine how evidence is assessed in clinical epidemiology. In section 
1.1.4. above, I presented a four-partite definition of clinical epidemiology. Its first part – 
The use of scientific knowledge, aiming at determining whether clinical interventions are 
effective or not – has to do with the outcome-based research methods characteristic of 
clinical epidemiology. As such, this first part is clarified through section 1.2. The second 
part of the definition – to be assessed and applied in clinical health-care decision-making 
as evidence which justifies recommendations for or against interventions concerning 
individual patients – will be clarified in the following sections. Notably, the application of 
evidence in actual health-care decision-making falls outside the framework of clinical 
epidemiology. Instead, the assessment of evidence is assessment with respect to its 
application. The main objective of the present analysis is to examine what characterizes 
this assessment of evidence. Before I turn to this examination, however, an initial 
conceptual analysis of “evidence” is necessary. 
 
1.3.1. What is “evidence”? Some philosophical remarks 
In broad terms, “evidence” is anything presented as support of something else, usually by 
means of a propositional claim. To have evidence of something, then, is to have something 
that constitutes evidence of, or justifies, something else. Thus, evidence may be 
considered as a relational concept, through which a claim or an observation constitutes 
evidence in that it is used as support or warrant for another claim or observation. For 
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example, the claim stating that “a study concludes that classical acupuncture is more 
effective in pain relief than analgesics” may be used as evidence for the claim that 
“patients should be recommended acupuncture rather than analgesics in emergency pain 
management” (cf. Haneesh Murugesan, et al., 2017).  
The relational concept of “evidence” is mirrored in the most common philosophical 
minimal definition of “evidence” – as “that which justifies belief” (cf. Kelly 2016). From 
this definition, it follows that “evidence” is something you possess that is external to your 
belief and which justifies that particular belief. The “external” source of evidence (as that 
which justifies a certain belief) may refer either to a (mental) belief or to (physical) 
observable data.  
Evidence as a relational concept, defined as that which justifies belief, is a general 
characteristic applied to the following investigations of clinical epidemiology and of EBP. 
 
1.3.2. “Evidence” in clinical epidemiology  
When applied to health care practice, a justification referring to mental beliefs is typically 
denoted as “personal expertise”, while a justification referring to observable data typically 
relates to empirical (scientific) data. In clinical epidemiology (and in EBP) such data will 
typically refer to data from research literature. Reference to mental beliefs, e.g., the use 
of personal experience as evidence, on the other hand, is not a typical attribute of clinical 
epidemiology.14  
An essential question is what kind of things the evidence refers to in clinical epidemiology. 
In general, that which justifies belief is derived from clinical research studies, primarily the 
results of such studies. This is typically referred to as “external evidence” (e.g., Haynes et 
al. 2006: 162), referring to scientific research results derived from clinical studies.  
                                                          
14 However, such evidence is often included in EBM literature; cf. Chapter 2 below.  
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What, then, are research results derived from clinical studies about? As noted above, 
these are typically epidemiologic studies of the effect of interventions on populations. The 
main aim of such studies is to determine whether an intervention is clinically effective or 
not (e.g. based on knowledge provided from the results of an RCT about the average effect 
of a specific clinical intervention). Thus, evidence, as that which justifies belief, can be 
explained in clinical epidemiology as scientific, primarily epidemiological, research results 
of which the aim is to determine whether an intervention is effective or not (cf., the first 
part of the definition of clinical epidemiology in 1.1.4 above). 
However, the mere fact that a piece of evidence (e.g. empirical research) justifies a belief 
in that a certain intervention is clinically effective is by itself a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition on its own merit to constitute applicable evidence. In addition, the 
piece of evidence must be effective in clinical practice, for the actual clinical decision-
making (cf., the two latter parts of the definition in 1.1.4). This has to do with what 
evidence in clinical epidemiology is for. 
As stated above, clinical epidemiology’s main aim is to improve clinical performance. This 
improvement is provided by basing clinical decision-making on evidence that an 
intervention is clinically effective. Any evidence in clinical epidemiology is constituted by 
some data that affects the belief, directly or indirectly, in a hypothesis that a certain 
intervention is clinically effective. Thus, there is only evidence if it affects clinical decision-
making. For example: A systematic review of RCTs concerning the outcome of a certain 
intervention on a patient-group is only evidence when it is considered as the justificatory 
basis for an actual clinical decision-making regarding a particular patient. 
In sum, “evidence” in clinical epidemiology refers to “scientific, primarily epidemiological 
research result(-s),15 aiming at determining whether an intervention is effective or not, 
                                                          
15 In both clinical epidemiology and EBP literature, it is common to refer to “evidence” as “(scientific) 
research” in general (e.g., Haynes et al. 2006) and EBP (e.g., Straus et al. 2011), without a clear distinction 
34 
 
which justifies beliefs in hypotheses about clinical effectiveness for clinical decision-




1.4. Assessment of evidence 
 
The following section is an examination of the framework for assessing methods and 
evidence in clinical epidemiology (cf. the third part of the definition in 1.1.4.). In clinical 
epidemiology and EBM-literature, this is commonly referred to as “Critical appraisal”, 
referring to the process of systematically assessing the outcome of scientific research in 
terms of trustworthiness, value and relevance in a particular context (cf. cebma.org). 
These formal criteria serve as the basis on which the content of both Critical appraisal and 
the evidence hierarchies are construed.  
The following examination of evidence-assessment in clinical epidemiology is four-fold: 
Firstly, I will examine the formal criteria of evidence assessment (1.4.1), before I turn to a 
general description of Critical appraisal (1.4.2.) and to the hierarchies of evidence (1.4.3.). 
Based on these examinations, I will add some concluding remarks on clinical 
epidemiology’s view pertaining to evidence (1.4.4.). 
 
                                                          
between the research result and the research study (including its research-methods) generating this result. 
I consider this unclear distinction in the literature a product of imprecision rather than in conflict with my 
definition.  
I find it uncontroversial to differentiate between “research study” and “evidence” in this way: “Evidence” 
is the end-result of the research, whereas the “research study” is constitutive for this product. As I will 
investigate in detail in the following sections, the quality of the evidence is a question of the content and 
methodological rigor of the research.  
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1.4.1 Criteria for assessing quality of evidence: internal and external validity 
The methodological features constitute essential characteristics necessary for an 
adequate understanding of clinical epidemiology. The focus of attention, however, is not 
on the research results themselves, but on the explicit assessment of the quality of the 
research studies and of the evidence generated from these. “Quality of evidence” is an 
often-used term both in clinical epidemiology (e.g., Haynes et al. 2006) and EBP (e.g., 
Straus et al. 2011; Atkins, D. et al. 2004)., and refers to two specific criteria: (1) the degree 
of confidence that the research data are correct, and (2) the degree of generalizability 
(often synonymously referred to as applicability, relevance, and usefulness) of the 
research data to clinical practice. The common terminology for these criteria is “internal 
validity” and “external validity”, respectively.  
According to the Cochrane handbook, “validity” generally “[h]as to do with whether the 
instrument is measuring what it is intended to measure” (Higgins and Green 2011). 
Internal validity concerns the trustworthiness of the evidence, and external validity refers 
to its usefulness16 in clinical practice. The question of the effectiveness of an intervention 
in clinical practice is ultimately a question of external validity but requires that the 
evidence exhibits internal validity at the outset. Thus, external validity is only relevant to 
assess if and only if the study in question is internally valid. Together, internal and external 
validity constitute the assessment of the quality of the evidence, both in clinical 
epidemiology and EBP. Evidence is often referred to as exhibiting high or low quality, 
depending on the degree to which the evidence at hand fulfils the criteria of validity.  
 
                                                          
16 In the following I will apply “usefulness” as a generic term, referring to three specific elements: 
“generalizability”, “applicability”, and “usability”. While “generalizability” and “applicability are inherent 
properties in the conceptual construct of “external validity”, “usability” is external to “validity” and the 
scientific framework of clinical epidemiology. Instead, “usability”, in my usage of the term, refers to 
assessment of evidence with regard to patient preferences and circumstances at the point of patient care. 
I will describe “usability” in more detail in section 2.2., as a necessary element to the assessment of 
evidence in the practice of EBP.  
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1.4.1.1. Internal validity and bias 
Internal validity refers to the degree to which we can be confident that the study is well 
conducted. In this context, “well conducted” means that the research is done in an orderly 
fashion, according to methodological criteria, so that the results are trustworthy. It 
consists in following transparent methodological criteria, primarily based on a scientific 
framework of epidemiology and statistics and extended to social science research and 
qualitative research when the clinical question demands it. 
The degree of internal validity in research results is often described relative to the degree 
of risk of bias.17 For instance, the Users’ Guide states that “[s]tudies that have higher 
internal validity have a lower likelihood of bias/systematic error” (Guyatt et al. 2015: 660). 
Bias refers to systematic errors, or “deviation from the truth” (cf. Sackett 1979), in results 
or inferences (cf. Higgins and Green 2011). 
In principle, internal validity can refer to any factor that may cause misleading study 
results. Such factors may be random errors, which happen by chance, or systematic errors, 
tending in a specific direction (cf. Guyatt et al. 2015: 104). While random errors can be 
minimized by larger sample sizes (cf. ibid.), systematic errors require more nuanced 
solutions that differ depending on the specific type of error and the methods used (e.g., 
misleading information due to flawed selection or errors in allocation of patients in a 
                                                          
17 It is important to note that measurement of the “degree of bias” has to do with “risk of bias”. As Blunt 
(2015) notes, “For [internal] validity to be a useful construct, it must be defined instead as justifiable 
confidence in the absence of (serious) bias in study-results. That is, [internal] validity is a measure not of 
bias but of risk of bias” (cf. Blunt 2015: 55). Furthermore, no study is free of bias; measurements of bias in 
a study are usually approximations. For instance, The Cochrane Handbook for Systematic Reviews of 
Interventions (Higgins and Green 2011: 188) demonstrates this point when stating that “It is usually 
impossible to know to what extent biases have affected the results of a particular study”. Elsewhere in the 
literature, however, internal validity of a study is often defined as “[t]he extent to which it is free from 
bias” (e.g., Higgins et al. 2011: 890). Such a description is inaccurate, due to the fact that it is usually 
impossible to know to what extent the study is “free from bias”. A more accurate description would be 
“the extent to which the study has a reduced risk of bias”.  
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study). It is these systematic errors that are important in the following presentation of 
“bias” as a challenge to internal validity. 
Most literature addressing bias in clinical research focusses on comparative methods that 
measure associations between two variables – an intervention (or exposure) and an 
outcome (cf. 1.2. above). A comparative research design entails that a certain population 
sample (e.g. group of patients) are allocated to two (or more) groups – one “study group” 
receiving the intervention under investigation, and one “control group” receiving either a 
placebo or another intervention. The outcomes of both groups are then compared. A 
prerequisite for mitigating bias in comparative studies is that “participants in both groups 
[…] should be similar in all characteristics except for the intervention being studied” (Attia 
2005: 259).  
The main appeal of randomized studies in clinical epidemiology is their presumed ability 
to minimize types of biases and confounding factors. Compared with randomized studies, 
observational studies are considered more prone to bias and to confounding factors. 
Potential biases in clinical research are numerous, and a full presentation of these exceeds 
the scope of the current analysis.18 For the purpose of the current examination and for 
the analysis of the EBP debate below (Chapters 3 and 4), allocation bias and confounding 
factors are most central. In the following, I will provide a short description of allocation 
bias and confounding factors, before I turn to the reasons for which randomized trials, 
and RCTs in particular, are considered the best methodological designs for mitigating 
allocation bias and confounding factors. 
 
                                                          
18 For instance, Chavalarias and Ionnades (2009) identify 235 kinds of biases. It is common in much of the 
literature to divide specific kinds of biases into a few standardized main categories. Chavalarias and 
Ionnades suggest a tripartite categorization: selection bias, information bias, and confounding (ibid: 1213). 




Allocation bias involves the systematic difference in how participants are assigned to 
treatment- and comparison groups in a trial, resulting in unequal distribution of patient- 
and disease features between groups, and may include any differences between the 
groups under comparison, other than the treatment itself, that can influence the outcome 
of the study (cf. Catalogue of bias collaboration 2018; La Caze: 2009: 518). Allocation bias 
occurs when recruiters selectively enrol patients in the trial based on what the next 
treatment allocation is likely to be. For example, the recruiter may allocate patients with 
a better prognosis to one of the groups, thereby skewing the research result. 
Consequently, the result of the study would be poor, demonstrating a high degree of risk 
of bias, and thus exhibiting low internal validity.  
 
Confounding factors  
In addition, closely related to risk of bias in clinical studies, there are “confounding 
factors”, or “confounders”, through which the effects of interventions are ‘confounded’ 
by extraneous factors (cf. Herbert et al. 2005: 20). “Extraneous factors” are factors that 
are unrelated to the experimental intervention, but which may affect the outcome of the 
study. Examples of common confounding factors are natural recovery (leading to the 
patient’s condition resolving independently of the intervention) and placebo effects 
(where the ritual of intervention rather than the intervention itself produces effects). 
Together, all types of bias and confounders entail factors that are unbalanced between 
the comparison-groups and have an effect on the outcomes measured, producing 
                                                          
19 In clinical epidemiology and EBP literature, “selection bias” is sometimes used instead of “allocation 
bias”, specifically referring “[t]o selection of patients into treatment arms” (Paludan-Müller et.al. 2016: 2). 
Within epidemiologic literature, however, “selection bias” refers more broadly to selection of a non-
representative population into a study (cf. ibid.). 
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imbalances in the study and thereby contributing to deviations that may lead to over- or 
under-estimations of the effects of interventions.  
Specifically, a confounder has an impact as a “[d]istortion that modifies an association 
between an exposure and an outcome because a factor is independently associated with 
the exposure and the outcome” (Catalogue of bias collaboration 2018). For instance, in a 
study examining whether coffee drinking (factor A) causes pancreatic cancer (disease B), 
it could be that smoking (factor X) may be a risk factor for disease B, modifying the 
outcome, but not accounted for in the study.20 Thus, smoking – as a confounding factor – 
would make it appear that there is an association between the exposure and the outcome 
even when there is no true association between factor A and disease B. In this way, any 
confounding factor can provide a potential alternative explanation for the result of a 
clinical problem (cf. Howick 2011: 36) – by modifying the association between the 
exposure (coffee drinking) and outcome (pancreatic cancer) of that result. To the extent 
to which these confounding factors occur as systematic errors, they are to be regarded as 
sources of bias.21 
 
1.4.1.1.1. Randomization as the best way to mitigate risk of bias in clinical research 
Methodologically, the most significant feature in comparative trials is that of 
randomization. Whereas observational studies tend to suffer from these kinds of biases, 
comparative randomized trials are purportedly designed to minimize risk of these kinds of 
biases. In this sub-section, I will examine the basis for the claim that randomization is the 
best way to mitigate risk of bias in clinical research. 
                                                          
20 This example is partly based on a PowerPoint-presentation by Kaur 2014. 
21 Formally, a confounding factor exhibits three necessary properties: (1) The factor potentially affects the 
outcome; (2) the factor is unequally distributed between experimental and control groups; (3) the factor 




Methods of randomization when allocating participants to groups, i.e. by distributing 
participants either to a test intervention or a placebo intervention by chance (e.g. by coin-
tossing)22 is said to minimize, or indeed eliminate, the risk of allocation bias and of 
confounding factors (cf. Howick 2011: 43). The basic idea is that when a random allocation 
method is used to allocate people to receive either the experimental intervention or the 
control intervention, neither assessors nor study-participant have any influence over the 
subject who will receive the experimental intervention. In contrast, non-random methods 
of group assignment, e.g., when alternating subjects between one group and the other, 
may cause a breach in the allocation concealment, and thus increase the risk of the same 
kinds of biases (as well as other kinds, such as performance bias; cf. ibid.).  
In principle, however, randomization may be subverted be investigators or participants 
who may be able to decipher the random allocation sequence, which in turn opens for an 
increased risk of bias. Another central feature of randomized trials, namely “blinding”, 
prevents this from occurring. Randomized studies can be concealed by either single 
blinding (in which the participants are not informed of their treatment allocation) or 
double blinding (in which neither the participants nor the researchers know which 
participants belong to which groups). Double blinding contributes towards reducing the 
potential influence from various confounding factors that arise from the knowledge of 
which participants are receiving the experimental intervention (cf. ibid: 46f). A double-
blind RCT is considered the best study design with regard to minimizing the risk of 
allocation bias and confounders in clinical studies. 
While both randomization and blinding are important features, the essential feature of 
RCT – as its name ostensibly refers to – is its ability to randomize. The method of the RCT 
                                                          
22 Coin-tossing is a simple and often used example to demonstrate the inclusion of chance in the 
procedure. In usual practice other procedures are more common, e.g. the use of envelopes containing 
randomly generated instructions pertaining to assignment of individual patients to specific groups (cf. 
Howick 2011: 43).  
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aims to reduce certain sources of bias when testing the effectiveness of an intervention 
by randomly allocating test subjects to two or more groups, treating the two groups 
differently, and then comparing them with regard to the effects of the intervention. It is 
this random allocation that is commonly deemed to be the main advantage of the RCT 
when compared to other research designs.  
As described above, each confounding factor provides a potential alternative explanation 
for the result of a clinical problem. Through the random allocation of patients to different 
groups, comparability of the groups is assured, by preventing, or at least mitigating, 
confounding of the effects of the intervention due to differences between the groups. 
Thus, randomization is considered the best way to reduce the risk of confounding (cf. 
Catalogue of bias collaboration 2018).23  
To describe it more accurately, randomization is said to provide the basis for the equal 
distribution of potential confounders between the study groups that may affect results in 
treatment groups and control groups (e.g., Kuntz et al. 2008; Straus et al. 2011). “Equal” 
in this context means that the potential confounders are evenly distributed among the 
comparison-groups, so that they are balanced with regard to the comparison to be made. 
The claim has been stated even more patently, i.e. that randomization controls for 
confounders, both known and unknown (e.g. ibid; Kuntz et al. 2008: 3), and that 
randomization “balances the groups for confounders that we haven’t identified yet!” 
                                                          
23 In addition to randomization, there are several other means by which to prevent the risk of confounding, 
including stratification and statistical adjustments (cf. ibid.). While these additional means are important 
aspects of clinical epidemiology methodology, they are not as central to the current analysis, nor to the 




(Straus et al. 2011: 187). There is no other research design that exhibits this purported 
ability.24  
In sum, randomization provides the means to keep study groups as similar as possible at 
the outset, thus enabling the investigators to isolate and quantify the effect of the 
interventions they are studying and to control for other factors. The allocation of patients 
into comparison groups occurs independently of both researcher and patients, thus 
mitigating several potential biases, such as allocation-bias as well as confounding factors. 
The internal validity of a study is directly related to these considerations: To the extent a 
clinical study manages to mitigate the risk of confounding factors and biases, it is 
considered internally valid. Provided that a study exhibits a sufficient degree of internal 
validity, the study can then be assessed for external validity. 
 
1.4.1.2. External validity 
To exhibit external validity, the results of the study must be generalizable to other settings 
and patients (cf. Haynes et al. 2006: 8). External validity measures the degree to which the 
results are representative and applicable to the individual patient in the actual clinical 
context. The main focus is on the degree to which the study in general, and its patient-
important outcomes in particular, are generalizable and applicable to a patient in clinical 
practice. It is important that the research study is designed and reported in such a way 
that it allows clinicians to assess the degree to which the results could reasonably be 
applied to an individual patient (cf. Rothwell 2007: 61f).25 
                                                          
24 The confidence in RCTs in general, and the purported ability of randomization to balance for both known 
and unknown confounders in particular, is a controversial aspect in clinical epidemiology (and EBP) 
methodology. I will come back to these matters when analyzing the EBP debate, in 3.2.3 below. 
25 These considerations are often considered in conjunction with the “strength-of-recommendation” of 
the evidence, which has to do with how strongly the intervention can be recommended to the patient. 
The strength of recommendation is graded based on (1) previous assessment of evidence quality and (2) 
the ratio of benefits and harms. Specifically, (2) concerns uncertainty about three factors in particular: the 
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For instance, if the inclusion criteria (e.g., age or sex) for those people who participated in 
an RCT (i.e., the study population) are dissimilar to a patient in clinical practice (i.e., the 
target population), the external validity would be regarded as weak.26 
Ideally, this evidence consists of a summary of several RCTs, answering a clinical question 
identical to the relevant clinical practice scenario, in which the target population exhibits 
identical eligibility criteria (e.g. patient characteristics such as age, gender, and ethnicity; 
and disease-characteristics such as co-morbidity) compared with as in the study 
population (e.g., concerning age, gender, ethnicity, etc.). In such a case, the question of 
external validity is straightforward, and the external validity would be considered strong. 
To the extent that the clinical question and the study population differ from the target 
population (e.g., an individual patient in an actual clinical scenario), the external validity 
of the study is lower.  
In the clinical epidemiology and EBP literature, external validity is often equated with 
terms like applicability, extrapolation, generalizability, relevance, transferability, and 
usefulness. In comparison to the explicit content of “internal validity”, “external validity” 
is more complex, with several overlapping determinants that are not easy to separate in 
an adequate manner (cf. Rothwell 2009). When assessing the external validity of a 
research study, there are several determining factors that may influence the degree of 
external validity of the study.27 Four central factors are: 
                                                          
balance between desirable and undesirable effects; uncertainty or variability in values and preferences of 
the patient; and uncertainty about whether the intervention represents a sound use of external resources 
(e.g., finances) (cf. Guyatt et al. 2008b: 926).  
26 It should be noted that the discussions of external validity vary considerably in relation to the methods 
used. In a systematic review of RCTs, of, say, the testing of a drug to a mass population, the problem of 
external validity is solved statistically, by comparing the test-groups to a total population. By contrast, 
assessment of the result of a phenomenological case study description of a patient’s experience of her 
own illness, is at best only suggestive as to how similar patients are to be understood. 
27 The following presentation of external validity is based partially on Dekkers et al. 2009 and Murad et al. 
2018. However, there are some discrepancies between these sources, making them incompatible in 
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 (1) The extent to which the study population is representative of the target population, 
in terms of sample selection and sample size of the study population (which should be 
“sufficiently large”, selected randomly when possible) and consist of a heterogeneous 
population (homogeneity will not suffice for the study to be generalizable to an “average” 
person). 
(2) The extent to which the study population is representative of the target population, in 
terms of eligibility criteria whereby potential study subjects are included or excluded. For 
instance, the research study must be assessed as to whether the conclusion in a study can 
be generalized to a target population that does not meet all the eligibility criteria (cf. 
Dekkers et al. 2009: 92). 
(3) The extent to which the research results can be applied in a different treatment setting 
(other than in the study). Dekkers et al. refers to this through the question of “[w]hether 
the research results are valid for patients to whom results are generalizable but who are 
in a different treatment setting than the original study population” (Dekkers et al. 90). For 
example, differences in treatment settings (e.g., availability of diagnostic procedures or of 
technological equipment; or with regard to the difference between routine treatment and 
study treatment), administrative policies, or availability of health care expertise in 
different countries or cities may influence treatment results, and contribute to a lower 
degree of applicability of the research result. 
(4) The extent to which the outcomes of the study are considered important to the target 
population (e.g. the individual patient). Some research studies include “patient-oriented 
                                                          
certain regards. The initial distinction that Dekkers et al. make between “external validity” and 
applicability” contrasts with that of Murad et al., who distinguish between “generalizability” and 
“applicability”. I apply the distinction of Murad et al. Another incompatibility between the two is that 
Dekkers et al. distinguish between eligibility criteria and treatment setting (placed in “external validity” 
and “applicability” respectively). Conversely, Murad et al. subsume both eligibility criteria and treatment 
setting within “applicability”, attributing to “generalizability” a strictly statistical concept based on 
statistical sample theory. Regarding this distinction, I follow the distinction of Dekkers et al., subsuming 
eligibility criteria under “generalizability”, and treatment setting under “applicability”.  
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evidence”, or “patient-important outcomes”, which measure outcomes that matter to 
patients: morbidity, mortality, symptom improvement, and quality of life (cf. Ebell et .al. 
2004).28 Assessment of external validity in this case would consist in examining whether 
the study results demonstrate improvements that are considered relevant to the specific 
target population.  
Factors (1) and (2) are often referred to as “generalizability” (e.g., Dekkers et al. 2009; 
Rothwell 2007; 2009). “Generalizability” concerns how confidently we can transfer the 
results from a study population to the target population. The degree to which we can be 
confident in a study’s generalizability is assessed by examining the representativeness of 
the study population to the general target population, in terms of sample selection and 
sample size of the study population (cf. Murad et al. 2018), as well as the eligibility criteria.  
Factors (3), and (4) are often referred to as “applicability” (cf. Dekkers et al. 2009), having 
to do with particularizing or individualizing the research results to the patient (cf. Glasziou 
et al. 1999: 33). More precisely, the question of applicability has to do with the question 
of “[w]hether the research results are valid for patients to whom results are generalizable 
but who are in a different treatment setting than the original study population” (Dekkers 
et al. 90). It is also a question of whether the patient-important outcomes are relevant to 
the patient.  
Consequently, assessment of external validity can assess a study to be of strong 
generalizability (e.g. conducted with rigorous sampling from a population with strict and 
distinct inclusion criteria) but still be considered to have poor applicability (e.g. when the 
                                                          
28 These considerations are explicitly included in the “strength-of-recommendation” of the evidence, 
which has to do with how strongly the intervention can be recommended to the patient. The strength of 
recommendation is graded on basis of (1) previous assessment of evidence quality and (2) the ratio of 
benefits and harm (including assessment of whether the evidence is patient-oriented) (cf. Guyatt et al. 
2008b: 926).  
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setting is different, or the patient-important outcomes are unclear, which could make it 
difficult to apply the results in clinical practice). 
Epidemiologic research literature varies with regard to the extent to which these factors 
are included in the research study, and to whether these factors are reported in an 
adequate manner. To the extent that they are lacking or poorly reported, it is up to the 
clinician to make judgments concerning the external validity of a particular piece of 
research evidence.  
The question of the external validity of research evidence when assessing it for application 
to the individual patient in clinical practice is an integral part of evidence-assessment. 
Considerations of both internal and external validity are to be considered necessary 
elements of the critical appraisal-scheme.  
 
1.4.2. Critical appraisal 
The criteria for assessment of evidence quality also constitutes the core of the Critical 
appraisal-schemes. Critical appraisal is an important feature of clinical epidemiology, both 
methodologically and historically. Historically, clinical epidemiology was introduced as a 
new scientific basis for both problem-based education and production of literature 
(Sackett et al. 1985), focusing on training the student’s ability to independently seek and 
critically appraise the relevant research results to specific clinical problems, regarding 
diagnosis, prognosis, and therapy.  
As such, Critical appraisal schemes serve as guides for clinical decision-making, equipping 
clinicians with tools for independent and efficient assessment of sources of evidence, and 
then application of the evidence in clinical practice (thus fulfilling the two last parts of the 
definition of “clinical epidemiology” above). 
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An important implication of the introduction of critical appraisal schemes, as well as of 
using the levels of evidence (see the following section below), is that the practice of 
clinicians who follow them becomes standardized, thereby minimizing the problem of 
unwanted variation of interventions, and thus reducing ineffective treatment.29  
Critical appraisal serves as a method by which to assess the evidence in health care 
practice, by way of explicating certain “inference rules for clinical decision-making” (cf. 
Sackett 1989b), or later, when presented as an integral part of EBP, as “[t]he application 
of formal rules of evidence in evaluating the clinical literature” (Guyatt et al., 1992: 2420). 
The “formal rules” coincide with the criteria for evidence-assessment presented above. In 
line with the definition of “evidence” (1.3.2.) and the principles of assessment of evidence 
(1.4.1.), one could redefine Critical appraisal as a kind of formalized way of justifying 
beliefs with regard to hypotheses about clinical effectiveness for clinical decision-making, 
by applying principles of evidence assessment developed from clinical epidemiology.  
Critical appraisal-schemes forms were developed to guide students and clinicians in 
appraising evidence in an efficient manner. The illustration below serves as an example of 







                                                          














The questions in the upper half of the form (with exception of the second question)30 
concern questions of usefulness (referring to strength of evidence) on the basis of 
assessment of validity (referring to the quality of evidence).  
The illustration also demonstrates the close relationship between critical appraisal and 
the view of evidence in clinical epidemiology: The last four questions (marked in blue) 
concern the kind of research design that has generated the evidence in question. If the 
evidence generated is not based on the specific research designs of clinical epidemiology, 
the article is principally discarded. The questions referring to “gold standard”, “strong 
                                                          
30 The second question differs substantially from the other by being directed towards the authors behind 
the study, rather than the study itself. The idea seems to be that a good track record implies better quality 
of the studies produced by the authors. Assessment of authors are removed in later developments of 
appraisal forms.  
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causation”, and “randomization” have to do with criteria of internal validity of the studies, 
as necessary conditions for continuing reading the study at all.  
The critical appraisal form has been developed into various versions in the EBP literature, 
but the core components of the assessment, based on the principles of assessment 
developed in clinical epidemiology, remain unchanged.  
 
1.4.3. Evidence hierarchies  
 Gordon Guyatt, a prominent figure in both clinical epidemiology and EBP, states that “Not 
all evidence is equal, and a set of principles can identify more vs less trustworthy 
evidence” (Guyatt et al. 2015:16). Through these principles, evidence is ranked high or low 
according to whether they are considered valid. In this section, I will present the 
hierarchical structure of ranking evidence as a central feature of clinical epidemiology. 
A hierarchy of evidence can be defined as “[a] system of classifying and organizing types 
of evidence” (Guyatt et al. 2015: 658). The classification and organization are conducted 
according to assessments of the quality and strength of evidence. Typically, evidence is 
assessed with regard to (1) risk of bias and measurement of outcome, concerning both 
the accuracy of the measurement and the ability to demonstrate a large effect size (cf. 
internal validity); and (2) whether the research results are applicable to clinical practice 
(cf. external validity). As such, hierarchies function as a particular kind of appraisal tool. 
The main intention is similar to Critical appraisal forms, namely, to guide clinical decision-
making. By referring to a hierarchy of evidence, the clinician is able to seek the highest-
quality evidence source available to guide her in making clinical decisions.  
There are several kinds of hierarchies, for example singular studies (often in combination 
with systematic reviews of several single studies; e.g. Guyatt and Rennie 2002), 
aggregated studies (e.g. 6S-system by Haynes et al.: 2001), and methodologies (e.g., 
Sackett, D.L. 1981b: 986). Common to all of these is the fact that they rank evidence-
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sources according to internal validity. Some hierarchies, like GRADE, rank evidence 
according to external validity as well.31  
There are also different hierarchies for different clinical questions. For instance, in 
hierarchies ranking evidence sources for therapeutic questions, the RCT (or summaries of 
several RCTs) are ranked highest; in hierarchies for prognostic questions, observational 
studies are typically placed on top (cf. Guyatt et al., 2015: 10).  
Initially, the evidence-hierarchies were presented as “levels of evidence”. This was 
originally described in a report by the Canadian Task Force on the Periodic Health 
Examination in 1979 (Canadian task force 1979). The hierarchy was presented as follows: 
 
(Source: Burns et al. 2011) 
In this hierarchy, evidence sources are ranked with regard to their assumed ability to 
answer therapeutic questions, i.e., they are rated according to degrees of confidence in 
the estimates of the effects of health care interventions. RCTs are ranked at the highest 
level and expert opinions at the lowest level, according to susceptibility of bias. As 
discussed above, the RCT is typically viewed as the best available evidence because its 
                                                          
31 According to Blunt (2015), there are no hierarchies that rank evidence explicitly with respect to external 
validity, only to applicability, which technically refers to evidence strength (of recommendation), and not 
to evidence quality (of validity) (cf. 1.4.1.2. above). As I stress in 1.4.1.2., the difference between external 
validity and the strength of recommendation is not always clear-cut in the literature. Blunt seems to agree 
with this when he states that when the term ‘applicability’ is used with regard to hierarchies, it “might be 
used to mean external validity” (Blunt 2015: 56).  
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design is considered less prone to a risk of systematic errors than other kinds of evidence 
sources.  
Until recently, there were no defined hierarchical structures accounting for evidence in a 
more nuanced way. From 2008, GRADE (Grading of Recommendations Assessment, 
Development and Evaluation) has been dealing with this issue. Within GRADE, there is the 
same tendency to prioritize the method of RCT as in the model above, but in a more 
complex assessment of ranking evidence relative to a treatment’s putative effects, 
weighing properties of RCTs and Observational studies against each other.  
GRADE offers a two-step process to assess the evidence: (1) An initial ranking is ascribed, 
based on methodology. GRADE only includes RCTs and observational studies and ascribes 
a “high quality” grade to RCTs and a “low quality” grade to observational studies. (2) 
Secondary criteria are assessed, which allows the quality of the evidence to be up-graded 
(e.g., by large and/or consistent effects) or down-graded (e.g., by risk of bias, 
inconsistency and/or imprecision), and assigned a “high”, “moderate”, “low”, or “very 
low” rating (cf. Howick 2011: 29f). For instance, an RCT would be down-graded to “very 
low” if high risk of bias and imprecision occur, and an observational study may be up-
graded to “high” if it demonstrates large effects. Based on this ranking system, the 
clinician is able to decide whether to recommend using the treatment in question, given 
the balance of effects on the outcomes of interest (cf. Blunt 2015: 47).  
Expanding upon La Caze’s (2008) concept of “categorical interpretation of hierarchies”, I 
will differentiate between “categorical” and “non-categorical” interpretations of 
hierarchies. A categorical interpretation of a hierarchy refers to the notion that evidence 
ranked higher up in the hierarchy always trumps evidence ranked further down the scale. 
In such interpretations, results from top-ranked evidence sources are always considered 
superior to the results of evidence sources from further down the hierarchy, relative to 
methodological considerations exclusively. The Canadian task force hierarchy (see figure 
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above) is an example of such an interpretation, in which the “type of evidence” is ranked 
according to methodological considerations, where level-I evidence is categorically 
superior to level II and III. Conversely, a non-categorical interpretation of a hierarchy 
refers to the notion that evidence ranked higher up in the hierarchy does not always trump 
evidence ranked further down. 32 In non-categorical interpretations, there are other 
conditions in addition to the methodology that are considered when ranking evidence 
sources. GRADE is an example of a non-categorical interpretation: While the initial ranking 
is based on methodological criteria alone (corresponding to a categorical interpretation), 
the secondary up-and-down criteria provide additional conditions to the hierarchical 
ranking of evidence sources. In the following, I will describe such non-categorical 
interpretations as “conditional interpretations” of hierarchies.33  
The developments of hierarchies are more commonly associated with EBP than with 
clinical epidemiology literature, and the hierarchical view of evidence is indeed a key 
feature of EBP (cf. 2.2 below). A central point in my thesis is to demonstrate that the 
principles of evidence assessment upon which the hierarchies are built are based on the 
specific view of evidence of clinical epidemiology. In the following subsection, I will 
conclude by summing up clinical epidemiology’s view of evidence.  
 
1.4.4. Clinical epidemiology’s view on evidence  
Clinical epidemiology’s stance on evidence may be said to represent a principle of 
“outcome is everything”, thereby separating useful outcome-based research from any 
other kind of research to be applied in clinical decision-making. Less useful information in 
                                                          
32 While La Caze describes categorical interpretations in a similar manner as I do above (La Caze 2008: 1), 
he does not provide a description of non-categorical interpretations. However, he describes the GRADE 
system as a response to the limited criteria of categorical interpretations (ibid., 18), suggesting 
characteristics similar to those I attribute to non-categorical and conditional interpretation of hierarchies.  
33 The differentiation between “categorical interpretations” and “conditional interpretations” are inspired 
by, but not identical to, Blunt’s (2015) use of these terms. 
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this context consists of mechanistic reasoning, the main focus in traditional physiology 
and pathophysiology.  
Research-knowledge is applied in order to determine whether an intervention is effective 
or not, which in turn justifies beliefs with regard to hypotheses about clinical effectiveness 
for clinical decision-making. As a prerequisite for this application, evidence sources are 
assessed according to criteria for evaluating the validity and strength of the evidence. In 
particular, evidence is assessed in terms of risk of bias and applicability to clinical practice. 
Evidence hierarchies are used for explicating the evidence assessments through which 
evidence sources are ranked relative to the degree of confidence they provide in 
estimating accuracy and/or effects of health care interventions. Through formal rules of 
evidence appraisal and through the hierarchies, the clinician can seek out the highest 
quality evidence available to guide their clinical decision (cf. Guyatt et al. 2015: 11).  
The criteria by which evidence is assessed hierarchically do not, however, imply that 
evidence considered to be of less quality (such as mechanistic evidence) is non-valid. The 
typical clinical epidemiologist’s claim would be that mechanistic evidence ranks below 
outcome research, in particular due to less rigorous and transparent methods (i.e. internal 
validity) and less attention to relevant outcomes in clinical practice (i.e. external validity). 
It may still be valid information, but with higher susceptibility of bias.34 
Within clinical epidemiology, in particular regarding therapy, information provided from 
mechanistic evidence sources are most often considered less relevant. The primary 
concern in clinical epidemiology is attention to the outcome of treatments as the basis 
upon which recommendations of treatment are justified. In cases where information from 
                                                          
34 Within the literature of EBM, mechanistic, pathophysiological reasoning is often referred to as 
“background information”, concerning necessary but insufficient knowledge the practitioner needs to 
understand “foreground information”, which typically refers to outcome-based research knowledge, 
directly related to the actual clinical issue. I find it reasonable to assume that this way of thinking is 
inherent in clinical epidemiology as well.  
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RCTs are not available, the clinical epidemiologist should provide such research. In the 
meantime, other available evidential information belonging further down the hierarchy of 
evidence should be used. Thus, the hierarchy of evidence doesn’t exclude research 
evidence other than RCT’s, but the RCT is explicitly set as the standard against which any 
other information is compared. This is clearly demonstrated in the method of RCT as the 
gold standard method of answering questions about therapy. 
The view on evidence as described above represents clinical epidemiology’s core idea of 
the use of clinical research: The development and use of methods regarding the results 
(the outcome of interventions) of quantitative studies of populations, to be assessed 
through explicit evidence criteria. Critical appraisal of evidence is considered a 
fundamental resource in clinical practice, as justification for clinical effectiveness, 
concerning decision-making hypotheses about questions as to whether an intervention 
works. This is the content which constitutes, to use Sackett’s words,” the revolutionary” 






1.5. Clinical epidemiology and evidence-based medicine 
 
In 1981, the central teachings of Critical appraisal were published as a seven-part article 
series entitled “How to read clinical journals” (Sackett 1981a; 1981b). During the following 
years, Sackett and others published several publications of different aspects of the 
method of critical appraisals for different study designs. The first publication of EBM 
(Evidence-Based Medicine Working Group 1992), with its focus on “the application of 
formal rules of evidence in evaluating the clinical literature” may be read as the final 
publication of this series (cf. Zimerman 2013). 
From these remarks, it is reasonable to claim that EBM, and EBP, grew out of clinical 
epidemiology in general, and out of critical appraisal in particular (cf. Smith and Rennie: 
2014). This does not mean, however, that EBP is reducible to its origins, a conclusion that 
resonates with Sackett’s own view: 
As more and more clinicians, armed with the strategies and tactics of clinical 
epidemiology, cared for more and more patients, they began to evolve the final, 
vital link between evidence and direct patient care. Building on the prior evolutions 
[…], and often incorporating the patient’s own values and expectations […], the 
revolution of Evidence-Based Medicine was introduced by Gordon Guyatt. […] Since 
its first mention in 1992, its ideas about the use (rather than just critical appraisal) 
of evidence in patient care and in health professional education have spread 
worldwide […]. (Sackett 2002: 1164) 
 
There are two important points to be made about this quotation. Firstly, the “final 
revolution” of EBM is said to provide the link between “evidence and direct patient care”. 
Clinical epidemiology‘s primary concern is the use of research from epidemiology and 
biostatistics in a clinical perspective, as a basis for clinical decision-making. This research 
is to be assessed – through critical appraisal – in the evaluation of direct health care, but 
the practical dimension of health care as such is placed outside its scope. In the 
presentation of EBM in the above quote, the principles of clinical epidemiology are 
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extended to direct patient care in medical practice. In the same manner, the evaluation of 
critical appraisal is turned into application. The last sentence makes this explicit by 
focusing on “the use (rather than just critical appraisal) of evidence in patient care”. A 
central difference, then, between clinical epidemiology and EBP is that, while the former 
focuses on generating and assessing scientific knowledge, EBP’s main focus is on the 
practical use of this knowledge, at the actual point of patient care. 
The second point to be made regarding the quotation above, is that the “evolution” of 
EBM and EBP is moving beyond the scope of clinical epidemiology in that it involves 
“incorporating the patient’s own values and expectations”. In later definitions of EBM, 
knowledge concerning the incorporation of the patient’s values is considered an equally 
important aspect as both scientific knowledge and knowledge concerning the practical 
application of research evidence. 
The two points concerning the difference between clinical epidemiology and EBP can be 
further demonstrated in light of the definition of clinical epidemiology presented in 
section 1.1.4. above: Whereas clinical epidemiology provides the assessment for 
application of evidence in clinical health-care decision-making (cf. the two last parts of the 
definition), the EBP clinician is the agent making use of this evidence to justify a 
recommendation for or against a specific clinical intervention for a particular patient, in 
accordance with the patient’s values and preferences.  
When Gordon Guyatt, a student of Sackett, introduces the term EBM,35 he also includes 
“judgment” as an additional aspect:  
For the clinician, evidence-based medicine requires skills of literature retrieval, 
critical appraisal, and information synthesis. It also requires judgment of the 
                                                          
35 When Guyatt first introduced the idea of practicing evidence-based, he presented it as «scientific 
medicine». When the faculty of Medicine at McMaster, Canada, reacted to this, arguing that any basic 
scientists practices scientific medicine, Guyatt’s second suggestion was “Evidence based medicine” (cf. 
Smith and Rennie: 2014). 
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applicability of evidence to the patient at hand and systematic approaches to make 
decisions when direct evidence is not available. (Guyatt: 1991) 
 
The last sentence above is ambiguous in that it is not clear whether the requirement of 
judgment is present only when “direct evidence” is not available, or if it is a requirement 
in any application of evidence. To my mind, the most reasonable interpretation is that 
applicability of evidence necessitates some use of judgment (e.g. as part of the critical 
appraisal of external validity and applicability), while “systematic approaches to make 
decisions” (other than critical appraisal-skills) is explicitly stated as a requirement only 
“when direct evidence is not available”.  
The sentence clearly represents in EBM a movement beyond the rather strict scientific 
scope of clinical epidemiology. I will suggest that there are two necessary requirements in 
the conceptualization of EBP: the scientific, clinical epidemiologist foundation with regard 
to research results considered as evidence; and what I understand as the non-scientific 
foundation, concerning the practical application of research evidence. This latter 
dimension includes both the incorporation of patient’s values, and the use of individual 
judgment, typically termed “clinical expertise” in the EBP literature. 
The non-scientific dimension may seem trivial; it is, after all, what any clinical practice 
entails. However, it is not the least trivial when it comes to understanding the scope and 
delineation of EBP. It is important to note, however, that this requirement does not make 
EBM any less “evidence-based”; the scientific dimension of clinical epidemiology presents 
the primary scientific basis through which the EBP practitioner retrieves and assesses the 
evidence for any clinical decision-making. 
In the following chapter on the model of EBP, I will examine the two dimensions of EBM 
in epistemological terms, as scientific knowledge (relating to knowledge of scientific facts), 
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and non-scientific knowledge, relating both to knowledge of values (regarding the patient) 





Chapter 2: The concept of evidence-based practice 
 
2.0. Introduction  
The main aim of this chapter is to provide an adequate understanding of EBP through an 
epistemological analysis of the kinds of knowledge that constitute EBP. Three essential 
elements of EBP are identified, with reference to three key terms in the EBP literature that 
are common in EBP definitions: (1) evidence; (2) clinical expertise; (3) patient preferences 
and circumstances. In epistemological terms, (1) corresponds to scientific knowledge, 
whereas (2) and (3) correspond to non-scientific knowledge. This chapter clarifies the 
content of these three elements. It also discusses the content of the different kinds of 
knowledge, as well as of how these kinds of knowledge are structured in relation to one 
other. I will provide a more detailed description of these kinds of knowledge. 
To a large extent, scientific knowledge represents the clinical epidemiology framework of 
EBP and constitutes what is most controversial to EBP. In turn, scientific knowledge is the 
component that differentiates EBP from non-EBP approaches. Non-scientific knowledge, 
conversely, characterizes EBPs difference from clinical epidemiology, and at the same time 
its similarity to non-EBP approaches. As I will demonstrate below, both kinds of knowledge 
are necessary for an adequate understanding of EBP. One important issue in this chapter 
is to identify how the various kinds of knowledge inherent in EBP are structured in relation 
to the concept of EBP as a whole. 
To conduct the epistemological analysis of the concept of EBP, a clarification is required 
of the central concepts and principles in the EBP model. Firstly, I will provide a general 
overview of how different kinds of knowledge are represented in EBP literature from 1992 
to the present day (section 2.1.). Secondly, I will discuss EBP in its extension from clinical 
epidemiology towards clinical practice. Through this discussion, I will discuss essential 
features within the concept of EBP and identify the differences between clinical 
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epidemiology and EBP (section 2.2.). Thirdly, I identify four core principles in EBP, common 
in standard descriptions throughout the EBP literature (section 2.3.). I conclude section 
2.3. by presenting a definition of “evidence-based practice” (section 2.3.5.). This definition 
will serve as a point of reference with regard to both the subsequent epistemological 
analysis of the concept pf EBP and for the following chapters on the EBP debate. 
Based on these clarifications, I will conduct an epistemological examination of the 
structuring between scientific and non-scientific knowledge in EBP, with a primary focus 
on explicating the kinds of knowledge inherent in the concept of EBP (section 2.4.).  
The chapter has five main parts: 2.1: A brief history of the representation of scientific and 
non-scientific knowledge in EBP. 2.2: Evidence-based practice and the extension to 
practice. 2.3: Core principles in EBP. These three parts provide conceptual background for 
the subsequent section 2.4: Analysis of scientific and non-scientific knowledge in EBP. This 
section comprises several subsections in which I will examine different kinds of knowledge 
separately. Based on the possible combinations of scientific and non-scientific kinds of 
knowledge, I will then, in section 2.4.4., discuss three concepts, of which “moderate” EBP 
is by far the most reasonable. Lastly, in section 2.5., I will conclude the analysis by 






2.1. A brief history of the representation of scientific and non-scientific knowledge in 
EBP 
 
The first official text presenting EBP – as evidence-based medicine – from 1992 describes 
EBP as a reaction against traditional clinical practice,36 stressing the need for application 
of evidence results from outcome-based methods as a basis for clinical decisions. Initially, 
the aim of EBP was on educating clinicians on assessment and use of published clinical 
research literature to improve clinical care. As EBP developed, the means to reach the aim 
of improving clinical care were articulated in greater detail by including processual 
practice, use of expertise, patient preferences and circumstances as necessary elements.  
The controversial content in EBP is apparent from the first official text: Traditional health 
care, with its attention focused on underlying pathophysiologic mechanisms (cf. 1.2.1. 
above) and use of expertise, was deemed insufficient as a basis for determining whether 
interventions are effective or not. Instead, research results from epidemiologic, outcome-
based methods were to be used as the optimal basis for clinical decisions. In effect, both 
pathophysiologic mechanisms and expertise were considered inferior evidence sources 
with regard to measuring the effects of clinical interventions. Instead, such information 
was considered necessary as “background information” in clinical practice.37  
Through the use of models of hierarchies of evidence, the EBP literature – as a direct 
extension of clinical epidemiology literature – was explicit about how the confidence in 
different evidence sources should be considered, relative to specific criteria of evidence 
quality (cf. section 1.4.4.ff above). However, the models of EBP did not explicitly address 
                                                          
36 This is described quite dramatically, and erroneously, as a “paradigmatic shift”. In context, the paradigm 
conception is based on a misinterpretation of Kuhnian philosophy of science, whereby normal sciences, 
due to accumulation of anomalies, are replaced by a scientific revolution. Instead, “paradigm shift” is used 
in a broader way to indicate a major change of practice (cf. Blunt 2015: 15). The description of EBP as a 
“paradigmatic shift” has endured to some extent (e.g. in Bhandari et al. 2004) but is no longer part of the 
standard descriptions in the EBP literature.  
37 ”Background information” is discussed in more detail in 2.4.2. below.  
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the question of how scientific knowledge was related to other kinds of knowledge. While 
non-scientific knowledge has always been recognized in the EBP literature, early EBP 
literature was not clear on how evidence was to be considered in relation to the expertise 
of the clinician on the one hand, and to the preferences and circumstances of the patient 
on the other. As a result of increasing attention toward these issues – to a large degree as 
a response to criticism of that these issues are lacking – EBP authors published new 
definitions and modifications to earlier EBP descriptions. Particular attention was paid to 
how EBP was not reducible to scientific knowledge alone, but also included expertise and 
patient preferences, both equally necessary as evidence. Around 1996, EBP authors 
introduced models of EBP to illustrate this. 38 The models typically depicted three inter-
connected Venn-diagrams, representing (variations of) “evidence”, “expertise”, and 
“patient preferences and circumstances” (cf. Wieten 2018), such as in Figure 1 below:  
 
                                                          
38 The assertion that the use of EBP models dates from 1996 is an approximation, supported by Wieten 
(2018).  
Initiated in 1991, EBP is a rather new concept, with little research having been done on its historical 
development. The few articles on the subject (e.g., Bluhm&Borgerson 2010; Raspe 2007; Smith & Rennie 
2014; Sur & Dahm 2011) tend to describe the development in EBP as analogous to methodological 
developments in epidemiology and clinical epidemiology. Wieten (2018), in my view, is an exception, 
pointing to “[t]hree historical models of expertise integration” (Wieten 2018: 1). 
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(Wieten 2018: 3) 
From 1996 onwards, it became common to include variations of this model in 
introductions to EBP.39 In their description of the current model of EBP in 2017, 
Djulbegovic and Guyatt point to the increasing attention to non-scientific knowledge as 
one of the most central progressions in EBP: 
EBM progressed to recognise limitations of evidence alone, and has increasingly 
stressed the need to combine critical appraisal of the evidence with patient’s values 
and preferences through shared decision making. (Djulbegovic & Guyatt 2017: 415) 
 
Thus, the relationship between evidence, expertise, and patient preferences and 
circumstances has become a highly central topic in the EBP literature. At the same time, 
in most EBP literature it is not very clear what these elements entail, or how they are 
interconnected. The main attention in the following is on clarification of this topic, in 
particular with regard to the different kinds of knowledge in EBP and to how they are 




                                                          
39 There is much variation in these models, both in shape and in numbers of elements. For instance, Cullum 
et al. (2008: 12) present a variation containing 5 circles. Four of the circles are partly intersect one another 
(labelled respectively “clinical state”; “patient preferences and actions”; “research evidence”; and “health 
care resources”). “Clinical expertise” is placed in the middle, depicted by a dashed line and a square, placed 
within the frame in which the other four circles intersect. While such an illustration may increase the 
specificity of the elements, it also contributes to a higher level of complexity that is not often adequately 




2.2. Evidence-based practice and the extension to practice  
 
As demonstrated in Chapter 1, the scientific background of EBP is terminologically and 
historically based on clinical epidemiology. Terminologically, central terms and features in 
EBP literature such as “evidence”, attention to “outcome-based methods”, “critical 
appraisal” and the “hierarchies of evidence” are developed within clinical epidemiology. 
Historically, EBP is said to grow out of Critical appraisal, as a tool for assessing research 
knowledge with respect to application in clinical practice through formal rules of 
assessment, developed through clinical epidemiology (cf. 1.4. above). As such, EBP is 
reducible to clinical epidemiology.  
The central features that differentiate EBP from other clinical approaches coincide with 
its clinical epidemiology heritage. In effect, what is controversial in EBP – its emphasis 
upon evidence from epidemiologic evidence sources and the criteria through which 
evidence is assessed – also coincides with clinical epidemiology.  
However, as stated in 1.5. above, EBP is not reducible to its origins. Instead, EBP extends 
to direct patient care in clinical practice, in which evidence is to be applied. What does 
this extension to clinical practice entail? The extension of EBP can be described in two, 
closely connected, ways: as an extension from clinical epidemiology, and towards clinical 
practice.  
As described in Chapter 1, the aim of clinical epidemiology is to provide high-quality 
evidence sources as a basis for clinical decision-making. The methodology of clinical 
epidemiology provides the means to access and assess evidence sources for application in 
clinical health-care decision-making. When evidence and the means for evidence 
assessment are considered necessary conditions for clinical decision-making in EBP, it is 
to be considered an extension from clinical epidemiology.  
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While clinical epidemiology represents a scientific structure for providing evidence 
suitable for justifying recommendations for or against clinical interventions in clinical 
decision-making, EBP is a model for approaching such clinical decision-making – beginning 
at the point where the scope of clinical epidemiology ends.  
The aim of EBP is to apply the best available evidence in clinical decisions and thereby 
improve clinical decision-making in individual patient care. The central difference 
between EBP and clinical epidemiology, then, has to do with the attention to application 
of the evidence in clinical practice. In the extension towards practice, the evidence must 
be applied at the point of patient care. At this point, to apply evidence requires knowledge 
of elements that are external to the clinical epidemiology framework.  
As analysed in 1.4.1.2. above, applicability is an attribute of the quality of the evidence in 
terms of whether the evidence can be used in patient care. From the point of view of 
clinical epidemiology, this is either exclusively a matter of generalizability from the study 
group to the patient (or population) at hand, or considered through strength of evidence, 
in which quantifiable patient-related outcomes are taken into consideration (in addition 
to generalizability). 
At the point of patient care, however, the evidence must be “integrated”40 (or 
“translated”) into clinical practice by a clinician to ascertain whether the evidence actually 
corresponds to patient unique preferences and circumstances. In this case, knowledge 
concerning the clinician’s expertise and her ability to integrate, as well as knowledge 
concerning the patient and the circumstances, are considered necessary conditions in EBP 
decision-making, in addition to the evidence. 
                                                          
40 In the EBP literature, “integration” and “translation” of evidence into clinical practice are central terms. 
These terms serve as metaphors for any activities regarding the application of the evidence at hand. 
Certainly, this activity is not unique to EBP. Instead, it is a common challenge to all clinical practices, EBP 
and non-EBP alike.  
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Thus, the content of the justification for recommending for or against interventions in 
individual patient care is dependent on the abilities of the clinician, along with knowledge 
about the clinical setting and the patient’s preferences that are provided neither in the 
research information nor through the framework of clinical epidemiology. 
In other words, evidence provided through clinical epidemiology principles does not 
improve patient-care directly but equips the EBP clinician with information necessary for 
clinical decision-making. The direct link to clinical practice at the point of patient care is 
established by the clinician, who makes use of her expertise to apply this evidence in 
accordance with patient preferences and circumstances.  
Thus, it is not enough to be doing research to obtain the best evidence, nor to be able to 
critically appraise it. The focus of EBP is directed towards the application of this research 
– EBP is about using, not doing, research.41 This is the most central demarcation between 
clinical epidemiology and EBP. Information provided from the research evidence must be 
assessed for application to the actual clinical situation in clinical practice. In turn, such 
assessed evidence is used as a tool for the EBP clinician when solving a specific patient-
related clinical problem. What is essential to EBP, then, is not only evidence but the 
practical application of it: For evidence to be applied in direct clinical practice, it must be 
interpreted by the clinician in her clinical practice, in accordance with the patient’s 
preferences and circumstances.  
The critical appraisal forms developed in clinical epidemiology provide the scientific 
framework for this interpretation: Provided that the evidence exhibits internal validity, 
the evidence can be assessed for external validity (i.e., generalizability and applicability)42 
in individual patient care. In addition, however, for evidence to be applied in clinical 
                                                          
41 This is not to say that an EBP clinician cannot conduct research. When conducting research, however, 
the scientific framework of the research is constituted not by EBP itself, but by principles from clinical 
epidemiology and other scientific frameworks. 
42 These concepts are analyzed in detail in Section 1.4.1.2. above. 
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practice at the point of patient care – that is, to be practising evidence-based practice – 
the input from both the clinician and the patient are necessary requirements. More 
accurately, any use of evidence in EBP concerns the assessment and application of 
evidence in a specific clinical setting, conducted by a clinician, in accordance with the 
patient’s preferences.  
Clinical epidemiology is involved every step of the way until this application of evidence, 
but it does not engage in the actual application of the evidence at the point of care, 
whereby actual clinical decision-making occurs. At this point, the extension to practice 
takes centre stage, at which point the clinician’s encounter with the patient occurs as 
evidence-based practice.  
Notably, assessment of evidence in the extension to practice at the point of patient care, 
is contingent on information about the specific clinical setting and the patient’s 
preferences that is not provided in the research literature.43 This kind of assessment 
comes in addition to, and not integral with, assessment of external validity (which assesses 
the evidence in terms of the information provided in the research literature). To be able 
to distinguish conceptually between these two kinds of evidence assessment, I will 
distinguish between, on the one hand, “generalizability” along with “applicability” of the 
evidence (belonging to external validity) and, on the other hand, “usability”, which refers 
                                                          
43 This observation is in line with Rothwell (2009), who describes the complexity of “external validity”, 
stating that it “[r]equires clinical rather than statistical expertise and usually depends on a detailed 
understanding of the particular clinical condition under study and its management in routine clinical 
practice. External validity is also highly dependent on the particular perspective of the individual making 
the judgement. For one clinician with a particular patient, a trial result might be almost perfectly 
applicable, whereas for another clinician and patient the external validity may be extremely low” (Rothwell 
2009: 95). In my view, the attention to “[t]he particular perspective of the individual making the 
judgement” (ibid.) is highly problematical to internalize to a scientific concept of external validity, and I 
have not seen any systematic attempts to do this. My distinction between “applicability” and “usability” 
is an alternative way of explaining how the attention to individual perspectives and judgments relates to 
“external validity”, without being integral to this concept.  
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to the assessment of evidence with regard to patient preferences and circumstances at 
the point of patient care.44 
In sum, the features that separate EBP from clinical epidemiology – the need for clinical 
expertise and attention to patient preferences and circumstances – must be considered 
as necessary elements. Without this extension, the question of epistemological issues 
concerning EBP would be answerable by the framework of clinical epidemiology types of 
knowledge alone. To put evidence into use as a basis for clinical decision-making – that is, 
to practise EBP health care – the clinician has to consider assessment and application of 
the evidence with regard to the clinical setting by means of her clinical expertise, in 
coordination with the patient’s preferences. This is what EBP connotes.  
In epistemic terms, such an evidence-based practice implies two distinct kinds of 
knowledge: Scientific knowledge (of evidence) and non-scientific knowledge (of clinical 
expertise, and of the patient’s preferences and preferences). Both kinds are necessary for 
an adequate understanding of EBP. In section 2.4 and its subsequent subsections, I intend 
to clarify what the concept of EBP entails, through an epistemological analysis focusing on 
the kinds of knowledge that are inherent in the concept of EBP. Before I turn to these 
matters, I will describe the most typical ways the concept is used in the EBP literature.  
 
                                                          
44 The main reason for introducing the term “usability” is to explicitly distinguish between evidence 
assessment based on critical appraisal (i.e. as part of the clinical epidemiology framework) and evidence 
assessment based on the clinician’s expertise. In addition, the term “usability” does not interfere with 
existing EBP nomenclature, as it is rarely applied in EBP literature. 
Importantly, “usability” is not synonymous to “usefulness”. As noted in footnote 14 in Chapter 1, 
“usefulness”, in my use of the term, refers generically to “generalizability”, “applicability”, and “usability”. 
“Usefulness” is an oft-used term in EBP, and rarely defined. In EBP literature, “usefulness” is applied with 
reference to “applicability”, without a clear distinction between application as a technical term (i.e., as 
part of external validity) and as a generic term referring to “usefulness in practice” in general. For instance, 
Straus et al. 2011, sometimes equate “validity” with “usefulness” (e.g., at page. 3), while other times 
distinguish between them (e.g., at page 207).  
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2.3. Core principles in EBP 
 
For a more thorough presentation of central features of EBP, I will present four core 
principles that are common to standard EBP definitions and descriptions of EBP.45 These 
core principles point to closely connected ways in which EBP is described, as (2.3.1) “five 
linked ideas”; (2.3.2.) a process; (2.3.3) principles of hierarchy; (2.3.4) a structure for 
decision making. 
 
2.3.1. EBP as “five linked ideas”  
From its beginning, EBP has been explained by means of certain essential principles, or 
fundamental ideas. In an early article on EBP, Davidoff et al. presented the essential 
features of EBP as “rooted in five linked ideas”:  
1) clinical decisions should be based on the best available scientific evidence 
2) the clinical problem – rather than habits or protocols – should determine the 
type of evidence to be sought 
3) identifying the best evidence means using epidemiological and biostatistical 
ways of thinking 
4) “conclusions derived from identifying and critically appraising evidence are 
useful only if put into action in managing patients or making health care 
decisions 
5) performance should be constantly evaluated. (Davidoff et al. (1995: 1085).46 
 
Of these five ideas, 2), 4) and 5) are rather uncontroversial and are in line with professional 
and philosophical ideals of health care. All three ideas concern the application of practice, 
including the use of non-scientific knowledge with regard to the patient and 
circumstances. The second idea relates to the actual problem in a practical setting, and to 
                                                          
45 These principles are usually presented within the evidence-based medicine literature, and I will mainly 
refer to this literature. The principles are, however, equally essential to EBP. 
46 Sackett & Rosenberg 1995: “The need for evidence-based medicine», pp. 621f, published only months 
after Davidoff et al., offer a nearly identical description, presented as “principles of EBP”. 
70 
 
the importance of clearly formulated clinical questions; the fourth idea refers to the 
importance of practical implementation, and the fifth refers to evaluation of such 
implemented practice. 
The first and third ideas are primarily issues of scientific knowledge, echoing EBP’s clinical 
epidemiology heritage, and are more controversial.  
The first idea states the central idea of both clinical epidemiology and EBP – that any 
clinical decisions should be based on “best available scientific evidence”. The third idea 
explains what this entails, stating that the identification of such evidence is to be 
conducted by means of “epidemiological and biostatistical ways of thinking”, that is, on 
the basis of clinical epidemiology principles (as presented in Chapter 1).  
Both of these ideas have to do with EBP’s controversial view on evidence. Of course, in 
traditional health care, no one would deny the importance of evidence. However, as 
presented in Chapter 1, the main attention in traditional health care practices has been 
on mechanistic evidence sources, whereas proponents of clinical epidemiology argue that 
comparative, outcome-based methods offer superior support. Moreover, the use of 
personal expertise and habits has been accepted as evidence to a greater degree than 
within clinical epidemiology and EBP.  
The claim made in the first idea – that clinical decisions should be based on the best 
available scientific evidence – can be interpreted in two ways, depending on how “best 
available evidence” is understood.  
One version is to interpret “best available” evidence as referring to epidemiologic 
evidence-sources exclusively. This interpretation is seemingly supported by the third idea 
concerning “epidemiological and biostatistical ways of thinking”.  
A second way of interpreting “best available evidence” is to consider it pragmatically, 
implying that if epidemiologic research is not available (or the clinical problem determines 
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that other evidence-sources need to be sought; cf. the second idea), clinical decisions 
should be based on what is the best available non-epidemiologic sources of evidence.  
In the analysis of the EBP debate in Chapter 3 and 4 below, the first interpretation is 
identified as a “categorical interpretation”, which derives from misunderstandings of EBPs 
view on evidence. The second interpretation resonates better with most descriptions of 
EBP. For instance, the first official EBP text states that EBP “de-emphasizes intuition, 
unsystematic clinical experience, and pathophysiologic rationale as sufficient grounds for 
clinical decision-making, and stresses the examination of evidence from clinical research” 
(cf. Guyatt et al. 1992: 2420). A key element here is that these sources are “de-
emphasized”, and not omitted as such. In this case, the controversial character is not as 
apparent as in the first interpretation. However, what is regarded as “best” evidence also 
implies a hierarchical principle whereby assessment of evidence entails a systematic up- 
and down-grading of evidence (cf. 1.4.3. above). In addition, the EBP literature varies as 
to whether non-scientific evidence-sources, such as unsystematic (subjective) experience, 
are to be regarded as evidence at all (see also 2.4.3. below).  
 
2.3.2. EBP as a process 
EBP has been presented as a process since its beginning. For instance, Sackett and 
Rosenberg describe the practice of EBP as: 
[a] process of life-long, self-directed learning in which caring for our own patients 
creates the need for clinically-important information about diagnosis, prognosis, 
therapy, decision analysis […]. (Sackett & Rosenberg 1995: 622).  
 
This way of describing EBP concerns how it is practised, as a process, rather than as a set 
of ideas, with focus on “doing EBP”. Here, EBP is something done, as opposed to 
something believed (cf. Blunt 2015: 20). Straus et al. (2011) describe the process of EBP in 
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five distinct steps. These five steps resemble the five “ideas” listed above, but are now to 
be considered as a description of the complete practice of EBP comprising five steps:47  
Step 1: converting the need for information (about prevention, diagnosis, 
prognosis, therapy, causation, etc.) into an answerable question. 
Step 2: tracking down the best evidence with which to answer that question. 
Step 3: critically appraising that evidence for its validity (closeness to the truth), 
impact (size of the effect), and applicability (usefulness in our clinical practice). 
Step 4: integrating the critical appraisal with our clinical expertise and with our 
patient’s unique biology, values and circumstances. 
Step 5: evaluating our effectiveness and efficiency in executing steps 1–4 and 
seeking ways to improve them both for next time. (cf. Straus et al. 2011: 3) 
 
These steps may be understood as the core elements of EBP. Steps 1, 2, and 3 are 
recognizable from the clinical epidemiology framework: the clinical questions, attention 
to evidence sources, and the assessment of these sources. Step 4 is representative of what 
was described above as the extension to practice, whereby evidence is “translated” for 
application at the point of patient care. Step 5 is identical to the fifth “idea” above, 
stressing the importance of continuously improving clinical practice.  
The five-step practice of EBP which can be done in three modes, corresponds to three 
degrees of autonomy of the clinician:  
First, is the “doing” mode, in which at least the first four steps above are completed. 
Second, is the “using” mode in which searches are restricted to evidence resources 
that have already undergone critical appraisal by others, such as evidence 
summaries (thus skipping Step 3). Third, is the “replicating” mode in which the 
decisions of respected opinion leaders are followed (abandoning at least Steps 2 
and 3). All three of these modes involve the integration of evidence (from whatever 
source) with our patient’s unique biology, values and circumstances of Step 4, but 
they vary in the execution of the other steps (Straus et al. 2011: 3.) 
                                                          
47 An interesting difference between Straus et al. and Sackett & Rosenberg (1995; just cited above) is that 
the principles of the latter are understood within EBP practice, while Straus et al. seem to understand their 




The difference between these modes amounts to the different ways of incorporating 
evidence into practice, relative to the degree to which the clinician is able to perform 
critical appraisal of the evidence: The clinician can either “do EBP” by appraising the 
evidence herself, “use EBP” by using pre-appraised evidence conducted by others, or 
“replicate EBP” by following guidelines developed by other evidence-based clinicians. 
Notably, every mode presupposes the integration of evidence into practice, whereby the 
clinician’s expertise and knowledge concerning patient preferences and circumstances are 
considered as necessary elements in the EBP process. As noted in 2.2. above (i.e., through 
the extension to practice), the integration of these elements is a distinctive feature of EBP, 
distinguishing the latter from clinical epidemiology.  
The autonomy of the EBP clinician when “doing” EBP implies a significant confidence in 
the use of personal clinical expertise, through which the evidence is assessed for 
application at the point of patient care. Thus, there is a shift of attention from evidence 
as such to the clinician’s ability to critically appraise this evidence (when “doing” EBP) and 
to integrate this evidence into clinical practice (in every mode of practising EBP).  
Guyatt et al. (2015) presents a similar view of EBP as a process, but with a more moderate, 
less optimistic view of the autonomous EBP clinician. In this version of the EBP process, 
the assessments made by the individual clinician are replaced with pre-appraised 
evidence, thereby making individual clinical expertise – and, hence, non-scientific 
knowledge – less central. The presentation of EBP as a process by Guyatt et al. as a process 
demonstrates a more rigorous scientific model, with less room for the individual clinician’s 
independent use of expertise. Notably, in Guyatt et al., the notion of “critical appraisal” – 
central to the very concept of EBP in Straus et al. – is only found in the preface of the book, 
with a note that one of the changes from the previous editions of the book will be an 
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emphasis placed on pre-appraised resources. According to Guyatt et al., this is due to two 
realizations: 
First, […] that only a few clinicians would become skilled at critically appraising 
original journal articles and that preappraised evidence would be crucial for 
evidence-based clinical practice. Second, our knowledge of how best to ensure that 
clinical decisions were consistent with patient values and preferences was 
rudimentary […]. (Guyatt et al. 2015: xxiv).  
 
Thus, the clinician’s individual expertise concerning “critical appraisal” and “integration” 
is considered rudimentary by Guyatt et al. In effect, the clinician’s independent 
assessments are to a larger degree made superfluous in Guyatt et al.’s model than in 
Straus et al.’s. This change reflects a rather pessimistic view of “evidence-doers” as put 
forward by Straus et al. In Guyatt et al., the EBP clinician is not considered well enough 
equipped to perform either critical appraisal or integration and should instead base her 
performance on pre-appraised evidence or guidelines. The critical appraisal, i.e. the 
activity of assessing evidence, still has a central place in the version of EBP presented by 
Guyatt et al. (cf. Guyatt et al. 2015: 5). Ideally, however, this appraisal is conducted prior 
to the individual clinician’s use of the evidence, by groups of researchers or practitioners 
(through consensus based on research data) and produced as pre-appraised evidence and 
guidelines to be used by individual EBP practitioners. When “critical appraisal” does occur 
in Guyatt et al., it is labelled “appraisal”, directed exclusively at internal validity. Thus, in 
Guyatt et al., the processual structure of EBP is still a central, albeit more moderate, 
principle.48 
                                                          
48 In the moderate version of EBP as a process, found in Guyatt et al. (2015), the consequences of the 
rudimentary knowledge concerning the integration of patient preferences is somewhat unclear. As 
discussed in Section 2.2., this kind of knowledge has to do with the application of evidence at the point of 
patient care, which cannot be replaced by critical appraisal-schemes. Guyatt et al. seem to imply that such 
knowledge nonetheless can be sufficiently supported by pre-appraised evidence. It is highly doubtful that 
this is the case. Even in a guideline with nearly identical criteria between the scenario suggested and the 
clinical encounter with the patient, it is the clinician using her expertise that is responsible for applying 
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2.3.3. EBP as a principle of hierarchy 
Yet another typical way of describing EBP is by way of evidence-hierarchies as a 
fundamental principle. For instance, Guyatt et al. state as a fundamental principle that 
“EBM posits a hierarchy of evidence to guide clinical decision making” (Guyatt & Rennie 
2002: 5).49  
Hierarchies are central in the EBP discourse, and a controversial topic in much criticism of 
EBP, which I will address in Section 3.2. below. The underlying idea is expressed by Guyatt 
et al.: “Not all evidence is equal, and a set of principles can identify more vs less 
trustworthy evidence” (Guyatt et al. 2015:16). As described in Chapter 1 (Section 1.4.3. 
above), hierarchies rank evidence relative either to its methodological design (e.g., an RCT 
or an observational study), or to validity criteria (most typically internal validity criteria, 
such as risk of bias). As such, hierarchies represent the most distinct expression of 
scientific knowledge in EBP, through which evidence sources are hierarchically structured 
based on explicit methodological criteria. 
There are several different hierarchies occurring in the EBP literature, offering guidance 
to clinical decision-making in multiple ways. These ways can be demonstrated through the 
different roles they play in steps 2, 3, and 4 of the EBP process (cf. Blunt 2015, Chapter 1).  
                                                          
knowledge, in accordance with patient preferences and circumstances. Thus, expertise is a necessary 
element in the application of evidence in clinical practice, regardless of whether knowledge of such 
application is rudimentary or not.  
49 According to Guyatt & Rennie (2002), there are two fundamental principles of EBP. In addition to the 
positing of a hierarchy of evidence, there is a principle that “evidence alone is never sufficient to make a 
clinical decision” (ibid: 5). In the newest edition of the same book (2015) there are three fundamental 
principles of EBM: “Optimal decision making requires awareness of the best available evidence”; “EBM 
provides guidance to decide whether evidence is more or less trustworthy”; evidence alone is never 
sufficient to make a clinical decision” (Guyatt et al.2015: 8). In this version, the principle of hierarchy occurs 
only indirectly through the second principle. In the 2015-edition, Guyatt et al. also state that “Not all 
evidence is equal, and a set of principles can identify more vs less trustworthy evidence” (ibid:16). In my 




Hierarchies can be used as a tool for step 2 of the EBP process (finding the evidence), 
serving as a way by which to rank research literature. The idea is that clinicians should 
prioritize reading reports from highly ranked, often pre-appraised studies, such as the “6S-
pyramid” (Straus et al. 2011).50 
Hierarchies also function as a tool for performing step 3 (appraising the evidence), 
concerning information about the quality and strength of the evidence, focusing either on 
the connection between methodology and the evidence generated from this, or between 
the evidence and the claim of effectiveness of an intervention, such as the Canadian task 
force hierarchy described above (cf. Section 1.4.3. above). Hierarchies for appraising the 
evidence, in my view, is the most typical, in both pro- and anti-EBP literature.  
Hierarchies also play a role in step 4 (applying the evidence), illustrating connections 
between the evidence and the recommendations to patients (which in turn is based on 
the likely effect of treatment on individual patients), such as the GRADE hierarchy (Grading 
of Recommendations, Assessment, Development and Evaluations).51 A related use of 
                                                          
50 The “6S-pyramid” is presented as “[a] 6-level hierarchical structure, with original “studies” at the base, 
“synopses” of the most clinically relevant studies just above the base, “syntheses” (systematic reviews) of 
evidence just above, topped by “synopses” of the premier syntheses, then clinical topic “summaries”, and, 
at the pinnacle, the most evolved evidence-based information “systems” that link evidence-based 
recommendations with individual patients” (Straus et al. 2011: 34). 
51 As described in 1.4.3. above, The GRADE hierarchy is more sophisticated than other hierarchies in that 
it allows for a more complex assessment of ranking evidence (concerning a treatment’s putative effects), 
weighing properties of RCTs and observational studies against each other. GRADE offers a two-step 
process to assess the evidence: 1) An initial ranking is ascribed, based on methodology. GRADE only 
includes RCTs and observational studies and ascribes “high quality” grade to RCTs and “low quality” grade 
to observational studies. 2) Secondary criteria are assessed, which allow for the quality of the evidence to 
be up-graded (e.g., by large and/or consistent effects) or down-graded (e.g., by risk of bias, inconsistency 
and/or imprecision), and assigned “high”, “moderate”, “low”, or “very low” (cf. Howick 2011: 29f). For 
instance, an RCT would be down-graded to “very low” if high risk of bias and imprecision occur, and an 
observational study may be up-graded to “high” if it demonstrates large effects. Based on this ranking 
system, the clinician can decide to recommend or disapprove of the treatment in question, given the 
balance of effects on the outcomes of interest (cf. Blunt 2015: 47).  
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hierarchies is to develop guidelines to standardize evidence-assessment (cf. Blunt 2015: 
21).  
The variation of different kinds of hierarchies makes it impossible to refer to “the 
hierarchy” of EBP. The hierarchical principle however, which refers to the systematic 
structure of ranking evidence relative to each other according to specific criteria for 
evidence assessment, is a characteristic feature in EBP, inherited from its clinical 
epidemiology framework.  
 
2.3.4. EBP as a structure for decision-making  
Whereas the three core elements presented above refer to the specific content of EBP on 
which clinical practice should be based, the core element of decision-making refers to the 
aim of this practice. Typically, EBP is described as a “[s]tructure for optimal clinical 
practice” (Guyatt et al. 2015: 17). What distinguishes this practice from a non-EBP practice 
can be represented based on the EBP process – as a methodological approach to clinical 
decision-making, presenting steps to access, assess, and apply research results, and thus 
enabling the clinician to make clinical decisions.  
“Evidence” in “evidence-based practice” should thus be considered a means to an end, as 
an instrument leading towards clinical decision-making. The end has to do with improving 
clinical decision-making. The means is provided by “good-quality” evidence, including the 
formal rules of assessment (i.e. critical appraisal; cf. 1.4.2. above) of such evidence.  
As noted in 2.2 above however, evidence does not improve patient-care directly. The 
direct link to clinical practice at the point of patient care is established by the clinician, 
who uses her expertise to apply the evidence in accordance with patient preferences and 
circumstances. Thus, the clinician’s expertise, the patient preferences and the 
circumstances are all equally necessary means toward improving clinical decision-making. 
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The structure of EBP clinical decision-making, then, is constituted by processual steps, in 
which evidence is accessed, assessed and integrated into clinical practice through the 
clinician’s expertise, in correspondence with the patient’s preferences and circumstances.  
EBP should therefore not be referred to as a “science”, or a “scientific system”. I concur 
with Daly when she states that EBP does not constitute a comprehensive science of clinical 
care, but instead represents an important initiative in providing scientific evidence for 
clinical decision-making (cf. Daly 2005: 205).  
However, Daly’s statement can be interpreted in two different ways, depending on how 
the decision-making itself is considered relative to the model of EBP. One way of 
interpreting Daly’s claim is to consider decision-making itself as external to the model of 
EBP. In this interpretation, EBP would be identical to the definition of clinical epidemiology 
above, whereby evidence is provided for justifying recommendations for or against clinical 
interventions concerning individual patients. Another, more reasonable way of 
interpreting Daly’s statement, is to expanding the notion of “providing scientific evidence” 
to include the necessary means for applying evidence in individual patient care, thereby 
including the clinician’s expertise and the patient’s preferences and circumstances as 
necessary elements within the model of EBP (cf. 1.2. above). Such an interpretation takes 
into account the element of decision-making as an inherent part of EBP and is thus in 
accordance with the view of that the structure of decision-making is a core element of 
EBP. 
 
2.3.5. A definition of “evidence-based practice”  
Based on the analysis of the extension to practice and of the core principles, I will suggest 
a definition of EBP. Within the EBP literature, there are numerous definitions of EBP – 
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most often variations on the same content. One of the most cited definition is from 
2011:52  
Evidence based medicine requires the integration of the best research evidence 
with our clinical expertise and our patient’s unique values and circumstances. 
(Straus et al. 2011: 1) 
 
Here, EBM (and EBP) is defined by presenting its constitutive elements: research evidence, 
clinical expertise, and patient values and circumstances. The “integration” – central to the 
understanding of EBP as a process (see also 2.2. above) – must be considered a specific 
ability attributed to the clinical expertise.53 Most other EBM- and EBP-definitions follow a 
similar tripartite structure,54 most often by including “integrating” as well. 
One difficulty with this definition is that it does not clarify what constitutes “evidence”, 
what it means to be “evidence-based”, and it does not provide any information regarding 
the difference between EBP and non-EBP models. Another important element that is 
missing in definition advanced by Straus et al. is explicit attention to clinical decision-
making.  
A number of critics have attacked this and similar definitions, pointing to their 
platitudinous character, commenting that health care practice has always been based on 
                                                          
52 I agree with Blunt (2015: 14) that the most famous definition is formulated by Sackett et al 1996: 
“Evidence based medicine is the conscientious, explicit, and judicious use of current best evidence in 
making decisions about the care of individual patients. The practice of evidence-based medicine means 
integrating individual clinical expertise with the best available external clinical evidence from systematic 
research”. I have chosen to focus on the definition formulated by Straus et al. because of its more rigorous 
structure. 
53 I will discuss the ability to integrate in more detail in the subsequent sections of 2.4.3. below, as part of 
the clinician’s expertise. 
54 A notable exception is the first official EBM definition (Guyatt et al. 1992): “Evidence-based medicine 
de-emphasizes intuition, unsystematic clinical experience, and pathophysiologic rationale as sufficient 
grounds for clinical decision-making, and stresses the examination of evidence from clinical research”. In 
this definition, the attention is given to evidence sources exclusively. However, later in the same text, 
attention to both expertise patient preferences are described as essential elements. 
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evidence in some form (e.g., Blunt 2015; Miles 2009a, 2009b; Tonelli 1998; cf. Chapter 3 
below). In defence of the definition found in Straus et al., it can be claimed to be more 
pragmatic than scientific in scope, providing a description of EBP in extension to practice.  
Based on the analysis above, a more specific definition can be provided, more in line with 
the core elements of EBP. I will suggest a five-partite definition of the term “evidence-
based practice”, of which it is to be considered synonymous with: 
 “Approach to clinical decision-making, in which the clinician recommends clinical 
interventions to individual patients 
 based on the best evidence available, assessed according to methodological criteria 
of evidence quality, 
 where the evidence is integrated into clinical practice by a clinician 
 who, by making use of clinical experience, identifies, assesses and applies the 
evidence,  
 in accordance with the patient’s preferences and circumstances.” 
The inclusion of five elements provides a comprehensive definition. Compared to the 
version presented in Straus et al., it lacks the pragmatic aspect but adds a higher degree 
of specificity to the description of what practice in EBP amounts to. 
The first part of this definition concerns the aim of EBP, by including Clinical decision-
making as the genus of the definition, encompassing the other elements. The subordinate 
clause of the sentence demonstrates EBP’s connection to clinical epidemiology, referring 
to the point of which the definition of clinical epidemiology ends (cf. the definition of 
clinical epidemiology in 1.1.4. above).  
81 
 
The second part includes the element of «best evidence available”, making it less 
restrictive than the focus in Straus et al. on “best research evidence” exclusively. However, 
it is also added to this part that evidence is assessed according to methodological criteria 
of evidence quality (i.e., through critical appraisal). As discussed in 1.4.1. above, these 
criteria refer to considerations about internal and external validity of evidence-sources. 
These criteria are central elements in the EBP literature and constitute the most 
controversial and distinctive elements in EBP (i.e. its clinical epidemiology heritage; cf. 
Section 2.2.), thereby explaining the difference between EBP and non-EBP models. 
The third part of the definition includes the role of “integration” in clinical practice, which 
in turn is specified in the two latter parts.  
The fourth part includes the use of clinical experience as a necessary element of EBP. I 
have replaced “expertise” with “experience” as a necessary requirement. In this way, EBP 
is not restricted to experts alone.55 This fourth part also presents the objective of clinical 
experience: identification and assessment of the evidence, as well as the application of 
the evidence at the point of patient care. This description is a reference to the core 
element of EBP as a process and thereby incorporates it in the definition. Notably, 
“assessment of evidence” is included in both the second and fourth part of the definition. 
In the second part, “assessment of evidence” refers to methodological criteria exclusively 
(concerning internal and external validity), whereas “assesses the evidence” in this fourth 
part refers to considerations of whether the evidence is applicable in relation to patient 
preferences and the actual circumstances (i.e. concerning the usability of the evidence; cf. 
2.2. above).  
The fifth and last part of the definition includes the patient’s preferences and 
circumstances, further specifying what “integration” (in the third part) entails.  
                                                          
55 I will examine the difference between «expertise” and “experience” in more detail in 2.4.4.1. below. 
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In the following section, the content of the EBP definition will be examined through an 
epistemological analysis of the concept of EBP, with particular attention to what kinds of 
knowledge ‘evidence’, ‘expertise’ and ‘patient’s preferences and circumstances’ 
represent. I will do so by distinguishing clearly between scientific and non-scientific 
knowledge in the EBP model, and I will then discuss the specific content pertaining to 






2.4: Analysis of scientific and non-scientific knowledge in EBP 
 
As discussed in 2.3., when evidence is applied in the extension to practice, clinical 
decision-making is performed by the individual clinician, using her expertise to integrate 
evidence into clinical practice in accordance with the patient’s needs and preferences. In 
epistemic terms, both scientific and non-scientific knowledge are implied here, as 
necessary components of decision-making in EBP. Firstly, the clinical decision is based on 
scientific knowledge, i.e. research evidence and the criteria for assessment of this 
evidence. If such evidence is not available, the clinician makes use of non-scientific 
knowledge.56 Secondly, the evidence is to be integrated into clinical practice at the point 
of patient care by the clinician and according to the patient’s preferences and 
circumstances. Thus, the recommendations of interventions at the point of patient care 
require both scientific knowledge (of evidence and evidence appraisal) and use of 
additional, non-scientific sources of knowledge, such as the clinicians experience and 
knowledge of patient preferences and circumstances.  
In the following analysis, I will differentiate between and discuss the different kinds of 
knowledge and beliefs inherent in the concept of EBP. In the previous analysis, I have 
referred to “scientific” and “non-scientific knowledge”, which represent the main 
distinction I will address. Within this distinction, the three main elements of EBP – 
evidence, expertise and patient preferences and circumstances – will be analyzed, with 
regard to what each element entails, and how these elements interrelate. 
 
2.4.1. “Scientific knowledge” and “non-scientific knowledge” 
For the benefit of the following analysis, I define “scientific knowledge” in broad terms, as 
“propositional beliefs, justified through replicable systematic studies and/or by 
                                                          
56 As I will discuss in 2.3.1. below, EBP models differ regarding inclusion of non-scientific evidence.  
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methodological principles”. “Non-scientific knowledge”, conversely, is defined as “belief 
justified by experience or skill, without any reference to methodology”. 
In clinical epidemiology and EBP literature, a belief that is deemed to be scientific 
knowledge may be referred to as “evidence” if that belief is justified through systematic 
studies which in turn are organized according to methodological principles. A belief that 
is considered scientific knowledge can also refer to propositions concerning assessments 
of evidence (e.g. claims concerning the quality of evidence), which are justified through 
methodological principles (e.g., criteria of internal and external validity). 
On the other hand, non-scientific knowledge may refer to either propositional or 
procedural knowledge (cf. Fantl 2017). Propositional knowledge refers to true or false 
propositions relating to facts, whereas procedural knowledge refers to knowledge 
exercised in the performance of some task, manifested in the use of a skill (cf. Stanley & 
Williamson 2001).57 
A belief is considered non-scientific propositional knowledge if it is based on experience, 
without any reference to methodology. For instance, a clinician may make a claim 
regarding the recommendation of a particular treatment option, based on the clinician’s 
personal experience of the treatment’s benefits, irrespective of research literature. When 
non-scientific knowledge are included in EBP as evidence, it refers to such non-scientific 
propositional knowledge. For instance, the clinician’s personal experience about the 
treatment’s benefits may be used as evidence for recommending that particular 
treatment.  
Non-scientific knowledge may also be manifested through the use of a skill, exercised 
through practical procedures – as (non-scientific) procedural knowledge, e.g., through a 
                                                          




clinician’s know-how concerning how to communicate with the patient in an efficient 
manner. This clinician’s claim of that “I know how to communicate with patients” will be 
justifiable on the basis of the clinician’s ability to communicate with the patient.58 As I will 
argue in 2.4.3.2. and its subsequent subsections, several features regarding clinical 
expertise refer to procedural knowledge. 
 
2.4.2. Scientific knowledge in EBP 
What characterizes scientific knowledge in EBP is to a large degree dependent on its 
clinical epidemiology framework. Thus, scientific knowledge typically, but not 
exhaustively, refers to three elements: (1) epidemiologic research methods; (2) the results 
provided from these research methods, typically referred to as “evidence” and (3) the 
criteria for assessing methods and research results. For instance, a recommendation for a 
particular intervention to an individual patient is based on scientific knowledge to the 
extent that the recommendation is justified on basis of some evidence generated from a 
particular research method (e.g., an RCT). Knowledge of the confidence attributed to that 
evidence is scientific to the extent that it is based on methodological criteria of validity 
(e.g. of internal and external validity).  
EBP covers a broad field of health-care disciplines, directed at multiple different clinical 
scenarios. In the same manner as clinical epidemiology, EBP makes use of methods from 
statistics, psychology, the social sciences, economics, health policy, and so on. Both clinical 
epidemiology and EBP also includes traditional medical knowledge, such as 
pathophysiological principles, knowledge about disease and illnesses, etc. – mainly 
considered “background information”. Such information is considered necessary for any 
clinical practice, e.g. for understanding and justifying physical findings when examining a 
                                                          
58 In philosophical literature, this way of ascribing knowledge to abilities is labelled “the Ability Account of 
Knowledge-How” (cf. Fantl 2017), often attributed to Ryle (1949).  
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patient (see e.g., Guyatt 2015), but is does not support decisions-making directly (cf. 
Straus et al. 2011: 57). Often, this kind of information is in turn necessary for being able 
to answer “foreground questions”, which refers to specific knowledge relevant to inform 
clinical decisions (i.e., clinical questions, directed at either therapy, prognosis or diagnosis; 
cf. 1.2. above).  
In addition to the clinical questions of clinical epidemiology, EBP also includes clinical 
questions relating to ”experience and meaning” (e.g. in Straus et al. 2011: 18). This kind 
of clinical questions refer to scientific knowledge provided from qualitative research. For 
example, there are instances when clinicians need qualitative research to provide some 
guidance in deciding whether or not the findings from quantitative studies can be applied 
to their patients.59  
Further, every procedural step of EBP (cf. 2.2.2. EBP as a process) is to be considered 
representative of scientific knowledge in EBP. Even in the hypothetical case that there is 
no evidence available, a clinical practice is still considered evidence-based to the extent 
that it is justified by methodological principles. Thus, the very practice of becoming aware 
of the fact that there is no evidence (by attempting to access evidence according to EBP 
methodology) would in itself be evidence-based. This demonstrates how the processual 
steps within EBP constitute a kind of scientific knowledge, regardless of the research 
evidence – or more accurately, due to methodological knowledge of lack of evidence. 
                                                          
59 Qualitative research is designed for describing, exploring, and explaining the phenomena being studied 
(cf. Cullum et al. 2008: 53), answering clinical questions concerning “What is it”, “How is it experienced?”. 
For instance, phenomenological studies may provide information about experiences of families towards 
aggressive behavior by a relative who is affected by dementia (cf. Straus et al. 2011: 110f). 
Qualitative methods are additions to the clinical methods in clinical epidemiology (cf. 2.4.2. above). Such 
methods are mainly oriented towards the process, and not the outcome of clinical interventions (cf. 
Cullum et al. 2008: ibid.). However, it is important to note that answering such questions is supplemental 
to application of evidence (see e.g. Straus et al. 2011: 110f), and does not change the primary aim of EBP 
towards application of outcome-based research. 
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Conducting the steps of the EBP process is thus representative of scientific knowledge 
acquisition.60 
Scientific knowledge in EBP is typically associated with “evidence”, i.e. the results of some 
scientific research, most typically generated from outcome-based research, to be used as 
a basis for determining whether an intervention is effective or not. However, no EBP 
model excludes non-epidemiologic evidence sources. As mentioned, EBP covers a broad 
field of health-care disciplines, directed at multiple different clinical scenarios. These 
scenarios may create clinical questions of which epidemiologic evidence sources, or any 
scientific sources, are not always sufficient or available. 
Thus, EBP exhibits a broader scope of evidence than in clinical epidemiology. Following 
Guyatt et al, EBP includes a broad definition of evidence:  
[a]ny empirical observation or report of a symptom or mental state constitutes 
evidence, whether systematically collected or not. Thus, the unsystematic 
observations of individual clinicians constitute a source of evidence, a patient’s 
report of feeling tiredness or pain would represent a second feature of evidence, 
physiologic experiments constitute another source, and clinical trial results 
constitute a fourth. (Guyatt et al 2015: 16)61 
 
As such, evidence refers to any empirical ground for a belief: In this view, even a singular 
unsystematic observation of a phenomenon would constitute evidential belief. This points 
                                                          
60 This theoretical argument is inspired by a personal conversation with Per Olav Vandvik, a Norwegian 
EBP proponent and student of Guyatt. My question concerned whether an EBP practice is considered 
evidence-based, even in cases where no research evidence is identified. In response, Vandvik claimed that 
the EBP clinician would have to start by following step 1 and 2 of the EBP process (i.e. formulating 
answerable questions and search for research-data related to this question). Thus, by following these 
steps, the very practice of becoming aware that there is no evidence, would itself be based on evidence-
based principles.  
61 The definition of evidence put forward by Guyatt et al. may also be paraphrased according to the 
relational concept of evidence (cf. 1.3.1. above), as “any empirical observation or report of a symptom or 
mental state constitutes evidence, whether systematically collected or not, to the extent it affects the 
belief, directly or indirectly, in a hypothesis about that a certain intervention is clinically effective”. 
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to a very broad and pragmatic orientation toward evidence, in principle regardless of 
whether the evidence is representative of scientific knowledge. 
However, not every model of EBP is congruent with this broad conception of evidence. 
While any EBP model includes non-epidemiologic evidence, there are several models that 
do not include non-scientific knowledge as evidence. For instance, Herbert et al. state that 
“In our view, practice can only be evidence-based when it uses high quality evidence 
clinical research” (Herbert et al. 2005: 2). In effect, such a view on evidence will only 
accept evidence sources ranked high up in any hierarchy as the best available evidence. A 
similar view can be found in evidence-based medicine – how to practice and teach it 
(Straus et al. 2011): “Expertise is essential in authoring recommendations for clinical care, 
but it is not enough to ensure that the recommendations are also “evidence-based”.”  
At the other extremity, Djulbegovic et al. offer an even broader view on evidence, allowing  
[t]he use of private evidence (i.e., a unique patient’s experience, pain, etc.) that is 
not accessible to multiple individuals although it still requires that elicitation of that 
evidence be reproducible”. (Djulbegovic et al. 2009:165) 
 
While it may be controversial to include a patient’s experiences as evidence, the 
requirement of reproducibility suggests that it is viewed – at least potentially – as scientific 
knowledge. 
Regardless of their epistemic origins, all evidence-sources are still assessed, according to 
clinical epidemiology principles – representative of scientific knowledge. According to the 
hierarchical ranking of evidence, EBP also exhibits the same preference for outcome-
based experimental methods (when available in clinical practice), justified through 
methodological principles of validity. 
In the following analyses, both of EBP and the EBP debate, “evidence” will be used in the 
sense of Guyatt’s broad definition. The stance on evidence in EBP is thus to be regarded 
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as the “best available evidence” through a continuum of evidence sources, with 
systematic reviews of RCTs on the one end of the scale and clinical expertise on the other. 
While the specific sources of evidence may represent scientific and non-scientific 
knowledge, the criteria for assessing evidence – i.e. for differentiating between and 
ranking of different evidence sources with regard to their quality and strength – is based 
on scientific knowledge. 
 
2.4.3. Non-scientific knowledge in EBP 
The term «evidence-based» can be misleading in that it may imply that all clinical practice 
must be conducted solely on the basis of evidence; that is, exclusively based on scientific 
knowledge. The usual way of presenting EBP, in accordance with the definition suggested 
in 2.2.5., is to identify its three necessary components: evidence, clinical experience, and 
patient preferences and circumstances. All three elements have to be present to validate 
the applicability of evidence to the patient at hand. 
In the EBP literature, variations of these three elements are often depicted in Venn 
diagrams, illustrating their interdependent relationship, where the practice of EBP occurs 






The integration of the three elements should be done in cooperation between the clinician 
and the patient. The actual clinical decision is thereby made by the clinician, on the basis 
of evidence, informed by the patient, and finally integrated62 into clinical practice through 
the expertise of the clinician. Thus, the point of intersection is enabled by the clinician and 
her expertise. 
Evidence is examined above, as an element of scientific knowledge (cf. section 2.4.2.). 
Clinical expertise and patient’s values and circumstances represent non-scientific 
elements. I will examine the latter element – patient’s values and circumstances – below. 
In section 2.4.3.2., I will present an analysis of clinical expertise. 
 
2.4.3.1. Patient preferences and circumstances 
A typical criticism of EBP is that it minimizes or ignores patient values and preferences (see 
Chapter 3 for a discussion of this and other kinds of criticism). While it is true that the 
earliest official EBP definition did not explicitly mention patient preferences (Guyatt et al. 
1992), the texts presenting the definition have nonetheless made essential references to 
the patient. In this text, the underlying main goal of EBP is directly related to the patient: 
“The proof of the pudding of evidence-based medicine lies in whether patients cared for 
in this fashion enjoy better health” (ibid., 2424). Later descriptions of EBP express similar 
                                                          
62 Although “integration” is an often-used term in the EBP literature, there are few clarifying descriptions 
of it. I concur with Howick (2011) that “integration” in this context is to be understood as a particular kind 
of “clinical expertise”. As a consequence of this, Howick suggests that the definition of EBP offered by 
Straus et al. (2011) should be changed from “Evidence based medicine requires the integration of the best 
research evidence with our clinical expertise and our patient’s unique values and circumstances” to “EBP 
requires clinical expertise to integrate the best research evidence with patient values and circumstances” 
(Howick 2011: 177). 
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remarks, such as in Straus et al., 2011: 22) stating that patients serve as the starting point 
for any practice and teaching of EBP.  
Patient’s preferences and circumstances constitute necessary parts of the decision-
making process and concerns, belonging to the non-scientific aspects of EBP decision-
making.63 To maintain systematic adequacy, I will discuss patient preferences and patient 
circumstances separately.  
 
 Patient preferences  
In the EBP literature, as well as in the suggested definition of EBP above (cf. section 2.2.5.) 
knowledge concerning the patient is expressed in relation to the patient’s “preferences” 
and “circumstances”. According to Guyatt et al., “patient preferences” refers to  
“The relative value on various health states. Preferences are determined by values, 
beliefs, and attitudes that patients bring to bear in considering what they will gain 
– or lose – as a result of a management decision.” (Guyatt et al. 2015: 666).  
 
Patient preferences, then, are the sum of the patient’s beliefs and attitudes relevant to 
the clinical encounter with the clinician. The attitudes of the patient involve subjective 
experiences and value-judgments with regard to what the patient considers desirable or 
undesirable (cf. Warren et al. 2010). Based on their preferences, patients may override 
recommendations of clinical interventions. For instance, patients can choose alternative 
treatments, refuse treatment, and seek second opinions (cf. Cullum et al. 2008: 13).  
                                                          
63 Of course, the patient can possess justified true beliefs about her condition as well. To the extent that 
the patient’s beliefs are provided by scientific data, these beliefs are justified as scientific knowledge. 
Cullum et al. note that, due to an increasing degree of access to clinical information, some patients 
(particularly patients with chronic conditions), often gain more knowledge about their condition than the 
clinician (cf. Cullum et al. 2008: 13). In the clinical encounter, knowledge possessed by the patient may be 
expressed, and in any case interpreted by the clinician, with reference to the patient’s preferences. 
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 “Patient circumstances”  
“Patient circumstances” include two distinct elements: the clinical state of the individual 
patient, and the clinical setting” (cf. Straus et al. 2011: 1). The patient’s clinical state is the 
object of which the clinician aims to improve, first by identifying it (through a diagnosis) 
and then by acting upon it, e.g., by recommending a certain therapeutic course of action, 
justified by valid evidence considered applicable to both patient preferences and 
circumstances.  
The clinical setting – as the second element of patient circumstances – refers to any 
external contextual factor, such as limited availability of evidence-sources, medicaments, 
technology, equipment, or economical limitations. These factors are also included as 
elements that the clinician has to integrate to consider whether a particular evidence 
source should be applied in clinical practice. 
 
 “Knowledge concerning patient preferences and circumstances” in the EBP 
process 
Together, patient preferences and circumstances pervade every step of the EBP process: 
The generation of clinical questions (step 1) depends on information interpreted by the 
clinician concerning the patient’s clinical state and preferences. Identifying the best 
evidence (step 2) depends on circumstances in the clinical setting – e.g., regarding 
accessibility of evidence through electronic data-bases. Critical appraisal (step 3) of 
external validity is dependent on similarities between the test-population and the 
individual patient (e.g., similarities between inclusion- and exclusion-criteria of the test-
subjects in a research study compared with the patient). Integrating the evidence (step 4) 
entails consideration of whether the recommendation of a particular intervention is 
preferred by the patient, based on patient preferences, and of whether the surrounding 
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clinical setting provides the necessary requirements (e.g. with regard to availability of 
medicaments and equipment). The evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency in the 
execution of the previous steps of decision-making (step 5), is directly dependent on 
whether the clinical decisions conducted through the previous steps led to better 
outcomes in the clinical care provided for the individual patient.  
Epistemologically speaking, knowledge about patient preferences and circumstances 
concerns how the patient, informed by the EBP clinician, values the content and possible 
consequences of treatment options. It is thus a necessary part of the decision-making 
process, belonging to the non-scientific aspects of clinical decision-making.  
In the EBP definition suggested in section 2.3.5. above, and in line with most other EBP 
definitions (e.g., in Straus et al. 2011), patient preferences and circumstances are included 
as the objects with which every other step of the EBP process must be “in accordance”. In 
this definition, the EBP clinician, by making use of clinical experience, identifies, assesses 
and applies the evidence – “in accordance with patient preferences and circumstances”. 
What does this entail? 
Patient preferences and circumstances are integrated into clinical decision-making by 
virtue of the clinician’s knowledge, based on professional knowledge of the patient’s 
preferences and circumstances. This means that, in order to enable such an integration, 
the knowledge, beliefs, and attitudes of the patient have to be interpreted by the clinician 
as explicit preferences regarding the clinical decision (e.g., the patient’s preference for 
one treatment option A over option B).64 
                                                          
64 This is also the case when the patient willfully overrides recommendations of clinical interventions, e.g. 
by declining treatment. In such cases, the clinician may attempt to convince the patient to decide 
otherwise – based on an interpretation of the patient’s attitudes and claims. If this does not change the 
patient’s decision, the patient is responsible for the decision, in turn interpreted by the clinician and 
integrated into clinical practice, e.g. by recommending an alternative treatment, or no treatment.  
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Thus, “patient preferences and circumstances” refers not only to the patient, but also to 
the EBP clinician’s understanding of and responsibility for the patient‘s knowledge, 
subjective experiences, and attitudes, as well as of the external circumstances that may 
affect the clinical decision-making. This has to do with the clinician’s clinical expertise, 
which I will turn to in the following section. 
 
2.4.3.2. Clinical expertise in EBP 
As Howick (2011: 160) notes, “clinical expertise” in EBP is an ambiguous term. In EBP 
literature, “clinical expertise” is used in several different ways, fulfilling different roles 
within the practice of clinical decision-making. However, the various roles of expertise are 
expressed with varying clarity. I will claim that all of these roles must be considered 
necessary elements of the model. 
Clinical expertise refers to non-scientific knowledge. Following the categorization of the 
two kinds of non-scientific knowledge above (2.4.2.), clinical expertise can be categorized 
in two main kinds of knowledge, described in 2.3 above: (1) propositional knowledge and 
(2) procedural knowledge. Examples of expert propositional knowledge are (1) claims 
about that a therapy is effective for an individual, based on judgments of the clinical 
situation (cf. Howick 2011: 160); and (2) beliefs about the features that may affect the 
applicability of research results to an individual patient. Examples of expert procedural 
knowledge are (3) the ability to elicit patient values and preferences (cf. ibid.), and (4) the 
ability to perform a surgical operation. In the following subsections, differentiation 
between propositional and procedural knowledge will demonstrate important nuances 




2.4.3.2.1. “Clinical expertise” in the EBP literature 
 “Clinical expertise”, as defined in standard EBP literature, is typically and implicitly linked 
with procedural knowledge exclusively. In the EBP literature, “clinical expertise” is 
typically referred to as the ability to integrate evidence with patient preferences and 
circumstances, and the abilities necessary to perform specific clinical tasks (e.g. ibid; 
Straus et al 2011). For instance, Brian Haynes describes “clinical expertise” as: 
[t]he general basic skills of clinical practice as well as the experience of the 
individual practitioner. Clinical expertise must encompass and balance the patient’s 
clinical state and circumstances, relevant research evidence, and the patient’s 
preferences and actions if a successful and satisfying result is to occur”. (Haynes 
2002: 37) 
 
In this description, expertise is presented as a “basic skill”, referring to what was labelled 
“procedural knowledge” in section 2.4.1. above. The requirement that expertise has to 
“encompass” (which refers synonymously to “integrate”) the other elements of the EBP 
definition (evidence, patient preferences, and circumstances) also refers to this kind of 
procedural knowledge – as something which is exercised rather than claimed.  
Straus et al. 2011 defines “Clinical expertise” in a similar way, as an ability:  
By clinical expertise we mean the ability to use our clinical skills and past experience 
to rapidly identify each patient’s unique health state and diagnosis, their individual 
risks and benefits of potential interventions, and their personal values and 
expectations. (Straus et al. 2011: 1) 
Notably, “clinical expertise” is presented here as “an ability to use a skill”, making the 
description of expertise more complex. The differentiation between “ability” and “skill” 
may serve as a demonstration of the difference between “clinical expertise” and “clinical 
experience”.  
“Clinical expertise” is referred to as a certain ability to use “clinical skills and past 
experience”, and through this use identify relevant health care matters related to the 
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patient. What are “clinical skills” in this context, and how do they differ from “skills” in 
general? Straus et al. state that “clinical skills” include “history-taking, and physical 
examination” (ibid., xv). Skills are also mentioned as relating to “seeking and appraising 
evidence” (ibid., 7), “asking [research] questions”, as well as “listening skills” (ibid., 22), 
searching skills (ibid., 213), and “discrete “microskills”, such as conducting a MEDLINE 
search or a critical appraisal (ibid., 214). In general, “clinical skills” are related to the skills 
the EBP clinician is able to perform, on the basis of his or her health care professional 
education and training.65  
The focus, however, is not on the use of “clinical skills” or “past experience” as such, but 
on the “ability” to use these skills. The difference between “skill” and “ability” can serve 
as basis for differentiating between “skills” in general and “expert abilities”: The use of 
clinical skills is something any clinician is capable of doing, but what separates the clinical 
novice from the clinical expert is the ability to use these skills in an efficient manner (i.e., 
“to rapidly identify” relevant health issues pertaining to her patients). The same goes for 
the ability to make use of “past experience”, where the clinician is able to make use of her 
experience in an efficient manner (whereas the clinical novice is likely to overlook or rely 
too much on such experience).66 An example of this can be drawn from the wording of the 
definition: “to rapidly identify each patient’s unique health state and diagnosis” – a phrase 
that seems to suggest a differentiation between the “clinical expert” and “clinical novice” 
                                                          
65 In contrast, “skills” in general refer to any skill regardless of its relevance to EBP practice. Based on this 
basic difference, it seems appropriate to include “specific skills necessary in EBP practice”. In recent EBP 
literature, this is suggested in descriptions of “core competencies in EBP. See also footnote 29.  
66 Straus et al. tend to present “expertise”, “skills” and “abilities” in an unnecessarily complicated manner, 
not always inherently consistent. This is the case when they add “judgment” to the description, 
complicating matters even further. Judgment is described as an ability “[a]bout evidence itself or about 
how to integrate evidence with other knowledge, clinical expertise and patient preferences and 
circumstances” (ibid., 227). Here, judgment is situated external to expertise. The ability to integrate 
evidence with patient preferences into a clinical practice, then, is not based on the skill of “clinical 
expertise” itself but on “judgment”. Elsewhere, “judgment” means to integrate evidence “via the 
practitioner’s experience and expertise” (ibid., 35), contradicting the former description. These 
terminological nuances are less relevant to the present analysis, and I will not examine them any further. 
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through the rationale that identification of relevant matters is made more “rapidly”, and 
presumably on a more experienced basis, by the expert than the novice. 
The clinical expert’s skills and abilities refer exclusively to what I have described as 
procedural knowledge, meaning knowledge exercised in the performance of some task 
(cf. 2.4.1.). Conversely, the definition presented by Straus et al. makes no reference to any 
kind of propositional knowledge of the clinical expert.67 In principle, this is problematic, in 
particular with regard to evidence that has to be expressed in some manner. Even when 
“tacit” or “private” beliefs based on “hunches” is included as evidence (e.g. by Greenhalgh 
1999), it has to be articulated and is thereby propositional knowledge. In defence of Straus 
et al., the lack of reference to propositional knowledge in the definition is in line with their 
exclusion of non-scientific evidence sources (cf. 2.4.2. above). However, as I will discuss 
below, there are several other instances when practicing EBP that require the use of 
propositional knowledge. 
 
2.4.3.2.2. Five kinds of expertise in EBP 
Expertise in EBP can be subdivided into five distinct roles (cf. Howick 2011: 160). 
(1) General clinical expertise: personal judgments pertaining to the putative average 
effects of a therapy. 
(2) Individual clinical expertise: personal judgment about the effectiveness of a therapy 
for an individual.  
                                                          
67 Recently, Straus and others (Albarqouni et al. 2018) have presented a significantly broader description 
of skills and beliefs – described as “core competencies” – in EBP. “Competencies” are defined as “a 
combination of attributes, such as applied knowledge, skills and attitudes, that enable an individual to 
perform a set of tasks to an appropriate standard efficiently and effectively” (ibid, 2). The paper presents 
a total of 68 competencies considered necessary for standard clinical practice and sorts these 
competencies according to the five steps of the EBP process. Most of these competencies implicitly refer 
to propositional scientific knowledge.  
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(3) Integrating expertise: knowledge of how the best evidence can be integrated with 
patient values and circumstances. 
(4) Therapeutic expertise: Knowledge of how to amplify the potential therapeutic benefit 
of an intervention. 
(5) Performative clinical expertise: Abilities to solve various tasks involved in the clinical 
encounter.68 
The main differences between the five notions of “expertise” are between (1)–(2) and (3)–
(5). (1) and (2) are concerned with assessment of the putative effects of some therapy, 
based on clinical judgment alone (e.g. based on experiences from one’s own clinical 
practice) and can be considered as evidential support for claims about treatment 
effectiveness (to the extent the particular EBP model includes non-scientific evidence).  
Expertise referring to (3) (4) and (5) is not applicable as evidential support and involves 
tacit knowledge (cf. Howick 160). Instead, these kinds of expertise are to be considered 
necessary in any practical performance in EBP. “Integrating expertise” refers to the 
experiences and abilities needed to integrate evidence with patient preferences and 
circumstances. For instance, a nurse, using her clinical expertise, may override research 
evidence indicating that a certain intervention is optimal, if, for example, the patient is 
too frail to undergo the suggested intervention (cf. Cullum et al. 2008: 13).  
 “Therapeutic expertise” concerns experiences and abilities to improve benefits.69 
Examples of such expertise include procedural knowledge of how to enhance placebo 
effects (cf. Howick 2011), and of how to communicate empathically with the patient to 
                                                          
68 This list is a slightly modified model of “[f]ive distinct roles for clinical expertise in EBM”, by Howick 
(2011: 160). Howick refers to the first two kinds as “judgments” (without distinguishing it clearly from 
“expertise”). What I label “(5) Performative clinical expertise”, Howick describes as “clinical expertise», 
presumably implying that this is what the term typically refers to. 
69 This means benefits other than benefits measured through outcome-based research – the latter refers 
to claims or empirical observations supported by scientific knowledge.  
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reduce a patient’s anxiety due to uncertainty concerning treatment options (cf. Howick et 
al., 2018). 
“Performative clinical expertise” refers to propositional knowledge that is manifested 
through the use of particular skills, e.g., the ability to recognize symptoms, elucidate signs, 
take blood pressure and perform a surgical operation. 
None of these five kinds of clinical expertise are controversial. On the contrary, they are 
universal to any health practice. The most important point in the analysis of different kinds 
of expertise is that all these are necessary elements in the multiple ways in which EBP 
practice may be performed.  
Further examination of the non-evidential kinds of knowledge would be an interesting 
topic to explore but falls outside the aim of this PhD dissertation. Instead, I will end this 
section on non-scientific knowledge with a brief discussion of clinical expertise as 
evidential knowledge. 
 
2.4.3.2.3. Clinical expertise as evidential knowledge  
As discussed in 2.4.2. above, EBP entails a broad definition of evidence, as “any empirical 
observation about the apparent relation between events constitutes potential evidence”. 
In general, then, evidence refers to any empirically based claim that is able to serve as 
justification for beliefs in that a particular course of clinical action improves clinical 
performance. When scientific evidence is not available, most70 EBP proponents view 
clinical expertise as an adequate replacement: it would be inefficient in EBP clinical 
practice to deny the use of clinical expertise in principle whenever other kinds of scientific 
evidence were lacking. On the other hand, expert knowledge as evidence should never 
trump any other sources of evidence: In any actual clinical scenario, evidence from 
                                                          
70 But see 2.4.1. for exceptions to this view.  
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systematic scientific research (whenever available) is considered superior to the use of 
expertise as evidential knowledge.  
As noted in section 2.4.2, some EBP proponents also allow reference to the patient’s 
unique preferences (e.g. experiences of pain) as evidence. For instance, a patient’s 
complaint of serious chest pain can be applied by the clinician as evidence for 
recommending an alternative treatment option rather than the intervention that would 
otherwise be considered the best option. The patient’s statement may also be used as 
evidence that additional information is needed before formulating the clinical question at 
the beginning of the decision-making process. 
 
2.4.4. Concepts of EBP 
Based on the possible combinations of scientific and non-scientific dimensions of 
knowledge, it is theoretically possible to differentiate between at least three different 
versions of the concept of EBP. I will conclude this section on the structuring of knowledge 
in EBP by identifying the three variants in which the EBP model can be interpreted: 
“Moderate”, “maximal”, and “minimal” EBP. 
Moderate EBP is by far the most reasonable version, in which clinical decision-making is 
based on scientific research and methods whenever possible, and in which non-scientific 
knowledge is considered necessary as an additional element when implementing evidence 
into practice. In the EBP debate, most proponents and opponents of EBP tend to represent 
this moderate concept of EBP. I will address the moderate concept of EBP in more detail 
at the conclusion of this section.  
At both extremes of the moderate concept of EBP, theoretical EBP concepts can be 
constructed. At the one extremity, a minimal concept of EBP cab be identified, in which 
non-scientific knowledge must be considered external to the model, subordinating EBP to 
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clinical epidemiology. At the other extremity, it is possible to include “maximal EBP”, in 
which clinical expertise is considered superior to scientific knowledge, and thus is able to 
override evidence at any time during the clinical decision-making process.  
I consider the concept of “maximal EBP” as an extremity of no relevance to the actual EBP 
debate. The minimal concept is also an extremity, and it seems unreasonable to attribute 
such an interpretation to any author in the EBP debate. However, there are certain 
descriptions of EBP in parts of the literature that may be said to be tangent to such an 
interpretation. In most cases, I do not consider it reasonable to equate these 
interpretations with what the authors actually intend.71 Instead, my aim is to demonstrate 
how different descriptions of EBP can be problematic when interpreted in light of the 
possible combinations of scientific and non-scientific dimensions of knowledge. 
A minimal description of EBP is already implied in the discussion of Daly above (2.3.4), 
with regard to one interpretation of the description of EBP as representing “an important 
initiative in providing scientific evidence for clinical decision-making” (cf. Daly: 2005: 205). 
According to this interpretation, EBP is about providing evidence relevant to clinical 
decision-making but does not include elements from the decision-making process in its 
concept. Consequently, both clinical expertise and patient preferences are excluded from 
the concept of EBP.72 
A typical minimal concept of EBP consists of understanding EBP as synonymous with or 
subordinate to clinical epidemiology. An example of such a view may be found in Fletcher 
et al. 2014, who view EBP as a sub-category of clinical epidemiology and describe it as “a 
modern term for the application of clinical epidemiology to the care of patients” (Fletcher 
et al., 2014: 4f). A similar view is often presented by critics of EBP; for instance by Miles 
                                                          
71 However, as I will discuss in Chapter 4, there are certain theoretical conceptions in the Norwegian 
criticism that seem to imply a minimal concept of EBP. 
72 Notably, this interpretation contrasts with the second interpretation of Daly’s description (as presented 
in section 2.3.4. above), which I find more reasonable.  
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(2009a), who criticizes EBP’s narrow scope by asserting that “EBP remains, simply, the 
application of epidemiological data to clinical practice, nothing less and certainly nothing 
more” (Miles 2009a: 928). 
One could argue that both Fletcher et al. and Miles open for “moderate EBP” when using 
the term “application of” clinical epidemiology and epidemiologic data: When 
epidemiologic evidence is “applied”, clinical expertise is implied as a necessary element. 
But “application” in their descriptions is not specified with regard to whether it is based 
on clinical epidemiology principles alone, or is understood in accordance with EBPs 
extension to practice (cf. section 2.2). According to the definition of “clinical 
epidemiology” in 1.1.4., “application of evidence” refers to evidence assessments 
exclusively in terms of internal and external validity, regardless of patient preferences and 
circumstances in the actual decision-making at the point of care. In this case, the external 
validity would consist in questions about generalizability of the (average) research result 
to another population and applicability, without any judgments concerning unique patient 
preferences and circumstances (cf. 2.2. above). In this context, I am interpreting 
“application” in a very restricted, perhaps unreasonable way, and I do not think that Daly, 
Fletcher et al. or Miles would agree with me. If asserting agreement, however, they would 
have to specify how and to what extent “application of evidence” moves beyond the 
framework of clinical epidemiology.  
A third example, in my view, is more reasonable. This interpretation derives from 
Greenhalgh’s description of EBP:  
“Evidence-based medicine is the use of mathematical estimates of the risk of 
benefit and harm, derived from high-quality research on population samples [that 
is, epidemiology], to inform clinical decision-making in the diagnosis, investigation 
or management of individual patients. The defining feature of EBP, then, is the use 
of figures derived from research on populations to inform decisions about 




Through such a definition, EBP is understood exclusively based on principles of clinical 
epidemiology, that is, on scientific knowledge. Thus, neither the patient’s values nor 
clinical expertise are included in the concept of EBP. Greenhalgh seems to imply that the 
practical extension of EBP (which differentiates it from clinical epidemiology in the first 
place; cf. 2.2.) is not inherent in the concept at all. Instead, non-scientific knowledge is 
included in what Greenhalgh labels “narrative-based” knowledge: 
[…] Dave Sackett emphasized that evidence-based practice was no threat to old-
fashioned clinical experience or judgment. The question of how clinicians can 
manage to be both ‘evidence-based’ (i.e. systematically informing their decisions 
by research evidence) and narrative-based (i.e. embodying all the richness of their 
accumulated clinical anecdotes and treating each patient’s problem as a unique 
story rather than a ‘case of X’) is a difficult one to address philosophically […]. 
(Greenhalgh 2010: 5f) 
 
In Greenhalgh’s terminology, “narrative-based” seems fully comparable to what is 
described above as the extension to practice, in which the clinician has to make use of 
clinical expertise to be able to assess and integrate evidence into the clinical situation 
according to the patient’s preferences and circumstances. In effect, Greenhalgh’s 
distinction between “evidence-based” and “narrative-based” implies that any use of non-
scientific knowledge is exterior to the concept of EBP. Through such a position, it is difficult 
to understand how non-scientific knowledge is to be related to scientific knowledge at all, 
leaving EBP as a scientific rigorous, though practical vague concept. While my 
interpretations of Daly, Fletcher et al. and Miles are arguably weak, I find it difficult to 
interpret the quotes from Greenhalgh in any other way.  
 
2.4.4.1. A moderate concept of EBP 
In “moderate EBP”, clinical decision-making is based on scientific research and methods 
whenever possible, and where non-scientific knowledge, such as expertise and patient 
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preferences, are considered necessary elements when applying evidence into clinical 
practice. In addition, if scientific knowledge is not available, clinical expertise may 
constitute evidence.  
On basis of the previous analysis in this chapter, the moderate concept of EBP is not only 
most typical, but the only reasonable combination of scientific and non-scientific 
knowledge. Every EBP model and description I have referred to in this chapter – with the 
exception of Greenhalgh’s version above – is representative of the moderate concept. 
Davidoff et al.’s (1995) “five linked ideas” (cf. 2.3.1. above) and Straus et al.’s (2011) 
process of EBP (cf. 2.3.2. above) may serve as typical examples. Guyatt et al.’s (2015) 
alternative model of the EBP process is also representative of a moderate concept of EBP, 
albeit to a lesser degree than Davidoff et al. and Straus et al., because the individual 
clinician’s autonomy in performing EBP is limited in favour of following guidelines. Within 
this moderate concept of EBP, it is also possible to distinguish EBP models that include 
non-scientific knowledge as evidence (such as Guyatt et al 2015) from EBP models that do 
not (such as Straus et al. 2011 and Herbert et al. 2005).  
The concept of EBP in Miles (2009a) may be interpreted as a moderate concept of EBP if 
“application of epidemiological data to clinical practice” (implicitly) refers to the non-
scientific elements of the clinician’s expertise and the patient’s preferences. In this case, 
Miles’ description would refer to a moderate concept of EBP, with a restrictive range of 
epidemiologic evidence sources.  
It is reasonable to assume that differences within the moderate concept of EBP are a 
matter of professional differences: Some health care professions may have good reasons 
for including or excluding non-scientific knowledge as evidence, and equally good reasons 
for different degrees of confidence in the individual clinician’s clinical expertise. However, 
these differences are in turn interpreted by EBP opponents, who may understand EBP as 
a more unified concept. Some opponents may also misinterpret a limited confidence in 
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individual expertise in favour of following guidelines as a function which in effect excludes 
clinical expertise completely. In the following analysis of the EBP debate (Chapters 3 and 






The main aim of this chapter has been to clarify the concept of EBP, in particular by 
examining scientific and non-scientific kinds of knowledge. In 2.1., a brief history of the 
development of EBP demonstrated that an increasing recognition of different knowledge 
sources is an essential feature of EBP literature. In 2.2., the essential differences between 
clinical epidemiology and EBP were analysed through a discussion of what the extension 
to practice entails: At the point of care, the clinician has to integrate evidence into clinical 
practice according to the patient’s preferences. At this point, the clinician is dependent on 
certain kinds of knowledge that are not provided through the clinical epidemiology 
framework.  
In 2.3., EBP has been described in multiple, contiguous, ways where four core elements 
have been identified: (1) EBP can be described through certain “linked ideas” pertaining 
to the basis for clinical decision-making, whereof the attention to clinical (epidemiological) 
research evidence is the most controversial. (2) EBP can be understood as a process 
consisting of certain steps the clinician should undertake in order to practice evidence-
based practice. The process of EBP is something that is either done, used or replicated, 
corresponding to the degree of the clinician’s autonomy in assessing and using evidence 
in clinical practice. (3) EBP can be described as a principle of hierarchies, whereby evidence 
is ranked with regard to various criteria, mirroring the five processual steps of EBM. (4) 
EBP is also identified as a structure for decision-making, which constitutes the main aim 
of EBP.  
In clinical decision-making, the use of evidence in EBP is not only a question of scientific 
knowledge but relates to non-scientific knowledge as well – in particular referring to 
knowledge concerning clinical expertise and patient preferences and circumstances. On 
the basis of these core elements, a five-partite definition of EBP was presented. Through 
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its extensive range, the definition identifies demarcating features with regard to its main 
aim of clinical decision-making, its controversial character and its dependence on both 
scientific and non-scientific knowledge.  
In 2.4., the concept of EBP has been examined in more detail through the structuring 
between scientific and non-scientific knowledge in EBP. This examination demonstrates 
what kinds of knowledge are inherent in the concept of EBP. In particular, I have 
differentiated between scientific knowledge (research evidence) and non-scientific 
knowledge (clinical expertise and patient preferences). Based on the analysis of scientific 
knowledge, I suggested an interpretation of evidence in EBP as a continuum between 
“best available evidence” – typically consisting of RCTs – on the one extremity, and clinical 
expertise on the other. Non-scientific knowledge was further defined as either 
propositional or procedural knowledge. Both kinds of knowledge are necessary for EBP. 
Analyses of the EBP literature demonstrated that procedural knowledge is the most 
common when referring to expertise. However, five different kinds of clinical expertise 
were identified, with only one specific kind (performative clinical expertise) referring to 
procedural knowledge exclusively. Furthermore, some of these kinds of expert knowledge 
can also be applied as evidential knowledge. To the extent that non-scientific knowledge 
is included in EBP models, it is always ranked at the bottom of evidence hierarchies.  
Based on the possible combinations of scientific and non-scientific dimensions of 
knowledge, I presented three different theoretical concepts of EBP: “Maximal”, 
“minimal”, and “moderate” EBP. The concepts differ relative to the extent to which non-
scientific knowledge is taken into consideration. In light of the previous analyses, only 
moderate EBP is justifiable. However, I also discussed instances in the EBP discourse in 
which some descriptions tended to imply a minimal concept of EBP.  
While non-scientific knowledge in general is both important and challenging, it is not 
unique, neither conceptually nor practically, to EBP. In any health care (and presumably 
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in any practical profession in general) where scientific knowledge is somehow involved, 
there will necessarily be a structural relation to non-scientific knowledge. In my view, the 
reason that this relation seems to occur more often in the EBP literature than in non-EBP 
literature, is that the discourse on evidence and the affinity to scientific vocabulary makes 
it more palpable, and not more controversial or problematic than in non-EBP practice. 
Based on these considerations, I will conclude the examination of EBP by highlighting its 
epistemic structure. In general, this structure of EBP is rather simple: EBP consists of three 
main elements – evidence, clinical experience, and patient’s preferences. The first 
element represents scientific knowledge and the two latter represent non-scientific 
knowledge. Evidence refers most typically to scientific knowledge. In cases where such 
evidence is lacking, clinical experience is often allowed as non-scientific knowledge. There 
are several other important features in this tripartite structure, as discussed in the 
chapters above. The most important feature with regard to the following chapters, 3 and 
4, on the EBP debate, is that both kinds of knowledge are equally necessary to the concept 










Since its inception in 1992, EBP has become highly influential in modern health care, with 
considerable impact in health care practice, education and policy-making. Proponents 
have disseminated literature on EBP through a vast number of textbooks, journals and 
websites. Although definitions and descriptions vary among different authors and across 
various professions, the core content of EBP is the same: to provide an adequate and 
efficient basis for clinical decision-making with regard to treatment options in individual 
health care by basing clinical decision-making on the best available evidence, assessed and 
applied by the clinician, in consultation with the patient (cf., section 2.2. above). The novel 
idea of this model is that the basis for decision-making is based on scientific evidence, 
provided through the scientific framework of clinical epidemiology (cf., Chapter 1).  
The main attraction of the concept of EBP is that it enables identification of an effective 
treatment in a reliable way by using clear and concise criteria. However, the confidence 
in and the use of EBP are highly controversial matters. EBP has been the target of incessant 
criticism attacking various aspects of the EBP model. EBM proponents in turn have 
responded to some of the criticism, and these responses have then become subject to 
further criticism. The arguments by proponents and opponents for and against EBP 
comprise the EBP debate, which is the subject in this chapter.  
While parts of the EBM debate provide nuanced and important points, other parts tend 
to be less sensitive, creating an over-simplified and superficial image of EBP, leading to 
neither a constructive debate nor a better understanding of the subject. Notably, these 
characteristics are commonly shared by proponents as well as opponents. Regarding the 
110 
 
opponents, the criticism has tended to be too narrow and one-tracked. In addition, many 
of the critical arguments are similar to one other, so that the quantity of contentions does 
not necessarily represent differentiated objections. In terms of the proponents, criticism 
is seldom met with adequate responses. When responses are given, the criticisms being 
refuted are typically labelled misconceptions, which in turn leads the EBM opponents to 
accuse proponents of arrogance and lack of critical rigour in the EBP debate. The main aim 
of Chapter 3 is to identify the main arguments against EBP and to discuss whether the 
arguments and claims raised are valid and relevant.  
In the following analysis of the EBP debate, I will demonstrate that most criticisms can be 
categorized broadly within four main issues. I will also demonstrate that parts of the 
criticism present nuanced and important points, while other parts tend to be less sensitive 
to the EBP model. Such images of EBP are often over-simplified and superficial, creating 
straw-man fallacies about EBP, leading to neither a constructive debate nor a better 
understanding of the subject.  
 
3.1.1. What is controversial in EBP? 
In general, the EBP debate concerns a controversy about whether or not the EBP model 
provides an adequate basis for clinical decision-making. The essential controversial point 
here is the use of evidence from epidemiologic research in a clinical setting. In Chapter 1, 
I presented the reasons why epidemiologic, outcome-based data is considered the most 
reliable source of evidence for clinical interventions and listed the methodological 
features through which various kinds of evidence are assessed and viewed hierarchically 
in accordance with clinical epidemiology principles. In particular, randomized comparative 
studies are considered the best kinds of evidence available due to their ability to reduce 
the risk of bias, and thereby ensure high internal validity. Such studies aim at determining 
the effectiveness of clinical interventions in general, measured by the average effect of 
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interventions in groups of patients. To implement such results in the form of evidence to 
justify recommendations for or against clinical interventions in direct patient care, criteria 
of external validity are applied so as to assess the degree to which the evidence is to be 
considered useful in clinical practice. Both the view of outcome-based data as the most 
reliable evidence source and the degree to which such evidence is useful in clinical practice 
are controversial.  
In Chapter 2, I demonstrated how EBP’s extension to practice entails an expansion from 
the clinical epidemiology framework. This expansion consists in a broadening of the 
definition of evidence and includes two additional elements pertaining to non-scientific 
knowledge: the use of expertise and the attention to patient preferences and 
circumstances. Neither expertise nor patient preferences and circumstances are 
controversial by themselves. Rather, these elements become controversial when 
discussing the extent to which the use of expertise and patient preferences and 
circumstances are compatible with the methodological features of clinical epidemiology.  
What is beyond controversy is the principle that health care practice should be based on 
some form of evidence. As John Worrall, a prominent critic of aspects concerning RCT’s in 
EBP, states: “It is surely obvious that medicine, like any other rational activity, must be 
based on evidence. The interest is in the details” (2007: 1). The following examination of 
the critical arguments against EBM will proceed with the same motive ‒ to look at the 
details in the criticism. I will identify the specific aspects of the EBP model that are 
addressed and will discuss the extent to which the specific kinds of criticism offer valid 
and relevant arguments with regard to deficiencies in the EBP model. I will also comment 
on cases where EBM proponents have responded to the criticism and examine whether 




3.1.2. Four main kinds of criticism of EBP 
A general observation concerning the EBP debate is that every kind of criticism raises 
claims that basic principles and concepts within the EBP model are too narrow or too 
unclear to provide an adequate basis for clinical decision-making. In my view, there are 
four main topics of criticism against EBP: the conceptual unclarity of EBP definitions (3.2); 
the scope and justification of evidence (3.3); the role of expertise (3.4); patient 
preferences and autonomy (3.5). In the following analysis of the EBP debate, various types 
of criticisms will be ordered under one of these four main topics. 
The three latter topics of criticism are tightly interconnected, corresponding to the 
tripartite model of EBP, and sometimes conflated (cf. 3.3.2 below). Criticism concerning 
expertise and patient autonomy is seldom discussed without a particular view of EBP’s 
view of evidence. Criticism regarding evidence is the most common kind, and this will be 
the subject of the most comprehensive analysis, comprising several subsections. 
 
 
3.2. Criticism concerning conceptual unclarity of EBP definitions  
 
Several critics point out that the EBP and EBM literature and definitions in general tend to 
be too general and uninformative (e.g., Blunt 2015; Ekeland 2009; Ekeli 2002; Martinsen 
2009; Miles 2009a). A typical version of this kind of criticism is that the general definitions 
veil the essential content of EBP (e.g., Ekeli 2002; Martinsen 2009).73 Some critics make 
this observation more aggressively than others. For instance, Miles (2009a) describes it as 
EBP’s “enormously vague character”, whereas Tonelli (2007) points to variations in 
different definitions and asserts that the “Humpty Dumpty character of EBM” entails that 
                                                          
73 Ekeland 2009, Ekeli 2002, and Martinsen 2009 will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4, including 
examination of their criticism of the vague concept of EBP. 
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the term of EBM (and EBP) “[m]eans just what the speaker chooses it to mean, neither 
more nor less” (Tonelli 2007: 504). 
In particular, critics stress the uninformative character of descriptions concerning clinical 
expertise. For instance, several critics (e.g., Blunt 2015: 15; Charlton and Miles (1998); 
Goldenberg 2006; Loughlin (2006); Miles (2009a; 2009b); Tonelli 2006; Zarkovich and 
Upshur 2002) have claimed that the phrase “[c]onscientious, explicit, and judicious use of 
current best evidence” found in the 1996 definition of EBM (Sackett et al. 1996: 71) is 
nothing more than a platitude. 
I consider criticism regarding conceptual unclarity of EBP definitions as relevant. Ideally, 
there should be consensus on a singular standard definition of EBP, exhibiting necessary 
and sufficient requirements for a clinical practice to be evidence-based. The lack of such 
an operational definition makes the EBP debate unnecessarily imprecise at the outset.  
However, criticism concerning this issue is seldom worked out in further detail, nor argued 
for. Instead, it may be read as an attitude towards conceptual clarification of what EBP 
really amounts to. Through this attitude, the critics identify and argue against what they 
consider to be untenable assumptions regarding the basis for clinical practice, in principle 
regardless of the definitions they make use of. It is the identification and contested 
content of these assumptions, along with the arguments made against them that 
constitute the essence of their criticism regarding evidence, expertise and patient 
preferences and circumstances in EBP – the content of which I will present in the 






3.3. Criticism concerning evidence  
 
Criticism regarding evidence in EBP primarily targets EBP’s clinical epidemiology 
framework, i.e. the attention to and confidence in epidemiologic outcome-based methods 
and data. There are four aspects of this framework that critics address in particular. Firstly, 
they claim that the epidemiologic methods exclude other sources of evidence, so that 
what counts as evidence in EBP becomes too narrow in scope. Secondly, they criticize the 
justification of alleged superiority of RCTs – that is, the claim in EBP literature that data 
generated from RCTs is the most reliable (i.e. internally valid) source of evidence. Thirdly, 
they contend that the usefulness of epidemiologic evidence sources in clinical practice 
(i.e. concerning external validity) is limited. Fourthly, they claim that there is a lack of 
empirical evidence showing that epidemiologic methods produce better outcomes than 
other methods.  
Criticisms of the second and third aspects are more nuanced and technical than the 
others. It should also be noted that criticism with regard to external and internal validity 
does not argue against the model of EBM as such. Rather, the main target in the criticism 
concerning external and external validity refers strictly speaking to the clinical 
epidemiology framework, and hence to the methodological presuppositions of EBP.  
Across these four aspects, the EBP debate is characterized by a huge amount of attention 
to evidence hierarchies. Arguments, pro and con, concerning justification of evidence 
hierarchies address the issues of how and on what basis hierarchical ranking of evidence 
can or cannot be justified. Such arguments concern both the scope of hierarchies and the 
criteria for evidence quality in terms of external and internal validity, where critics attack 
the ranking of epidemiologic evidence – and of RCTs in particular – above other kinds of 
evidence. In the following discussion on criticism regarding evidence, arguments 
115 
 
concerning evidence hierarchies will be considered through the four main aspects of 
criticism. 
Furthermore, there is a tendency in most criticism primarily to discuss evidence in EBP in 
relation to therapeutic questions. While therapeutic questions are important and likely 
represent the most typical topic in the EBP literature as well, these may lead to an 
unnecessarily narrow content and scope in the debate over EBP. 
The following discussion of criticism regarding evidence in EBP encompasses four main 
claims: The scope of what counts as evidence is deemed to be too narrow (3.2.1.); the 
alleged superiority of RCTs (3.2.2); the usefulness of applying results from randomized 
comparative evidence sources in clinical practice is limited; (3.2.3); there is lack of 
empirical evidence that EBP methods produce better outcomes than non-EBP methods 
(3.2.4). These four claims are connected, but contain distinct features, with different lines 
of arguments. I will examine each of these issues in the following sections. 
 
3.3.1. The scope of what counts as evidence is deemed to be too narrow 
This kind of criticism is set forth in two variations: either by a categorical claim that the 
content of what counts as evidence is narrow, or by a conditional claim that, even though 
several kinds of evidence are potentially included in EBP, the criteria for assessing the 
quality of evidence are too reductive and restrictive, systematically favouring 
epidemiologic kinds of evidence over other kinds of evidence. 
The categorical version is essentially a claim that only epidemiologic evidence sources 
constitute evidence in EBP (e.g. Miles 2009a). Sometimes the claim is expressed even 
more narrowly with the assertion that only randomized trials or systematic reviews 
constitute the evidence in EBP (e.g., Hampton 1997 and Swales 1999; cf. Straus & 
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McAlister 2000). As Strauss and McAlister (2000) point out, such criticism is based on a 
misperception of EBM/EBP.  
While the more general categorical claim is theoretically justifiable in terms of a narrow 
concept of EBP (cf. 2.4.4.), it does not reflect the moderate concept of EBP, which is by far 
the most reasonable version (ibid.). Through a moderate concept of EBP, such a claim is 
swiftly dismissed by reference to the definition of “evidence” as “any empirical 
observation or report of a symptom or mental state constitutes evidence, whether 
systematically collected or not” (Guyatt et al: 2015: 16; see also 2.4.2. above), or by 
reference to most existing hierarchies, which include non-randomized evidence sources, 
such as case studies. Such interpretations also serve as a straw-man fallacy to further 
debates.74 While such categorical claims are easily dismissed, the conditional claim is more 
sensitive to nuances in the model of EBP. 
The conditional claim holds that evidence in EBP has a narrow scope in that it 
systematically favours epidemiologic kinds of evidence above other kinds of evidence 
sources. This is a more relevant kind of criticism in that it targets the essential 
controversial matters of EBP – the use of epidemiological evidence from clinical 
research.75 
For instance, Miles (2009a) and Tonelli & Callahan (2001), and Tonelli (2007) claim that 
evidence in EBP (primarily in the context of EBM) is too narrowly defined through its 
clinical epidemiology framework, which in turn implies a limited methodology, 
systematically favouring epidemiologic evidence above other evidence sources (Bluhm 
                                                          
74 An entertaining example of such a straw-man claim is that of Miles et al: “The EBM protagonists are 
dazzled scientists who set out to dazzle, rejoicing like aerobatic children vaulting through the statistical 
stratosphere, casting down meta-analyses and systematic reviews to clinicians below» (Miles et al.: 1997: 
84). It should be unnecessary to point out that such descriptions of EBP proponents and methodological 
considerations are inaccurate, creating over-simplified depictions which are easy for other critics to refute. 
75 Critics presenting variations of this conditional claim most often express an awareness of the tripartite 
model of EBP and criticize the other elements of the model as well (cf. sections 3.3. and 3.4.). 
117 
 
2005, Blunt 2015, and La Caze 2008; 2009 have also contributed with highly relevant 
arguments to this kind of criticism). In the same vein, Upshur et al. (2001) and others also 
criticize EBP proponents for demonstrating an inappropriate reliance on epidemiology,76 
through EBPs assessment of any kind of evidence based on epidemiologic interpretation 
properties (i.e., internal and external validity). This is a relevant kind of criticism to which 
EBP proponents seldom respond. 
Other critics, like Sturmberg (2009), goes further, arguing that the narrow methodology 
allows only for a few clinical problems to be solved. Such criticism seems to interpret 
evidence in EBP as able to address therapeutic questions only. As described in Chapter 1, 
epidemiologic methods are designed to answer clinical questions concerning diagnosis 
and prognosis, as well as therapy.  
While both categorical and conditional claims about the narrow scope of evidence in EBP 
may be dismissed by referring to the aforementioned broad definition of “evidence”, 
critics may respond that the matter is less clear-cut across the EBP literature, where 
descriptions of evidence are frequently narrower in scope.  
In particular, many critics refer to a particular sentence from the textbook Evidence-Based 
Medicine – how to practice and teach it:  
If the study wasn’t randomized, we’d suggest that you stop reading it and go on to 
the next article in your search. (Note: We can begin to rapidly critically appraise 
article literature by scanning the abstract to determine if the study is randomized, 
if it isn’t we can bin it.). (Straus et al. 2011: 70 [italics in original]) 
 
                                                          
76 By “inappropriate reliance on epidemiology”, some critics also refer to the exaggerated confidence in 
epidemiologic evidence, claiming that the alleged superiority of epidemiologic evidence is unwarranted. 
This kind of criticism addresses methodological problems regarding internal and external validity; these 




Such statements, critics claim, demonstrate the narrow scope of evidence provided 
through the EBP model (e.g., Borgerson 2009). However, most critics fail to notice that the 
quoted section does not account for evidence assessment in general but is restricted to 
assessment of therapy only. The book also accounts for assessment of diagnosis, 
prognosis, and aetiology as well, without an equally strong recommendation of 
randomized research.  
Critics may still argue, of course, that the recommendation of randomized evidence 
pertaining to therapy is too narrow. There are, however, few critics who make such a 
claim. Tonelli takes a different route, arguing that “[i]t is time to remove evidence, both 
term and notion, from clinical decision making, for it no longer serves any useful purpose, 
if it ever did” (Tonelli 2009a: 320). Although EBP proponents consider non-evidential 
beliefs to be useful and indeed necessary to clinical decision-making (cf. Chapter 2.4.3), 
such a stance is explicitly in opposition to EBP’s stance on evidence and serves more as a 
radical alternative to EBP than an argument against it. 
Perhaps the most usual line of criticism claiming that the scope of evidence in EBP is 
narrow are the arguments targeting evidence hierarchies. Indeed, most critics of EBM 
seem to characterize EBM’s scope of evidence by describing one or more hierarchies, and 
thereby discuss the scope of evidence in EBP according to how it is demonstrated through 
evidence hierarchies. The Grade Hierarchy – such as it is described in Chapter 1 above – is 
one of the hierarchies that is typically addressed.77 
When examining criticism of hierarchies, it is important to recall what the main function 
of hierarchies in EBP is and is not. As stated in chapter 1.4.3., hierarchies are systems that 
classify and organize types of evidence sources according to criteria for assessing the 
                                                          
77 Other hierarchies often referred to in the EBM debate are the levels of evidence (Canadian task force 




quality of evidence (cf. Djulbegovic & Guyatt 2017). Hierarchies are thus tools for assessing 
the quality of certain kinds of evidence, relative to each other. Hierarchies are not 
intended to replace the other components of the EBP model, but rather to complement 
the EBP clinician’s assessment of evidence. Following this, when discussing the usefulness 
of hierarchies, it must be said that hierarchies provide only initial information, in terms of 
internal and external validity, while the complete assessment of usefulness of the 
evidence requires the clinician to consider the clinical context and the patient’s 
preferences (cf. 2.2). For instance, if the study to be used exhibits poor quality according 
to a down-grading in GRADE relative to internal or external validity, it will necessarily have 
poor usefulness in the actual clinical decision-making. If the study exhibits sufficient 
quality, the clinician will then consider its usefulness in line with the individual patient’s 
preferences. This demonstrates that assessments of evidence in clinical practice cannot 
be discussed based on hierarchical principles alone, contrary to the approach that critics 
often take. 
When discussing hierarchies, critics also tend to speak of “the hierarchy”, when they are 
actually referring to different hierarchies, differing in various ways (e.g., Sackett’s “levels 
of evidence”, and Guyatt et al.’s GRADE hierarchy; cf., section 1.4.3. above). In addition to 
there being different hierarchies for different clinical questions, there are also different 
interpretative assumptions in different hierarchies, in particular concerning the difference 
between categorical and conditional hierarchies (cf. ibid.). However, the main principle of 
hierarchies remains the same and is the main concern for the analysis below: evidence 
from certain kinds of research is ranked higher than other kinds. In GRADE hierarchies, 
this ranking is based on two interpretation properties of the evidence – its internal and 
external validity. In hierarchies concerning therapeutic questions, which is the topic for 
most of the debate, epidemiologic research is ranked higher than other kinds of data, with 
randomized research data on top.  
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The claim that evidence hierarchies represent a too narrow scope of evidence imply the 
following interpretation: EBP hierarchies only allow certain kinds of evidence, i.e. 
epidemiologic data, to count in clinical decision-making. The justification of such claims 
depends on which particular hierarchy critics are referring to.78 
This claim is not justified if one refers to hierarchies in general, which mirror the broad 
definition of “evidence” in EBP and which in principle include any empirical and systematic 
observation (cf. Guyatt et al. 2015: 11; see also section 2.4.2 above). The “hierarchy of 
evidence” in the User’s Guides (2015: 11), demonstrates this, with a depiction of N’of-1 
clinical trial on top, followed by RCTs, observational-studies, basic research, and clinical 
experience ranked at bottom. On the other hand, the criticism is justifiable when referring 
to the GRADE hierarchy in the same User’s Guides, which represents “[a] more 
sophisticated framework” (ibid.) than the hierarchy of evidence just mentioned.  
Both versions are presented by Djulbegovic & Guyatt 2017, where GRADE (on the right 
side of the figure) is depicted as including randomized and observational studies 
exclusively, in stark contrast to the far more inclusive “traditional” hierarchy (placed on 
left side of the figure):  
 
                                                          
78 An interesting variation of the criticism concerning the narrow scope of evidence in hierarchies is that 
the principles of evidence hierarchies do not acknowledge the intimate relationships between different 
kinds of research. For instance, Bluhm argues that this intimate relation is ignored when bench research 
(e.g., physiological studies) is placed near the bottom and clinical research is placed at the top of most 
hierarchies (Bluhm 2005: 537f). I consider this argument very interesting in that it identifies an aspect that 
is under-communicated in most EBP literature. However, EBP proponents could respond by claiming that 
bench research is included as a necessary element of EBP practice (i.e., as background knowledge”), but 
refers to a kind of evidence source that is inherently sub-optimal with regard to both risk of bias, and to 
the specific knowledge relevant to inform clinical decisions (i.e., foreground knowledge), and is thus placed 
hierarchically lower than other kinds of evidence sources. (“Background” and “foreground” knowledge is 






At the right-hand side of the figure, the GRADE hierarchy is presented with two study 
designs, randomized trials and observational studies. One could easily argue that such a 
depiction of GRADE represents a narrow view of evidence in hierarchies and resonates 
with criticism claiming that EBP is a movement characterized by a preference for 
prioritizing epidemiological evidence. Such a hierarchy may correctly be criticized for 
excluding numerous sources of research information (e.g., Rosner 2012).  
On the other hand, it would be wrong to claim that GRADE hierarchies in general exhibit 
too narrow scopes of evidence. GRADE, in the same manner as the concepts of EBP and 
EBM themselves, have evolved. Initially, GRADE focussed on studies rating effectiveness, 
but has later moved on to consider methods for grading diagnostic and prognosis studies, 
and to include both qualitative and quantitative studies. For instance, within the GRADE 
model, a system has been developed for ranking qualitative research quality (CER-
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QUAL).79 When Guyatt et al. (2008) state that there is “[a]n emerging consensus on 
grading recommendations”, and the World Health Organization (WHO) describes GRADE 
as “internationally agreed standards for making transparent recommendations” (cf. Blunt 
2015: 104), the most reasonable interpretation in my view is to consider the statements 
in light of the expanded version of GRADE. Critics may further reply that GRADE is not the 
consensus tool it has been portrayed as being, and users of GRADE do not always use it 
consistently (cf. ibid.).  
Some critics, in part based on the observations described just above, claim that the 
principles and content of evidence hierarchies within EBP literature lack unity and clarity 
(e.g., Blunt 2015; La Caze 2008). This claim is both valid and relevant: There are several 
different hierarchies in EBP, and their specific criteria for assessing evidence quality are 
not always adequately explained.  
In my view, the criticism that evidence hierarchies are narrow is of less relevance, because 
EBP proponents commonly make use of evidence hierarchies representing a scope of 
evidence proper to their professional fields. The argument that the principles and content 
of evidence hierarchies within EBP literature lack unity and clarity (e.g., Bluhm 2005; Blunt 
2015; La Caze 2008) – mirroring the criticism of unclarity of EBP definitions – is a more 
relevant criticism. 
In sum, there are three particular kinds of criticisms targeting the narrow scope of 
evidence sources in EBP: a categorical claim that only epidemiologic data count as 
evidence and a conditional claim that evidence in EBP systematically favours 
epidemiologic evidence sources over non-epidemiologic evidence sources. The 
categorical version is based on a misunderstanding of what evidence amounts to in EBP, 
whereas the conditional version is more sensitive to the EBP literature and presents a 
                                                          
79 See: https://www.cerqual.org/publications/ 
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more relevant kind of criticism. Both the categorical and conditional version can in 
principle be dismissed with a reference to the broad definition of “evidence” in EBP. 
However, critics are correct in stating that the scope of evidence is not clear-cut across 
the EBP literature, as descriptions of “evidence” often vary. 
The third main kind of criticism concerning the narrow scope of evidence in EBP addresses 
the scope of evidence in hierarchies, and the conditions by which evidence sources are 
hierarchically ranked. Critics may be correct when criticizing a narrow scope of evidence 
sources, depending on which hierarchy they are referring to. However, the fact that 
several critics tend to ignore that hierarchies include a broader scope of evidence sources 
and that there are different hierarchies for different types of clinical questions, makes 
parts of this criticism less relevant 
 
3.3.1.1. The narrow scope of what counts as evidence demonstrates a positivistic 
tendency 
The most extreme version of criticism concerning the narrow scope of evidence in EBP is 
that because EBP promotes only epidemiologic research, it limits the scope of what is 
relevant health care knowledge in a positivistic manner (Anjum 2016; Miles 2009b; Silva 
and Vyer 2009; Tonelli 2009b; Walsh & Gillett 2011). This line of argument characterizes 
positivism, quite crudely, as an epistemological approach that bases scientific knowledge 
on quantifiable (logical and mathematical) principles, in addition to what can be verified 
empirically. It recognizes only scientifically verifiable propositions as meaningful (cf., 
Goldenberg 2005).80 One central tenet in the positivist theory is that “positive” knowledge 
is exclusively derived from sensory experience, interpreted through logical inferences. 
                                                          
80 None of the references to Goldenberg is meant to suggest that she is representative of this kind of 




Thus, positivism holds that it is possible to justify only those knowledge claims that are 
reducible to either logic or sensory perceptions. In such an epistemology, claims based on 
non-sensory beliefs (e.g., theological and ethical) are deemed unverifiable and, hence, 
nonsensical. 
Broadly described in this way, one might argue that there are some similarities between 
positivism and EBP. Grimen (2009) points to several similarities: Both movements share 
the same considerations about which methods provide the most reliable and useful 
knowledge; both movements are attentive to how scientific knowledge can improve 
practice, they share the same positive attitude to studies that provide generalizable 
knowledge; and there is a belief in a simple translation from scientific knowledge to 
practice. At the same time, Grimen points out, there are explicit discrepancies as well: EBP 
does not entail a vision of a fundamental, unified science, nor is the hierarchical 
structuring of knowledge reducible to such a unified view; EBP provides no philosophy of 
language; and EBM is open to qualitative studies (cf. Grimen 2009: 195f).  
The equation between positivism and EBP is typically suggested by pointing out that EBM 
has a similar concept of evidence by which scientific beliefs are constituted by scientific 
“hard” evidence alone (cf., Goldenberg 2005). Thus, critics claim, EBP only endorses 
evidence derived from systematic and methodologically rigorous clinical research, 
whereby intuition, unsystematic clinical experience, patient preferences, and 
pathophysiologic rationale, are considered irrelevant.  
In such a line of argument, a rather simple straw man is made of EBM, which then is 
criticized. For instance, some critics present “post-positivist” claims stating that EBP 
ignores subjective interpretations as necessary requirements for scientific practice (cf. 
Goldenberg 2005). Such a view of EBP are based on misreading of the EBM and EBP 
literature. For instance, the first official EBM text published, states that  
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Evidence-based medicine de-emphasizes intuition, unsystematic clinical 
experience, and pathophysiologic rationale as sufficient grounds for clinical 
decision making and stresses the examination of evidence from clinical research. 
(Guyatt et al. 1992: 2420 [emphasis mine]) 
 
One could argue that this statement endorses evidence derived from systematic and 
methodologically rigorous clinical research and presents a model for clinical practice 
wherein scientific knowledge is the primary authority. But this authority is not thereby 
equated to positivistic tenets.  
A more nuanced criticism, such as is found in Goldenberg 2005, is that the authority of 
scientific knowledge and methods may be out of step with current post-positivistic 
thinking. Goldenberg then points out that many of the arguments for this claim are similar 
to arguments used in philosophical criticism of positivism. Such a criticism seems more 
relevant to a debate, partly due to the fact that it does not equate EBP with positivism at 
the outset. 
However, the equation between EBP and positivism is fuelled by Djulbegovic, Guyatt & 
Ashcroft, who state that: 
The concept that reliable empirical observation (i.e., fundamental units of 
evidential significance), together with rules of evidence that separate “truth” from 
“falsehood” (in clinical research), is reminiscent of logical-positivism — a 
movement that dominated the philosophy of science about 80 to 90 years ago. Like 
logical-positivism in the early 20th century, EBM today has re-exposed a central 
tension in epistemology regarding the relationship between observed reality and 
unobservable reality (2009: 161), 
and  
Like positivism, EBM suggests we should restrict ourselves to the observed reality, 
and when we go beyond our observations, the focus is on extending our inferences 
about the unobserved world. Reality, however, remains ultimately unknowable. 
This positivist approach has some affinities with EBM, which for instance tends to 
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privilege knowledge about what can be shown to work over deeper questions 
about why it does so. (ibid.) 
 
On the other hand, Djulbegovic, Guyatt & Ashcroft also stress that the logical-positivist 
stance is too restrictive, and that EBP proponents “[a]re not committed to positivist theses 
about meaning and truth in science and medicine or about the kind of facts that can be 
known or not known” (ibid: 162). These qualifications should be unnecessary to provide. 
A positivist stance is too restrictive for any science. No scientist nor philosopher will 
defend the essential tenets of positivism. Djulbegovic, Guyatt & Ashcroft’s statements are 
unnecessarily linked with a term with negative connotations and will only serve as 
inspiration for other straw-man depiction of EBP. A more adequate description would 
involve a reference to the empiricist nature of epidemiologic evidence (cf. section 1.2.1. 
above). Thus, the central focus should be on “empiricism”, not “positivism”. Thereby, the 
presentation of a philosophical basis for EBP could potentially provide the basis for a 
constructive debate as well. 
 
3.3.2. The alleged superiority of RCTs is unjustified  
EBP proponents consider epidemiologic evidence, and in particular RCTs, superior to other 
kinds of evidence sources. This is demonstrated in hierarchies concerning evidence for 
therapeutic interventions, where epidemiologic data is consistently ranked higher than 
non-epidemiologic evidence sources, with randomized studies on top. When non-
epidemiologic evidence sources are considered, they often serve as supplementary 
evidence, insufficient in themselves. Indeed, the view of non-epidemiologic evidence as 
“insufficient” and primarily useful as “background knowledge” (cf. 2.4.2), is in line with 
the novelty of EBP leading to a characteristic confidence in epidemiologic data. 
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In particular, as described in the subsections of 1.4., randomized comparative research 
designs, and in particular the RCT, are considered superior to other kinds of evidence 
sources, primarily due to their ability to reduce risk of bias – such as allocation bias and 
other confounding factors.81  
This view of comparative randomized research designs as superior to other evidence 
sources, is a central feature of EBP: Within the EBP literature, such designs are considered 
the best available with regard to justifying claims about therapeutic effectiveness of 
health care interventions. This is also explicit in most evidence hierarchies, where such 
evidence sources are ranked higher than others. The justification for this, according to 
clinical epidemiology and EBP proponents is their presumed ability to mitigate risk of bias 
and to balance confounding factors (cf. section 1.4.1. above). This justification is also used 
as a basis for inclusion criteria for systematic reviews of therapeutic interventions (cf. 
Howick et al. 2015). As noted above (1.2ff), this is the main basis for the view of RCTs as 
the gold standard of clinical (therapeutic) research. 
Critics disagree with these considerations and argue that the alleged superiority of 
randomized research designs, and of RCTs in particular, is unjustified. The most cited 
criticism on this issue is that of Worrall (2002, 2007, 2010).82 Worrall’s main concern is 
about the confidence in RCTs and the claim of that EBP’s stance on ranking randomized 
studies above observational studies is unjustified.  
Worrall considers potential benefits of randomization, and concludes that the only actual 
benefit of randomization is that it is able to rule out allocation bias – which Worrall 
describes as “[d]ifferences between the two groups resulting from the selections made by 
the researchers involved concerning which patients are assigned to which groups” (2007: 
                                                          
81 See Section 1.4.1.1. above for a description of these terms. 
82 There are many prominent critics addressing the same issue. Often, many of their arguments refer to 
Worrall’s’ account (e.g. Borgerson 2005; Grossman and Mackenzie, 2005). 
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1008).83 This benefit, however, is not a feature exclusive to the method of randomization 
at all: 
[r]andomization as a way of controlling for selection [i.e. allocation] bias is very 
much a means to an end, rather than an end in itself. What does the 
methodological work here is really the blinding—randomization is simply one 
method of achieving this. (Worrall 2002: 14). 
 
The important methodological point here, Worrall states, is that the controlled 
distribution of trial participants to different groups is taken away from the experimenters. 
Blinding, as along with other well-conducted observational methods can see to allocation 
of participants with equally strong rigour. In turn, well-conducted observational methods 
can provide equally strong evidence in this regard (cf. Worrall 2002; Borgerson 2009: 
225).84 Therefore, randomized studies are not superior in minimizing the risk of allocation 
bias. 
Worrall also attacks another central claim in favour of the superiority of RCTs, namely, 
that randomization controls for confounding factors. As described in section 1.4.1.1.1. 
above, there are several EBP proponents who claim that randomization in an RCT controls 
for confounders, both known and unknown (e.g. Straus et al. 2011: 70, 187; Kuntz et al. 
                                                          
83 Worrall refers to this kind of bias as “selection bias”. As noted in footnote 20 (in Section 1.4.1.1.), 
“selection bias” and “allocation bias” is sometimes conflated, as in Worrall’s case. “Selection bias” usually 
refers to a skewed selection of trial population, with non-representative attributes to the population at 
large (cf. ibid.). 
84 For instance, there is also a method of “minimization”, through which an algorithm allocates each 
patient to the group, thereby minimizing imbalances in confounders between the groups (cf. Blunt 2015: 
129). EBP-related literature, such as the Cochrane Collaboration, considers such minimization to be equally 
able to exclude selection bias as randomization can (Higgins & Green 2011; cf. Blunt 2015: 129). The 
superiority of randomized studies is thus not necessarily a categorical view shared by all EBP proponents. 
On the other hand, such a modified view is not explicit in most EBP literature. 
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2008: 3), so that they are evenly balanced with regard to the comparison groups.85 Worrall 
(2002), on the other hand, demonstrates that this claim is false. 
Firstly, Worrall deems the claim that randomization controls for confounding factors as 
“trivially unsustainable” (Worrall 2002: 10), and continues: 
It is perfectly possible that a properly applied random process might “by chance”, 
“unluckily” produce a division between control and experimental groups that is 
significantly skewed with respect to some prognostic factor which in fact plays a 
role in therapeutic outcome but which was not initially controlled for. (ibid.)86 
The main point, as trivial as it is valid, is that it is impossible to control for factors that are 
not controlled for initially. Thus, randomization cannot guarantee that unknown 
confounding factors are controlled for.  
Secondly, Worrall targets the claim that randomization controls for known confounders 
so that they are evenly balanced with regard to the comparison groups. In principle, if 
there are many confounding factors in the allocated group, the chance that all 
confounding factors are evenly distributed in a given random allocation is low. Thus, 
randomization cannot guarantee that all factors that may have an effect on the trial 
outcome are balanced.  
                                                          
85 According to Cartwright, another prominent critic, the “canonical answer” for “what’s so good about 
RCTs?” is that “RCTs control for unknown confounders” (cf. Cartwright 2011). 
86 Worrall goes further, stating that statisticians know this to be a fact: “Giere, and above all Fisher, of 
course knew this and so presumably what they meant, despite what they say, is something weaker—only 
that the randomization controls for all factors, known or unknown, “in some probabilistic sense”.”(ibid.). 
Worrall does not explain what he means by “some probabilistic sense”. La Caze provides the following 
explanation, referring to a statistical, more formal concept of “bias” than is used in EBP literature (as well 
as by Worrall): “‘[b]ias is used in statistics in a number of more formal ways. In parametric statistics, 
statistical bias refers to the expectation of an estimator of a parameter. An estimator is unbiased if its 
expectation is equal to the true value of the parameter. This is often informally referred to as an 
estimator's long run average. It is only in the statistical sense that randomisation eliminates bias due to 
confounding factors, known and unknown. This is because statistical bias entails consideration of the 
entire sample space.” (La Caze 2009: 13).  
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The reason for this is quite simply that a random allocation does not by necessity balance 
all confounding factors (patient-features and disease-features) evenly between groups. 
On the contrary, a random allocation may distribute in any possible way, evenly as well as 
unevenly. For instance, there is no guarantee that a random allocation will distribute 
factors such as age or sex evenly into different groups. As Blunt notes, “[i]t is possible (if 
unlikely) for a random allocation to distribute all 50 men to one group and all 50 women 
to another. Less extreme but still important imbalances are not so improbable”. (Blunt 
2015: 127).87 
In principle, the chance that all confounding factors are evenly distributed in a given 
random allocation is low. Thus, randomization cannot guarantee that all factors that may 
have effect on the trial outcome are balanced.  
Moreover, Worrall suggests that even EBP proponents are aware of this when they 
recommend checking allocation for baseline imbalances in potential confounding factors. 
If identified, investigators will then re-randomize where baseline imbalances are found, 
until a suitably balanced allocation is conducted (cf. Blunt 2005: 128). In these cases, 
Worrall notes, it is not randomization itself, but the check for baseline imbalances and the 
following re-randomizing that allow one to control for known allocation confounders.88 
While EBP literature recommends checking for baseline imbalances (cf. Worrall 2007), 
attention to the importance of re-randomization is less central. 
                                                          
87 According to Worral, when EBP proponents claim that RCTs control for confounding factors, they commit 
what he calls a “quantificational fallacy” (Worrall 2002: 12): “Even if there is only a small probability that 
an individual factor is unbalanced, given that there are indefinitely many possible confounding factors, 
then it would seem to follow that the probability that there is some factor on which the two groups are 
unbalanced (when remember randomly constructed) might for all we know be high. Prima facie those 
frequentist statisticians who argue that randomization “tends” to balance the groups in all factors commit 
a simple quantificational fallacy.” (bid.) 
88 Worrall also points out that checking for baseline imbalances can identify only known confounders, not 
unknown confounders, despite the claims of several prominent EBM proponents.  
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While re-randomization may mitigate risk of allocation bias to a larger degree, 
randomization will still provide no guarantee for the equal distribution of confounders. 
From this perspective, the claim that randomization controls for confounding factors is 
weakened. 
Thus, Worrall directs criticism at the alleged superiority of RCTs above other evidence 
sources: RCTs are not able to rule out allocation bias in any better way than other 
methods, and the process of randomization provides no guarantee of control for known 
confounding factors. Worrall thus provides highly relevant criticism to the alleged 
superiority of RCTs over other evidence sources.89 
Blunt sums up Worral’s argument about challenges in controlling for allocation bias in a 
clarifying manner: “To justify ranking RCT evidence above non-randomized study evidence 
on the basis of allocation biases, an argument that non-randomized studies cannot or do 
not exclude imbalances in known confounders would be needed” (Blunt 2015: 128). This 
challenge has not been explicitly responded to by EBP proponents. 
As a response to Worrall’s criticism, EBP proponents have argued that even if other 
methods exclude such imbalances, RCTs have the potential for ruling out more kinds of 
biases90 and confounding factors than observational studies have (Howick 2011: 51: 
Howick & Mebius 2015: 1; La Caze et al. 2011). Howick maintains his defence of the RCT’s 
superiority to other kinds of evidence sources, concluding that: “[a]ll other things being 
equal […] randomized trials provide superior evidence to non-randomized trials” (ibid.). 
                                                          
89 Other critics, to a large extent based on Worrall’s arguments, extend their criticism to the principles of 
the ranking-system in EBP hierarchies, claiming that the ranking of randomized evidence sources above 
other evidence sources is unjustified (e.g., Bluhm 2005, Blunt 2015, and La Caze 2008; 2009). In principle, 
it is the same kind of criticism, addressing the same methodological problems within the hierarchical 
system. I consider this criticism just as relevant as Worrall’s. 
90 Specifically, proponents point to “confounding by indication”, or “choice of treatment bias”, as 
potentially being eliminated through a well-conducted RCT, while the same bias is difficult to rule out in 
observational studies (ibid; Howick 2011). 
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“All things being equal”, in this context, entails that, if randomized and non-randomized 
trials were compared, and provided the studies under comparison are conducted 
correctly, with a fully comparable research population, directed at an identical clinical 
question, the randomized trials would have higher internal validity than the non-
randomized trials (cf. La Caze 2009). It is not clear whether Worrall would agree or 
disagree on such a claim.  
Yet, Worrall’s main point about the differences between randomized and non-randomized 
studies being considerably less distinct than EBP proponents tend to claim remains a 
highly relevant criticism. While randomization has some benefits, such as preventing some 
types of allocation bias, which Worrall and other critics do not argue against, RCTs 
certainly do not ensure infallibility. Randomization does not, for instance, ensure that 
experimental groups are equally balanced for all confounding factors. In sum, criticism 
addressing the justification of the alleged superiority of RCT limits at least challenges the 
justification of RCTs as hierarchically superior to other evidence sources.  
In sum, Worrall and others criticize the alleged superiority of randomized trials, and in 
particular the RCT. According to critics, the advantages of such methods are exaggerated 
and are deemed to be considerably more fallible than how the same methods are depicted 
in the EBP literature. The claim that RCTs control for unknown confounders is refuted.  
EBP proponents respond to the criticism by stating that Worrall and others ignore that 
there are several kinds of biases in observational studies, for which an RCT is unable to 
account to a large extent. Another response is to claim that when all other things, except 
method, are equal, randomized trials will prove superior to non-randomized trials. 
Notably, this response does not explicitly refute Worrall’s criticism, but instead 
emphasizes issues that Worrall and other critics do not explicitly address. It is uncertain 
whether Worrall would disagree with this.  
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3.3.3. The usefulness of applying results from randomized comparative evidence-
sources in clinical practice is limited  
In the same manner as in the previous kind of criticism, this kind of criticism also primarily 
targets comparative randomized research data, and in particular RCTs. The concern that 
randomized data have limited usefulness in clinical practice represents a common 
criticism concerning evidence in EBP. The usefulness of evidence has to do with external 
validity, which refers to the generalization91 of the research results with regard to the 
effect found in a trial population setting to other populations in other settings (cf. Section 
1.4.ff.). There are several challenges to this generalization. Perhaps the greatest challenge 
is the application of population-based research-findings to an individual patient. Several 
related challenges are linked with the methodological conditions used to enhance internal 
validity of a clinical trial, e.g. a narrowly specified trial population, stringent inclusion 
criteria that may exclude patients in another setting (excluding older patients, and 
patients with co-morbidities), and the removal of conditions other than the treatment 
condition in the test that may affect treatment or disease progression.92 In these cases, 
the enhancements of internal validity would also enhance the risk of decreasing the 
external validity of the evidence. 
These challenges are discussed by critics, who claim that because individual circumstances 
and values may vary, and because there are so many uncommon diseases, epidemiologic 
data pertaining to average effects are often insufficient in real-world circumstances. In 
turn, this claim serves as a basis for the criticism that the EBP model represents an 
exaggerated and unjustified confidence in randomized comparative evidence sources.  
                                                          
91 “Generalization” in this context is used generically, including assessment of both the generalizability and 
the applicability of the evidence (cf. 1.4.1.2. above).  
92 In addition, clinicians may administer interventions differently than the expert clinicians who performed 
the trial, which further exacerbates the problems of application into clinical practice. This problem, 
however, does not relate directly to external validity, but to the usability of the evidence, which is based 
on the clinician’s expertise, when the evidence is to be applied in clinical practice at the point of patient 
care, according to patient preferences and circumstances (cf. section 2.2. above). 
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Several critics claim that the randomized trials, and RCTs in particular, despite their 
(presumed) ability to enhance internal validity, have several methodological weaknesses 
regarding external validity. They argue that evidence from randomized research rarely has 
sufficiently high external validity in a target population (e.g., Bluhm & Borgerson 2010; 
Cartwright 2007, Lexchin 2003, Rawlins 2008; Pocock 2000, Tonelli 1998).  
Such arguments have been proposed since the inception of EBM and EBP. Feinstein (1994) 
and Feinstein and Horwitz (1997) present some of the earliest criticism concerning this 
issue, while later criticism to a large extent represents variations on the same theme. An 
overall concern in their criticism is that evidence based on epidemiologic data alone leads 
to limited knowledge and is therefore not always useful in clinical practice. 
Feinstein & Horwitz identify several problems with EBP’s attention to epidemiologic data, 
and with RCTs in particular. The four most important arguments are: 
1) Epidemiologic data exclude pathophysiologic principles, ‘‘soft data’’ distinctive to 
individual patients and therapeutic expertise, such as “[d]ecisions to start or stop 
remedial therapy with oxygen, mechanical ventilation, blood transfusion, or for 
patients with electrolyte alterations will almost always depend on individual 
pathophysiologic status, not on published evidence.” Feinstein & Horwitz 1997). 
2) There are practical limitations to RCTs, due to ethical consideration (e.g., in 
investigating the effects of smoking, or by testing an intervention that is manageable 
by simpler interventions; cf. Feinstein & Horwitz 1997: 533), or to other contextual 
considerations, such as economy or time. 
3) Many RCTs have restricted eligibility criteria, enrolling a restricted population 
exclusively comprising patients expected to be highly responsive to treatment. 
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4) The results of randomized studies show comparative efficacy of treatment for an 
‘‘average’’ randomized patient and ignore clinical features such as severity of 
symptoms, illness and comorbidity. 93 
While all of these points are important and valid, it is not granted that they are devastating 
to the model of EBP.94  
Argument 1 is true – per definition: As described in section 1.2.1., the main demarcation 
between epidemiologic data and pathophysiologic data is that epidemiologic data are the 
result of outcome-focused methods, which entails a shift from the traditional focus on the 
underlying pathophysiological mechanisms. Hence, to the extent clinical problems have 
to do with pathophysiological mechanisms, as in the examples provided in the argument 
above, population research data will be of minimal relevance.  
However, the claim that “[e]pidemiologic data exclude pathophysiologic principles and 
therapeutic reasoning” could be interpreted to mean that the application of epidemiologic 
data in EBP clinical practice would exclude pathophysiologic principles.95 Such an 
interpretation would approximate a straw man fallacy: No model of EBP (or EBM, for that 
matter) entails such a view. As described in Chapter 2, EBP’s stance on pathophysiology is 
that it is insufficient as a basis for clinical decision-making, but not considered as 
unnecessary. Even EBM proponents when stating “if the study isn’t randomized, bin it” do 
                                                          
93 Feinstein & Horwitz also emphasize that epidemiologic randomized data lead to major disadvantages in 
EBM textbooks, including that such literature offers no instruction for the pathophysiologic and other 
judgmental reasoning used in clinical decisions (cf., Feinstein & Horwitz 1997: 533). In turn, this makes it 
challenging to individualize treatment in accordance with the patient’s personal preferences. I will discuss 
this point in more detail in Section 3.5.2. below, in conjunction with criticism concerning patient 
preferences in EBP. 
94 Notably, Feinstein & Horwitz do not propose this criticism as an anti-EBP argument. On the contrary, 
they state that they have “[f]riendly admiration for proponents of EBM, but worry about its current 
methods” (1997: 529). Later critics who cite Feinstein & Horwitz (e.g. Bluhm & Borgerson 2010; Upshur 
2006) or present similar arguments are not as friendly. 
95 I do not mean to imply that Feinstein & Horwitz 1997 suggest such an interpretation. Their focus 
regarding claim (1) is on the formal limitations that arise when the result of an RCT is the sole element of 
clinical decision-making.  
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explicitly refer to the need for non-epidemiologic data as supplemental knowledge (e.g. 
Straus et al. 2011). Thus, in actual clinical practice, the EBP clinician, based on clinical 
experience and professional expertise, would make use of pathophysiologic “background 
knowledge” (cf. section 2.4.2. above) when applying epidemiologic data in clinical 
practice.  
Arguments 2-4 are valid and demonstrate some of the shortcomings in data generated 
from RCTs, especially concerning small trials in which correspondence between trial 
groups and target groups may be considered low, most often due to too stringent 
exclusion criteria for test participants. Furthermore, there are clinical questions that are 
answerable only by using non-epidemiologic data, hence demonstrating that 
epidemiologic data are not always useful.  
However, it is not necessarily the case that non-RCT evidence always has higher external 
validity. Considerations of confidence in the result of any kind of study is to a large degree 
dependent on the generalizability of that result. Often, the challenges of external validity 
increase with the decrease in size and increase in eligibility criteria of the test-population, 
but this need not necessarily be the case. Some EBP proponents claim that the assumption 
about the inherent weak external validity of RCTs is taken for granted by critics like 
Worrall, Cartwright and others, without citing any evidence to support this (e.g., Howick 
& Mebius 2015; Solomon 2011). 
If EBP proponents ignored the problems of external validity, they could indeed be 
criticized for exaggerating the usefulness of epidemiologic data. This is not the case, 
however, in most EBP literature. Indeed, much of the EBP literature on epidemiologic 
research is attentive to problems of external validity, and there are at least three aspects 
in the EBP literature that explicitly relate to these problems. 
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Firstly, criteria for high-quality evidence include assessments of generalizability and 
applicability with regard to the target population (i.e. concerns relating to external 
validity; cf. section 1.4.1.2. above). If, for instance, an RCT does not meet these criteria, 
the evidence will not be assessed as high quality.96 This is a matter that many critics seem 
to ignore. 
Secondly, there are pragmatic trials, including RCTs, that prioritize external validity. 
Pragmatic trials aim to replicate real-world conditions, by using real-world clinicians (and 
not professional investigators) in actual clinical settings (e.g., in hospitals), on broad study 
populations, where the participants are more representative due to less strict eligibility 
criteria. (cf. Blunt 2015: 150).  
Thirdly, EBP promotes the use of n-of-1 trials, in which a single patient constitutes the 
entre trial population. In n-of-1 RCTs, the clinician tests which treatment is the best option 
by testing different treatments on a single patient, using random allocation to determine 
the order of an experimental and a control intervention. Guyatt et al.’s (2015) “hierarchy 
of strength of evidence for prevention and treatment decisions” ranks N-of-1 RCTs at top 
level, above standard RCTs, which indicates a high degree of attention to external validity. 
On the other hand, critics could respond that few other hierarchies demonstrate the same 
attention to external validity, and there are no explicit criteria for differentiating between 
explanatory and pragmatic trials in evidence hierarchies (cf. Blunt 2015: 151). Other than 
Blunt’s recommendations to expand GRADE’s up- and down-grading criteria to take these 
factors into account (cf. ibid.), I have not observed any criticism regarding this.  
Fourthly, the EBP literature also takes into account the abilities of the clinician when 
integrating evidence in accordance with patient preferences and circumstances – referring 
to what I have labelled assessment of the usability of the evidence (cf. section 2.2. above). 
                                                          




As discussed in Chapter 2, the extension to practice necessitates the clinician’s expertise 
and ability to integrate, as well as personal knowledge concerning the patient and the 
circumstances. Integration and knowledge concerning the patient and the circumstances 
are considered necessary conditions in EBP decision-making, in addition to the formal 
assessment of the external validity of the evidence (cf. ibid.). 
Critics may respond to this argument by stating that the EBP literature is less developed 
regarding the content and explicit implementation of these abilities. A general counter-
response from EBP proponents to any criticism concerning the extrapolation of evidence 
to individual patients is that problems of extrapolation from any kind of research 
knowledge is problematic in application of any kind of evidence, whether from basic or 
applied research. Thus, this is not a problem unique to EBP, but occurs universally in any 
health care framework (cf. Straus and McAllister 2000: 838).  
To sum up, critics claim that evidence generated from randomized comparative evidence 
sources have limited usefulness in clinical practice. This has specifically to do with 
challenges of external validity. There are four arguments in particular for this claim: (1) 
randomized research knowledge excludes pathophysiologic principles, ‘‘soft data’’ 
distinctive to individual patients, and therapeutic reasoning; (2) there are practical 
limitations to RCTs; (3) restrictive eligibility criteria, and (4) comparative efficacy of 
treatment only demonstrate effects for an ‘‘average’’ randomized patient, and not of the 
individual patient in direct health care practice. All of these arguments are valid and 
relevant.  
However, there is disagreement between opponents and proponents with regard to the 
extent of these problems. Two general responses from EBP proponents are that the 
problem of external validity is not a problem unique to EBP but occurs universally in any 
health care; and that it is not necessarily the case that non-RCT evidence always has higher 
external validity. There are also responses specifically addressing arguments (1), (2), (3), 
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and (4). Concerning argument (1), critics tend to ignore that the EBP literature also takes 
into account the abilities of the clinician who integrates evidence in accordance with 
patient preferences and circumstances. In this way, the challenges regarding external 
validity of the evidence are accounted for in any application of randomized data into 
clinical practice. Concerning arguments (2), (3) and (4), there are methodological tools 
specially designed to mitigate the challenges of external validity: there are pragmatic trials 
and n-of-1 trials, both of which are equipped to mitigate risk of external validity, and thus 
reduce the severity of these problems. 
 
3.3.4. Lack of empirical evidence that epidemiologic methods produce better outcomes 
than non-epidemiologic methods  
Critics claim that EBP is not ‘evidence-based’ because it does not meet its own empirical 
requirements for efficacy (e.g., Buetow et al. 2006; Dobbie et al. 2000; Miles 2009a; 
Tanenbaum 2009; Tobin 2008). For instance, Buetow et al. (2006) states that, “There is 
still a lack of empirical evidence that, by its own rules, EBM produces better health 
outcomes than conventional medicine […]”.97  
In Buetow et al.’s claim, the phrase “by its own rules” refers to the application of best 
available high-quality evidence, generated from epidemiologic randomized comparative, 
outcome-based methods. EBP proponents have also taken note of this, stating that even 
though the core of EBP is the proposition that patient care can be improved by basing 
clinical decision-making on information from statistically valid clinical trials, there is no 
evidence from the same evidence sources that this is actually the case (cf. Haynes 2004; 
                                                          
97 In this quotation, I have omitted the last clause of Buetow et al.’s sentence: “[a]nd can be effectively 
transferred into clinical practice”. By “transferred into clinical practice”, Buetow et al. address the problem 
of external validity. Thus, it seems that Buetow et.al. in this last section imply that there is lack of empirical 
evidence of the external validity of outcome-based evidence as well. This is a somewhat odd claim; it is 
easy to point to empirical evidence showing that evidence from outcome-based research has in fact been 
implemented into practice. 
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Jenicek 2006; Reilley 2004; Straus & McAllister 2000). Such evidence is impossible to 
provide as well. As Haynes states: 
No one has done a randomized trial of EBM with patient outcomes as the measure 
of success. Such a trial, would be impossible to conduct, given that the control 
group could not be effectively isolated from the research that EBM is attempting 
to transfer, and it would be regarded unethical to do so. (Haynes 2004: 237) 
Thus, the belief in that epidemiologic methods produce better outcomes than non- 
epidemiologic methods is without scientific support from clinical trials (based on 
epidemiologic methods).  
However, the core belief within EBP that outcome-based studies provide the best 
available basis for recommending interventions to patients can in principle be 
documented by other kinds of outcome-based research. Straus and McAllister refer to 
such documentation when stating that “[o]utcomes researchers consistently document 
that patients who receive proven efficacious therapies have better outcomes than those 
who do not” (Straus and McAllister 2000: 839). Critics could respond negatively to this 
documentation, as Straus and McAllister provide only three studies as examples of this, 
and as Blunt (2015: 239) remarks, it is unclear whether these studies would be ranked as 
high-quality evidence.  
Another line of argumentation responding to this criticism, is to demonstrate the historical 
impact of epidemiologic methods. Djulbegovic and Guyatt do this, referring to the impact 
of well-known randomized trials, pre-dating EBP: 
[A] criticism of EBM is that there is no high-quality evidence that its application has 
improved patient care. We would rebut by noting the history of a decade-or more 
delays in implementing interventions, such as thrombolytic therapy for myocardial 
infarction, and […] routinely administered useless and harmful interventions, such 
as lidocaine to patients after myocardial infarction, placing infants on their 
stomachs to sleep, or hormone replacement therapy for postmenopausal women, 





The central claim here is that randomized trials have demonstrated that several common 
clinical interventions, based on non- epidemiologic methods (e.g. based on 
pathophysiologic principles), in fact exhibit useless or harmful effects. The attention to the 
delays in implementing interventions preceding EBP is also important to the argument. 
The implementation of interventions based on the results from epidemiologic methods 
coincides with the initiation of EBP. It is due to clinical practice of EBP, precisely through 
the implementation of research findings derived from epidemiologic methods, that 
clinical practice was improved. Thus, the reference to these randomized trials serves as 
empirical evidence that epidemiologic methods (RCTs) produce better outcomes than 
non-epidemiologic methods (out of which the useless or harmful interventions were 
implemented in the first place).  
Opponents could respond by pointing to the examples that Djulbegovic and Guyatt refer 
to, by maintaining that they are few in number and thus insufficient for a claim that 
epidemiologic methods in general produce better outcomes than non- epidemiologic 
methods.  
In my view, the very basis for the debate concerning lack of empirical evidence for EBP 
methods is problematic precisely because of the facts addressed by Haynes (2004) above. 
Any evidence supporting the claim that epidemiologic methods produce better outcomes 
than do non-epidemiologic methods will by necessity be partial, and this partiality would 





3.3.5. An overview of the criticism concerning evidence  
I will end this section on criticism concerning evidence by presenting some concluding 
remarks.  
Criticism concerning evidence in EBP is addressed with variations of four claims in 
particular: (1) the scope of what counts as evidence is too narrow; (2) the alleged 
superiority of RCTs is unjustified; (3) the usefulness of applying randomized comparative 
data as evidence in clinical practice is limited; and (4) there is a lack of evidence that 
epidemiologic methods produce better outcomes than non-epidemiologic methods.  
In 3.1.1., I claimed that what is controversial in EBP is the application of epidemiologic 
methods and research results in clinical practice based on methodological principles from 
clinical epidemiology. This is demonstrated in all four kinds of criticisms: They all primarily 
concern methodological principles from clinical epidemiology, and in particular with the 
ranking of randomized trial evidence above other evidence sources.  
To the extent that critics target the methodological principles from clinical epidemiology 
in an adequate manner – that is, by clearly separating these methodological issues from 
the more expansive EBP model – their criticism addresses issues that constitute 
methodological presuppositions in the EBP model. Such criticism is demonstrated above, 
through Worrall’s criticism of the alleged superiority of RCTs, as well as through Feinstein 
& Horwitz’ criticism of the limited usefulness of applying results from RCTs as evidence. 
Both of these kinds of criticisms identify basic methodological limitations with regard to 
the RCT, and contribute, in my view, to the most relevant kind of criticism concerning 
evidence. The fourth main kind of criticism – addressing the lack of evidence showing that 
epidemiologic methods produce better outcomes than non-epidemiologic methods – is 
also valid in that it also addresses methodological concerns. The relevance and impact of 
this claim, however, is weakened due to that it cannot be completely responded to, 
neither by proponents nor critics.  
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On the other hand, there are critics who target the methodological principles from clinical 
epidemiology in an inadequate manner, by conflating clinical epidemiology principles and 
the more expansive elements in the EBP model. This is the case in much of the criticism 
regarding the narrow scope of evidence in EBP. In this criticism, the range of evidence 
sources in EBP is erroneously criticized on basis of clinical epidemiology’s view of 
evidence. The flaw in such an argument is that the broader conception of evidence and 
evidence sources in EBP is ignored. This is the case in what I have described as categorical 
claim about that the content of what counts as evidence is too narrow. By contrast, 
conditional claims about the reductive and restrictive criteria for assessing the quality of 
evidence, systematically favouring epidemiologic kinds of evidence to other kinds of 
evidence, is more relevant, due to its distinctive perspective on methodology rather than 
on the actual content of evidence sources.  
The conflation between clinical epidemiology principles and the more expansive elements 
in the EBP model are also apparent in the criticism regarding the limited usefulness of 
epidemiologic evidence. Feinstein & Horwitz’ criticism is both valid and relevant to the 
extent that they take into account methodological considerations of clinical epidemiology. 
When the same criticism targets evidence assessment concerning the application of 
evidence within the EBP-model, there are several mitigating factors that impact the 
criticism – not least the assessment of the usability of the evidence, in which the patient 
preferences and circumstances are accounted for. In sum, the validity and relevance of 
the criticism are related to whether the critics address methodological and controversial 
presuppositions concerning evidence in EBP, as rooted in its clinical epidemiology 
framework.  
As noted above, the other elements of the EBP model – expertise and patient preferences 
and circumstances – are not controversial in and of themselves. Rather, these elements 
become controversial when discussing the extent to which the use of expertise and 
144 
 
patient preferences and circumstances are compatible with the methodological features 






3.4. Criticism concerning clinical expertise  
 
Criticisms of clinical expertise and patient preferences are often intertwined. Before I 
address the two topics individually, I will comment generally about both.  
Broadly speaking, criticisms concerning clinical expertise and patient preferences in EBP 
concern the degree to which these elements are included in the EBP model. There are 
critics who claim categorically that clinical expertise and patient preferences are rejected 
altogether (e.g., Charlton 1997). Such categorical claims can be easily dismissed with 
reference to any definition of EBP. As demonstrated in Chapter 2, both clinical expertise 
and patient preferences must be considered necessary requirements in the concept of 
EBP. Most often,98 however, there is a more nuanced claim that the inclusion of clinical 
expertise and patient preferences is too limited, and that the relationship between these 
two kinds of non-evidential aspects on the one hand and evidential knowledge on the 
other is problematic.  
In the following discussion of the criticism, I will address criticism concerning clinical 
expertise below as well as in the main section 3.5 concerning patient preferences. 
Criticism concerning clinical expertise can be categorized under two main sections: 3.4.1: 
EBP minimizes the role of clinical expertise and 3.4.2: the autonomy of the clinical expert 
is reduced.  
 
3.4.1. EBP minimizes the role of clinical expertise 
Examples of this kind of criticism are that the EBP model leaves little or no room for clinical 
expertise, and that the EBP model ignores the fact that clinical research can never replace 
                                                          
98 Sometimes, critics present unqualified, categorical claims that EBP rejects personal experience and 
patient preferences, but make a more nuanced, more careful statement later in the same texts, where 
focus is on the downgrading of these aspects and a privileging of scientific knowledge (e.g. Loughlin 2008). 
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clinical expertise (e.g., Braude 2009; Charlton 1997; Charlton and Miles 1998; Horwitz 
1996; Maynard 1997; Martinsen 2009; Miles et al. 1998; Naylor 1995; Tanenbaum 1993; 
1995; 2009; Tonelli 1998; 1999). For instance, Tanenbaum (1995) claims that 
“Evidence-based medicine argues for the fundamental separability of expertise from 
expert and of knowledge from knower” (quoted from Greenhalgh 1999). The critics’ 
contention that the EBP model categorically lacks clinical expertise (i.e., is omitted 
entirely, as in the case of Tanenbaum’s claim) can be dismissed as erroneous based on 
EBP definitions. 
Less categorical arguments point out the tendency to downplay the challenges to clinical 
expertise in complex clinical interactions with the patient (e.g. Naylor 1995), in line with 
the general criticism presented above. To a large extent, this kind of criticism is correct. 
EBP textbooks and research tend to devote most attention to methodological concerns 
about how evidence is provided, while discussions of clinical expertise are few and brief, 
typically delimited to non-complex scenarios. 
There are also cases where critics seem to conflate clinical expertise as evidential and non-
evidential. For example, Charlton and Miles (1998) and Tonelli (1999; 2006) take the fact 
that clinical expertise is ranked low in evidence hierarchies as an argument in support of 
the claim that clinical expertise is minimized. Such a claim is perhaps valid when applied 
to the evidence hierarchy, where clinical expertise is considered as a particular kind of 
non-scientific evidence and, due to a larger risk of bias than other evidence sources, is 
placed at bottom of the hierarchy. However, when applied to clinical expertise as non-
evidentiary knowledge, beliefs, skills, and abilities of the clinician, which are considered 
necessary for extending evidence into practice, the claim is less straightforward. A 
possible relevant line of argumentation would be to point to cases in which clinical 
expertise is present in the non-EBP clinician’s practice but somehow disabled in EBP 
practice. Otherwise, the claim seems to ignore the other elements of the EBP model, as 
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well as the “second principle of EBP” – that evidence alone is never sufficient (cf. Guyatt 
et al. 2008a; 2015),99 referring to clinical decision-making as constituted by three equally 
necessary elements – evidence, patient preferences and circumstances, and clinical 
expertise (cf. Chapter 2).  
 
3.4.2. The autonomy of the clinical expert is reduced  
Criticism about the autonomy of the clinical expert in EBP is often connected with 
standardization and the so-called “cookbook medicine” argument, i.e. that EBP promotes 
a “cookbook approach” to clinical health care (cf. Feinstein & Horwitz 1997; Straus and 
McAllister 2000). This argument refers to the supposition that EBP clinical practice is 
controlled by formal rules of conduct, such as guidelines and pre-appraised evidence, 
which in turn presumably minimizes the use of clinical reasoning and leads to automatic 
decision-making.  
Many critics make use of variations of this argument, e.g., that the evidence hierarchy 
standardizes views on evidence (e.g. Blunt 2015) and that guidelines standardize clinical 
practice, leading to “a massive standardization movement” (Timmermans and Epstein 
2010: 80; cf. Knaapen 2014), thereby reducing the autonomy of the clinical expert (e.g., 
Timmermans and Berg 2003). Another variation is that the model of EBP as a whole is a 
substitute for clinical judgment (e.g. Cohn 1996: 161). A more refined variation of this 
claim is presented by Tonelli, in which the patient, due to the lack of attention to non-
evidential aspects of clinical practice, “[c]annot help but practice “cookbook” medicine, 
for they will have been provided none of the insight or skills that would enable them to 
successfully deviate from the “recipe”.” (Tonelli 1988: 1239).  
                                                          
99 The “second principle” is discussed briefly in Chapter 2, footnote 49. 
148 
 
Most EBP proponents will agree with the claim that EBP presents a model of standardized 
care. Indeed, standardization of clinical practice is often considered one of the strengths 
of EBP, since development and application of guidelines represents a reaction against 
unwanted variation of medical care (cf. Djulbegovic and Guyatt 2016: 4). The main 
disagreement is whether such standardization leads to reduced autonomy or not. This will 
be discussed in the following. 
Several critics point out that EBM’s use of research evidence, systematic reviews, and 
checklists make the individual clinician dependent on the manufacturers of such evidence 
and reviews (e.g., Charlton and Miles 1998; Greenhalgh et al. 2014; Horwitz 1996). 
Charlton and Miles (1998) present their case quite aggressively: 
But EBM regards clinical expertise as mainly a matter of collecting, analyzing and 
summarizing research done by other people. Hence the final arbiters of EBM 
practice are ‘systematic reviewers’ drawn from biostatistics, epidemiology, health 
economics and other ‘Infostat’ disciplines […]. Clinical advice has been neatly 
bypassed and subjected to external performance criteria. […] Suffice it to say that 
there is not a shred of evidence to suggest that an understanding of medical 
research and its interpretation for practice can be reduced to the routine 
application of checklists and formulae. […] In a nutshell, EBM involves a takeover 
of the clinical consultation by an alliance of managers and their statistical 
technocrats who are empowered to define ‘best practice’. The upshot is that the 
EBM apparatchiks acquire substantive influence over millions of clinical 
consultations, but without any responsibility for the clinical consequences. 
(Charlton and Miles 1998; 372) 
 
The main concern here is that the authority of the clinical expert is replaced by either 
epidemiologists (“statistical technocrats”) or managers, who do not partake in the clinical 
encounter. In principle, this is a legitimate concern. EBP proponents may legitimately 
respond that clinical expertise is not reducible to merely “collecting, analyzing and 
summarizing research done by other people”. As described in Chapter 1, the critical 
appraisal conducted by the clinician is also about assessing the evidence in terms of 
external validity, including the question of applicability to the individual patient, in which 
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the clinical setting and patient-important outcomes are considered (cf. Chapter 1.4.1.2.). 
The responsibility for the clinical consequences in using evidence is thus ultimately in the 
hands of the clinical expert. 
However, this response presupposes that the individual clinician conducts the critical 
appraisal. A more nuanced line of criticism from Bluhm and Borgerson (2010) point out 
that the extensive use of guidelines and pre-appraised evidence represents a new form of 
authority, thereby reducing the autonomy of the clinical expert: 
This approach to EBM is efficient, but in cutting out the critical evaluation 
physicians once again put themselves in a position of subservience to authority. In 
this case it is the authority of those who produce systematic reviews and guidelines, 
but given that there will always be social and political pressures on those producing 
the reviews and guidelines, this seems to be a risky endeavor. […] In establishing 
predigested reviews and guidelines as the new authority, EBM users once again 
drift away from the demands of critical thinking. Whenever this occurs, there is 
reason for concern.[…] [a]s EBM becomes the new authority in medicine, it no 
longer fulfills its own claims to anti-authoritarianism. (Bluhm and Borgerson 2010: 
216). 
 
In other words, following the three-mode typology for EBP practice found in Strauss et al. 
(cf. Chapter 2.3.2.), when the EBP clinician is no longer “doing”, but only “uses” or 
“replicates” EBP, clinical expertise is reduced.  
In my view, this is a highly relevant criticism that is not easily countered in current EBP 
literature. Proponents may respond by pointing out that even though critical appraisal is 
removed, the act of integrating evidence into practice and putting it to use according to 
the patient’s preferences and circumstances is still the most crucial step in evidence-based 
practice and can only be done by the individual clinician. (cf. Chapter 2; see section 2.2. in 
particular). While such a response may be legitimate, the current EBP model is not clear 
as to what kind of expertise is needed and how it is to be applied. 
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Moreover, as discussed in 2.2., and demonstrated in the definition of EBP in section 2.3.5 
above, assessment of the evidence in accordance with the patient’s preferences and 
circumstances can formally be considered external to the critical appraisal. Thus, the lack 
of response from EBP proponents is not necessarily because there is no room for this kind 
of clinical expertise, but because this kind of expertise is not adequately accounted for, 
neither in the EBP literature in general, nor in official definitions in particular. 
I will suggest a theoretical defence, by referring to the concept of “usability”, which entails 
assessment of evidence when applied at the point of care, in accordance with patient 
preferences and circumstances (cf. section 2.2. above). Such a defence mitigates any 
criticism relating to pre-appraised evidence, because the clinician’s expertise is still 
considered a necessary element when integrating any kind of evidence, including pre-
appraised information, into clinical practice. 
 
3.4.3. An overview of the criticism concerning clinical expertise 
There are two main claims concerning criticism of clinical expertise in EBP – that EBP 
minimizes the role of clinical expertise, and that the autonomy of the clinical expert is 
reduced. The first claim is often presented categorically and maintains that EBP relies on 
the fundamental separability of evidence and expertise. In parts of this criticism, there is 
also a tendency to conflate clinical expertise as evidential and non-evidential knowledge, 
and to ignore that the component of expertise that is non-evidential is considered a 
necessary element, in line with, and not subordinated to, evidence. Such a claim is 
erroneous with regard to EBP definitions.  
Conversely, conditional claims point out the tendency to downplay the challenges to 
clinical expertise in complex clinical interactions with the patient. This is a more relevant 




The second main claim addresses the autonomy of the clinical expertise and that this 
autonomy is reduced in the EBP model. This kind of criticism is directed at the 
standardization of clinical practice. Such standardization does not need to imply that the 
autonomy of the clinician is reduced: standardized practice in EBP still includes the 
external validity of standardized evidence and guidelines. Other critics address the 
application of pre-appraised evidence in EBP, which, according to critics, reduces and 
makes redundant the autonomy of the clinician. The impact of such a criticism can be 
mitigated by referring to the act of integrating evidence into practice, whereby patient 
preferences and circumstances are included; this is still the most crucial step in evidence-
based practice. The strength of this response is weakened by the fact that current EBP 







3.5. Criticism concerning patient preferences 
 
As demonstrated in chapter 2, the patient’s individual preferences are considered 
necessary elements of the EBP model. Patient preferences refer to the sum of the 
patient’s beliefs, attitudes, subjective experiences, and value judgments relevant to the 
clinical encounter. The debate concerning patient preferences is focused on the extent to 
which these preferences are accounted for in evidence-based clinical practice,100 and on 
whether the autonomy of the individual patient in EBP clinical decision-making thereby is 
maintained.101  
Critics point out that discussions of the role of patient values are lacking in the EBP 
literature (e.g., Henry et al. 2007; Miles 2009a) and that the individual and complex nature 
of the patient-clinician relation is downplayed (e.g., Bluhm and Borgerson 2011; 
Greenhalgh et al. 2014; Rogers 2002; Schattner & Fletcher 2003; Tonelli 1995). To a large 
extent, this kind of criticism is correct. In comparison to literature on methodological 
issues on evidence, there is considerably less attention paid to investigating methods by 
which to elicit patient preferences and values, and how to integrate these into clinical 
decisions.102 However, there has been a growing attention to these issues in the EBP 
                                                          
100 In the debate, there is no specific attention to patient circumstances, and I will not address this in the 
following analysis. 
101 The analysis will be restricted to whether patient preferences are accounted for through the model of 
EBP. In addition, there is the question of how the EBP clinician actually conducts the patient-oriented 
practice. For instance, the clinician may implement evidence in clinical practice based on poor evidence 
assessment or by ignoring patient preferences. Such examples of evidence-based mal-practice are less 
relevant to the following analysis, as such malpractice is due to the clinician, and does not refer to inherent 
deficiencies in the EBP model.  
102 Interestingly, there are debates within the EBP literature as well: While Greenhalgh et al. 2014 
maintains that patient values are highly problematic to integrate in the model of EBP, Djulbegovic and 
Guyatt explicitly disagree, responding that EBP has always promoted the importance of clinical judgment 
in critical appraisal and decision-making, as well as the need to consider the patient’s values and 
preferences (Djulbegovic and Guyatt 2017). In my view, Greenhalgh’s considerations are a direct effect of 
her exclusion of patient’s values and clinical expertise regarding the concept of EBP (see 2.4.5. for a short 
discussion on Greenhalgh’s description of what amounts to a minimal concept of EBP. The aim of the 
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literature, where several EBP proponents discuss the role of the patient-clinician 
relationship, values in clinical decision-making, and patient autonomy (e.g., Djulbegovic & 
Guyatt 2017; Greenhalgh et al. 2014; 2016; Guyatt et al. 2015; Haynes 2002; Haynes et al. 
2002; Kelly et al. 2015; Mebius et al. 2016).103  
The main subject matter in the debate concerns the relation between epidemiologic 
evidence and patient preferences. More accurately, critics question the extent to which 
patient preferences can be accounted for when applying epidemiologic evidence sources 
into clinical practice at the point of patient care. 
This subject matter is addressed in various ways and can be organized as criticism 
addressing three claims: A categorical claim that the element of patient preferences is 
lacking, contrary to what the definitions of EBP may state. I will analyse this kind of 
criticism in 3.5.1. below. A second claim addresses specific concerns that epidemiologic 
evidence sources are sub-optimal with regard to the individual preferences of the patient. 
According to critics, the problem is that epidemiologic evidence is difficult to 
“individualize” according to patient preferences, due to the fact that outcome-based data 
from population-research limits attention to patient individuality and autonomy. There 
are two specific variations of this kind of claim, and I will examine them in 3.5.1. and 3.5.2. 
respectively. A third claim is that patient autonomy is reduced, because it is not the 
patient, but the clinician who integrates patient preferences and circumstances. I will 
examine this claim in 3.5.3. 
                                                          
current analysis is to examine the main kinds of criticism concerning patient preferences in EBP, and I will 
not examine this internal debate in any detail in the following. 
103 In particular, there has been increased attention to shared-decision-making, referring to models for 
informed patient choice, in which the patient is presented with the evidence and with the advantages and 
disadvantages of alternative intervention options, enabling the patient to make informed decisions (e.g. 
Guyatt et al. 2015). There are several challenges to shared decision-making, and a full account of these 
exceeds the scope of the treatise. In my analysis, I will limit the analysis to the subject of the extent to 
which the EBP model is able to account for patient preferences in general. 
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3.5.1. Attention to patient preferences in EBP is lacking 
Similar to some cases of criticism concerning evidence and expertise, there are categorical 
interpretations with regard to patient values and autonomy as well, claiming that patient 
values are lacking in EBP models. At the outset, such interpretations may be dismissed as 
erroneous according to EBP definitions. However, critics claim that the inclusion of patient 
values is nothing but “lip-service” (cf. Miles 2009a) or “empty rhetorical gestures” (cf. 
Devisch & Murray 2009). Henry et al. claim that any kind of non-scientific evidence is 
excluded in EBP:  
Despite […] attempts to develop more nuanced definitions, in everyday speech 
evidence-based medicine connotes adherence to the hierarchy of evidence and is 
considered separate from or even antithetical to reliance on clinical expertise or 
patient values. (Henry et al. 2007: 293) 
 
Notably, EBP proponents have also suggested the same criticism, specifically addressing 
the “[l]ip service to shared decision-making” (Greenhalgh et al. 2014: 5). Greenhalgh et al. 
direct this criticism toward what they understand as poorly conducted evidence-based 
practice (sometimes described as “rubbish EBM”; Greenhalgh 2015) as opposed to “real 
“EBM”, based on the “founding principles” of EBP104 (Greenhalgh et al. 2014: ibid.). The 
criticism advanced by Greenhalgh et al. is thus not intended as a general criticism of the 
“real” principles of EBP. Nevertheless, their criticism provides support for similar, but less 
restrictive, criticism. 
In general, the criticism that patient preferences in EBP are lacking is more assertive than 
argumentative. Without argumentative support, any criticism of this issue is, in my view, 
erroneous, either because such criticism ignores EBP definitions, or because it is an 
                                                          
104 These founding principles refer to the rather broad ideals “[t]o individualise evidence and share 
decisions through meaningful conversations in the context of a humanistic and professional clinician-
patient relationship” (ibid., 4). Such broadly described ideals refer to any clinical practice. The important 
point is the question of how the model of EBP is able to ensure such ideals. In my view, Greenhalgh et al. 
make suggestions that are too general and too tentative to provide adequate answers to this question.  
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argumentum ad hominem, attacking the motives of EBP authors (or, in the case of 
Greenhalgh, of the clinician’s ability) rather than the content of their descriptions and 
arguments. 
 
3.5.2. Outcome-based data from population-research limits attention to patient 
preferences 
Critics claim that the application of epidemiologic evidence sources, with its attention to 
knowledge about the average outcomes of interventions on populations, is sub-optimal 
with regard to individual patient care. Most of the criticism concerning the extent to which 
patient preferences are accounted for can be categorized as variations of this claim. The 
basic assumption in this kind of criticism is that the limited usefulness of applying 
epidemiologic evidence in general (including the criticism supporting these limitations; cf. 
Section 3.3.3. above) extends to patient care. On the basis of this assumption, critics claim 
that it is highly problematic to account for the individual preferences of the patient.  
This kind of criticism, with its affinity to criticism of external validity, has been proposed 
since the initiation of EBP. For instance, Feinstein 1994 claims, correctly, that results from 
RCTs aim to demonstrate average efficacy rather than an “[o]ptimum management for 
individual patients” (Feinstein 1994: 801). Feinstein also states that decision-analysis 
aimed at mitigating the challenges of external validity “[c]annot accurately portray the 
true "values" for individual persons” (ibid., 803). In essence, this is the core content of 
criticism that outcome-based data from population-research limit attention to patient 
preferences. In the following, I will identify four typical variations of this kind of criticism. 
Variations of Feinstein’s criticism concerning the limits of the usefulness of evidence, 
extended to the limits of patient care suggest that the challenges to external validity and 
the principles through which external validity is accounted for (i.e., Critical appraisal) lead 
to a situation where it is problematic to take into account attention to patient individuality 
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and autonomy (e.g., Cohn 1996; Devisch & Murray 2009; Naylor 1995; Tonelli 1998; 
Upshur 2006). Another example is Bluhm and Borgerson’s criticism aimed at “[t]he specific 
rules [i.e., of critical appraisal] tying medical practice to medical research in EBM, which 
fail to capture important distinct elements of medical practice” (Bluhm and Borgerson 
2010: 219).105 
One of the more comprehensive versions of Feinstein’s criticism is proposed by EBP 
proponents. Greenhalgh et al. 2015 identify six difficulties regarding the incorporation of 
patient values in evidence-based practice: (1) published research have minimal input; (2) 
population-based research devalues attention to patients and carers; (3) EBP conflates 
patient care with decision-making tools; (4) there are power imbalances between the 
clinician and the patient; (5) EBP over-emphasizes the clinical consultation; (6) EBP is 
primarily concerned with people who seek care and ignores sub-populations with a great 
need for care (cf., Greenhalgh et al. 2015: 8). 
While the categorical quality of their arguments may be contested, the issues Greenhalgh 
et al. identify are all important contributions to the ongoing debate on patient values in 
EBP. It will exceed the scope of this treatise to examine each of these six issues. The debate 
concerning these issues is primarily occurring within the EBP community and is of less 
relevance to the general analysis of common arguments in the EBP debate. More relevant 
for the present analysis is the claim that follows from these six specific issues. These issues, 
Greenhalgh et al. claim: “[c]an all be traced back to the assumptions and preferred focus 
                                                          
105 The description that “practice is tied to research” is a critical remark in itself, suggesting that the 
practice of EBP is restricted and constrained by being forced to follow research rules and research 
evidence. This remark is based on a misinterpretation: In clinical epidemiology and EBP literature, it is 
common to describe the rules of assessment in the opposite direction, i.e., that the research rules and 
research evidence, through assessment of external validity, is tied to clinical practice (and not the other 
way around, which is the case in Bluhm & Borgerson’s description). This direction from research 
knowledge towards clinical practice is highly relevant, as it describes the very purpose of conducting 
critical assessment of external validity in the first place.  
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of the discipline of epidemiology: the science of experimental and observational studies 
of diseases in populations” (Greenhalgh et al. 2015: 8).  
Following this claim, the challenge to include patient preferences in EBP patient care 
derives from the application of epidemiologic evidence sources. At the outset, this a fair 
point: Epidemiologic evidence results provide information about the average effects of 
clinical interventions, conducted upon a specified trial population, not directly applicable 
to individual patients. As such, this is a problem of external validity, extended to individual 
patient care. Thus, the outcome-based data from population-studies limit attention to 
patient preferences, including the patients’ individuality and autonomy. 
Likewise, when arguing that outcome-based data from population-studies limit attention 
to patient preferences, critics claim that the over-representation of epidemiologic 
evidence leads to under-representation of other kinds of knowledge. For instance, Rogers 
claims that the attention to epidemiological evidence “[l]eads to under-representation of 
relevant data (especially qualitative evidence)”, which in turn limits patient choice (Rogers 
2002: 101). Feinstein & Horwitz emphasize that the over-attention to epidemiologic data 
leads to lack of attention to “[p]athophysiologic and other judgmental reasoning used in 
clinical decisions” (Feinstein & Horwitz 1997: 533). In turn, this makes it challenging to 
individualize treatment in accordance with the patient’s personal preferences.  
One last variant of the claim that outcome-based data from population-research limit 
attention to patient preferences is broader in scope and considers attention to 
epidemiologic evidence sources more or less irreconcilable with patient preferences. For 
instance, Tonelli states that: 
An intrinsic gap exists between clinical research and clinical practice. Failure to 
recognize and account for this gap may lead to unintended and untoward 
consequences. Under the current understanding of EBM, the individuality of 
patients tends to be devalued, the focus of clinical practice is subtly shifted away 
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from the care of individuals toward the care of populations […]. (Tonelli 1988: 
1234)106 
 
Thus, according to Tonelli, there is a shift of attention away from individual patient care 
to “the care of populations”, fulfilling goals of public health but not of individual patient 
care (cf. ibid., 1236). In effect, attention to patient preferences is minimized. Similar lines 
of argumentation have been presented by Upshur, who states that care and decision-
making are two distinct issues, of which EBP with its “[e]mpiricist mode of conceptualizing 
medicine” (Upshur 2006: 286) only accommodates decision-making, at the expense of 
care (cf. Upshur 2006: 285f). 
In essence, this broad kind of criticism implies an inherent dichotomy in EBP 
distinguishing, on the one hand, attention to epidemiologic research, and on the other, 
the preferences of the individual patient. This dichotomy leads to a situation where 
attention to patient preferences is “relegated to inferior status” (cf. Charlton & Miles 
1998: 327).  
 In my view, the broad descriptions of the dichotomy or “gap” between epidemiologic 
research data and clinical care, lack consideration of the role of evidence, the clinician and 
the patient in the EBP model. Instead, such a broad description approximates a minimal 
conception of EBP, in which non-scientific knowledge is excluded from the model (cf. 
section 2.4.4.).107 Conversely, as demonstrated in Chapter 2, the common (i.e. moderate) 
                                                          
106 The last sentence continues: “[…] and the complex nature of sound clinical judgement is not fully 
appreciated”. This last point is formally an argument concerning restrictions made to the clinician’s 
autonomy (as discussed in section 3.4. above). As such, “the gap” Tonelli is referring to is equally relevant 
to the clinical as to the patient. 
107 I must note that I find the tendency to dichotomize and distinguish between epidemiologic evidence 
and individual patient care rather extreme. In my view, this is a result of an unnecessary exaggeration of 
the difficulties in applying epidemiologic evidence to an individual patient. Despite the arguments 
presented above, I consider it highly doubtful that any of the critics would deny the applicability of 
epidemiological evidence in clinical patient care on such a general basis. For instance, when Guyatt 
confronts Tonelli with this question, Tonelli responds by stating that: “I never said that the results of clinical 
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concept of EBP includes non-scientific knowledge as a necessary element. In this model, 
patient preferences carry greater weight than the professional opinions of physicians, to 
the point where the patient’s preferences may override the best research evidence 
available (cf. section 2.4.3.1. above).108 
It is true that there are challenges when applying epidemiologic evidence in individual 
patient care – in particular due to the problems relating to external validity; cf. section 
3.2.2. above. These challenges, however, are to a certain extent accounted for and 
mitigated through the clinician’s assessment of external validity of such evidence. In 
addition, the evidence is assessed in accordance with the patient’s individual preferences 
through the following integration of evidence into clinical practice at the point of patient 
care, according to patient preferences and circumstances (cf. section 2.2. above). In 
addition, EBP literature recommends using qualitative data as an additional guide to 
inform decision-making otherwise based on epidemiologic data. As stated in section 
2.4.2., there are instances where the clinician needs qualitative research that attempts to 
provide some guidance in deciding whether or not the findings from quantitative studies 
can be applied to his or her patients. These examples demonstrate that a categorical claim 
                                                          
trials are never applicable or are never informative. That would be an indefensible position. What I said is 
that clinical research can never be directly or deductively applied to individual patients. That this has to be 
an active process that incorporates other forms of medical knowledge” (Guyatt & Tonelli 2012: 79). 
Compared to the previous quote from Tonelli above, this latter claim is considerably more qualified, and 
enables an alternative account of the disagreement between opponents and proponents regarding the 
inclusion of patient preferences in patient care. In this alternative account, there is minor disagreement: 
The main critical point in the latter citation is that “clinical research can never be directly or deductively 
applied to individual patients”. This is an observation EBP proponents would wholly agree to. Indeed, the 
purpose of the critical appraisal scheme and the concept of integrating evidence into clinical practice is to 
provide a basis for the application of evidence at the point of patient care (cf. Section 2.2. above). The only 
disagreement would be on what kinds of “other forms of medical knowledge” should be included. 
108 Bluhm and Borgerson argue that it may be tempting for clinicians to strongly guide patients to the 
correct evidence (Bluhm and Borgerson 2010: 220), or toward the clinician’s personal convictions about 
the best course of action, and thus override the values of the patient. This observation is correct and refers 
to a practical challenge in clinical practice. However, this is a problem of clinical practice in general, not a 
problem inherent in the EBP model.  
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implying a binary interpretation of epidemiologic evidence sources and individual patient 
care are problematic.  
Responses to the criticism that outcome-based data from population-research limit 
attention to patient preferences can be organized under three categories:  
(1) Responses referring to technical tools aiming at mitigating the tension between 
epidemiologic evidence results and the individual patient. EBP proponents respond to this 
kind of criticism by describing the extent to which the applicability of epidemiologic 
evidence is improved by models of shared decision-making (e.g. Guyatt et al. 2015; 
Djulbegovic and Guyatt 2017; Straus et al. 2011) and the inclusion of patient-relevant 
outcomes in clinical research (e.g., ibid.). 
(2) Responses referring to definitions of EBP (e.g. Straus and McAlister 2000). By referring 
to definitions, claims that EBP ignores patients’ values and preferences are deemed 
misperceptions (ibid., 838). A related response is to distinguish between challenges 
unique to EBP versus challenges universally applicable to any health care. Difficulties in 
applying evidence to the care of individual patients are considered a universal challenge 
to any health care, thereby mitigating several general variations of criticism on this issue.  
Another related response might be to distinguish clearly between the clinical 
epidemiology scientific framework of EBP and the application of evidence in evidence-
based practice. As stated in section 2.2. above, evidence provided through clinical 
epidemiology principles does not improve patient-care directly but equips the EBP 
clinician with information necessary for clinical decision-making. The direct link to clinical 
practice at the point of patient care is established by the clinician, who makes use of 
professional expertise to apply this evidence in accordance with patient preferences and 
circumstances. At this point of patient care, the evidence has to be integrated into clinical 
practice, by a clinician, to ascertain that the evidence actually corresponds to patient-
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unique preferences and circumstances. In this case, knowledge concerning the clinician’s 
expertise and ability to integrate, as well as knowledge concerning the patient and the 
circumstances, are considered necessary conditions in EBP decision-making, in addition to 
the scientific knowledge provided through the clinical epidemiology framework. 
Much of the criticism can be mitigated and/or labelled as the product of 
misunderstanding, by stressing that the application of evidence presupposes the 
application of evidence at the point of patient care and is not limited to clinical 
epidemiology principles. As some of the critics correctly point out, there are several 
challenges to individual patient care when applying epidemiologic evidence sources, but 
none of these challenges has to do with the fact that the preferences of the individual 
patient are excluded. Rather, considerations of assessment and application of evidence in 
EBP at the point of patient care must, by the very definition of EBP, include patient 
preferences. 
(3) Responses referring to the benefits of outcome-based research with regard to the 
individuality of the patient. For instance, Brody et al. respond to criticism that outcome-
based data from population-studies limit attention to patient individuality, by claiming 
that, rather than limiting attention to the patient, the application of population-based 
studies does in fact promote the individual: 
Instead of being treated as a bundle of tissues that demonstrate certain 
biochemical responses, the patient is now a member of a population that 
demonstrates more or fewer major complications of diabetes, such as premature 
death, blindness, and loss of limbs. Offered a choice of which "impersonal" way 
they would prefer to be viewed, most patients would probably opt for the latter, 
where the outcomes of research appear to have real, personal meaning. (Brody et 
al. 2005: 575) 
This is a point that the previous criticism ignores. The advantage of outcome-based 
research is that information about the direct effects of clinical interventions is more 
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distinct, both for the clinician and for the patient. In future debate, both views should be 
addressed in a coherent way. 
 
3.5.3. It is not the patient, but the clinician who integrates patient preferences and 
circumstances  
Critics have also claimed that EBP is more focused on the clinician’s decisions than on 
helping patients to become more involved in making decisions for the themselves, thereby 
decreasing the autonomy of the patient (cf. Brody 2005: 574. E.g., Brase 2005; Bluhm & 
Borgerson 2010, Charles 2010; Charlton & Miles 1998; Upshur 2006).109 
Bluhm and Borgerson make their claim in close connection with the EBP model (as 
presented in Chapter 2 above): 
[a]ccording to EBM, it is still up to the physician to “integrate” patients’ values and 
preferences with the evidence obtained from clinical trials and thus to determine 
the best treatment, suggesting that EBM’s contribution to patient autonomy is 
minimal. (Bluhm and Borgerson 2019: 220) 110 
While the description of the physician’s (or, more generally, the clinician’s) role in the EBP 
process is accurate, the inference of minimal patient autonomy is not necessarily true. As 
described in 2.4.3. and in the subsequent subsections above, the integration should be 
done in collaboration between the clinician and the patient. In addition, patient 
preferences are the central factor in every step of the EBP process (cf. 2.2; 2.4.3.ff).  
                                                          
109 A variation of this kind of criticism is that the main attention is to following directions from guidelines 
more than facilitating the patient’s choice (e.g., Rogers 2002). 
110 A similar version is presented by Upshur: “[t]he patient is seen as a vehicle or object from which to 
extract information. The clinician searches databanks for methodologically sound studies, critically 
appraises them and then brings them back for the application to the patient and evaluates the outcome. 




As described in 2.4.3.1.1., the expression “patient preferences and circumstances” in EBP 
refers not only to the patient, but also to the EBP clinician’s understanding of and 
responsibility for the patient‘s knowledge, subjective experiences, and attitudes, as well 
as for the external circumstances that may affect the clinical decision-making. The 
attention to “understanding of and responsibility to the patient‘s knowledge, subjective 
experiences, and attitudes” supports Bluhm & Borgerson’s argument that “it is still up to 
the physician to “integrate” patients’ values and preferences”,111 but this does not entail 
reduced patient autonomy. Rather, I consider the physician’s role as a presupposition for 
ensuring patient autonomy at the outset, whereby the patient’s values, beliefs and 
attitudes toward one or more possible courses of clinical actions are assured to be 
considered by the clinician.  
 
3.5.4. An overview of the criticism concerning patient preferences 
Criticism concerning patient preferences in EBP is more complex than the previous main 
kinds of criticism. Most arguments concern how patient preferences are related to and 
limited by EBPs stance on evidence and clinical expertise. Most of the criticism addresses 
the extent to which patient preferences are compatible with the attention to 
epidemiologic evidence sources. Some critics claim that patient preferences are in fact not 
included at all, as they are subjugated to epidemiologic evidence. I consider such a claim 
erroneous, contributing only to a straw-man argument, where the model of EBP is 
ignored.  
                                                          
111 Personally, I find this argument a bit odd: Bluhm & Borgerson seem to imply that it should be up to the 
individual patient to integrate her own values and preferences with the evidence, into clinical practice. In 
my view, this amounts to an irresponsible model for clinical decision-making. It should be the clinician who 
has responsibility for the clinical decisions to be made. For instance, the clinician could present two 
different therapeutic strategies for the patient, and carefully explain the advantages and disadvantages of 
each. When the patient finally decides to pursue a particular strategy, this is not a part of the integration 
of the evidence into practice, but is instead based on this integration.  
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The most common criticism concerns the extent to which outcome-based data from 
population-research limit attention to patient preferences. There are several variations of 
this claim, some of which imply a dichotomous relation between epidemiologic evidence 
sources and attention to patient preferences. This implication is invalid and leads to an 
over-simplified understanding of how evidence is assessed and applied in evidence-based 
health care. Other variations of this criticism point to challenges with regard to both 
external validity extended to the point of patient care, and to the potential under-
representation of relevant data and use of expertise. These criticisms identify challenges 
which are both valid and relevant concerns with regard to the inclusion of patient 
preferences in EBP. However, these challenges are well known to EBP proponents, and 
there are tools for mitigating them. Moreover, many of these problems are not unique to 
EBP, but extend to any health care practice.  
A third argument concerning patient preferences addresses the role and autonomy of the 
patient in EBP practice, claiming that it is not the patient, but the clinician who integrates 
patient preferences and circumstances. While it is true that the integrative process is the 
responsibility of the clinician, the critical claim ignores the central role of the patient as 
the main subject in every step of the EBP process, including that of integration.  
A general observation of the criticism is that there is a tendency to ignore the extent of 
non-scientific knowledge in EBP. In particular, the role of expertise is both necessary and 
important to ensure that patient preferences are included in clinical decision-making at 







In this chapter I have identified the main arguments against EBP and discussed whether 
the arguments and claims provided are valid and relevant. I have demonstrated that most 
of the criticism can be categorized under four main topics: (1) criticism of the conceptual 
unclarity in the concept of EBP; (2) criticism of the scope and application of evidence, as 
well as lack of evidence that EBP interventions provide better outcomes than non-EBP 
interventions; (3) criticism of clinical expertise; and (4) criticism of the extent to which 
patient preferences, including the patient’s values and autonomy, are accounted for in 
evidence-based practice. In the discussions above, I have also demonstrated that parts of 
the criticism present nuanced and important points, while other parts tend to be less 
sensitive to the EBP model, sometimes creating over-simplified straw-man fallacies about 
EBP. 
As stated in the introduction to this chapter, the essential controversial point in the EBP 
debate is the use of evidence from epidemiologic research in a clinical setting. In 
particular, the confidence in and the application of epidemiologic evidence sources 
constitute the core controversial elements. These elements have to do with the 
methodological presuppositions of EBP such as they are developed through clinical 
epidemiology. All four of the main topics of criticism are related to these presuppositions: 
The unclarity of the concept of EBP is primarily a problem of clarifying how epidemiologic 
and non-epidemiologic elements are combined; the scope of evidence has to do with the 
extent to which non-epidemiologic evidence sources are subordinated to epidemiologic 
evidence sources; while the topics of expertise and patient preferences have to do with 
whether and to what extent they are compatible with the epidemiologic principles of EBP. 
In my view, the most relevant criticism is presented by critics who are able to distinguish 
clearly between the methodological presuppositions from the model of EBP in general. 
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Conversely, critics who are unable to distinguish clearly between the methodological 
presuppositions from the model of EBP in general, generate irrelevant criticism.  
An example of relevant criticism is Worrall’s attack on the methodological presuppositions 
for the justification of ranking randomized evidence sources above non-randomized 
evidence sources. In my view, criticism concerning the justification of randomized 
evidence sources as superior to other evidence sources is the kind of criticism where EBP 
opponents and proponents seem to disagree the most.  
Another example of relevant criticism is Feinstein & Horwitz’ arguments about the limited 
usefulness of applying results from randomized comparative evidence sources in clinical 
practice. While the arguments in Feinstein & Horwitz’ criticism have been reflected in EBP 
literature and are in part mitigated (e.g., by the inclusion of pragmatic trials), this kind of 
criticism, similar to Worrall’s, addresses the methodological presuppositions of EBP.  
Examples of irrelevant criticism include categorical claims that EBP in general only includes 
epidemiologic evidence sources and that the EBP model excludes clinical expertise and 
patient preferences. These are examples of misinterpretations of what EBP is, often due 
to erroneous inferences from the model of clinical epidemiology (regarding clinical 
epidemiology principles) to the model and practice of EBP (regarding the actual 
application of evidence at the point of patient care.) 
In between these extremes, there is criticism that addresses different elements of EBP, 
with regard to whether they are accounted for in an adequate manner (such as whether 
the terms of “evidence and “expertise” are adequate) and the extent to which these 
elements are compatible with each other (such as the extent to which the view of 
evidence in EBP is compatible with clinical expertise and patient preferences). With the 
exception of categorical claims, all these criticisms are relevant.  
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These kinds of criticisms are relevant in that they identify challenges to clinical practice. 
The controversy in these criticisms, however, is minimal because they are recognized by 
EBP proponents and are problems that demonstrate the need for increased conceptual 
attention and clarity more than issues of methodological deficiencies.  
Disagreements between EBP proponents and opponents with regard to whether the 
elements of the EBP model are accounted for in an adequate manner have primarily to do 
with criticism of vagueness and impreciseness in key EBP terminology, such as “evidence”, 
“expertise” and “integration”. Most of these disagreements can be avoided by more 
accurate and unified terminology in EBP literature, and by more careful readings by critics.  
Criticism addressing the extent to which certain elements are compatible with each other 
can be understood as disagreements about the extent to which elements of the tripartite 
definition of EBP are combinable. Compared to criticism concerning evidence, criticism 
concerning both clinical expertise and patient preferences is less technical and more 
complex. It is less technical because the scientific terminology is less technical, and more 
complex because it problematizes the relationship between scientific knowledge on the 
one hand, and non-scientific knowledge concerning expertise and patient preferences on 
the other. Criticism concerning the autonomy of the clinical expert targets the relation 
between evidence and the role of clinical expertise. Most of this kind of criticism is 
mitigated considerably by stressing the necessary interdependent relation between them: 
In order for research data to be applied as evidence in clinical practice, to recommend 
interventions for individual patients, the research data have to be assessed in terms of 
both internal and external validity and in accordance with the patient’s preferences and 
circumstances. It is important, however, to stress that mitigation does not mean that the 
problems critics raise are less important or that the problems addressed are unnecessary 
to improve.  
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Based on the criticisms above, at least two improvements can be suggested: Firstly, that 
the hierarchical ranking of evidence sources should be based on and be more sensitive to 
an expanded set of criteria, e.g., by distinguishing between pragmatic and non-pragmatic 
trials. Secondly, more attention should be paid to the challenges of external validity, 
including clarifications of “generalizability” and “applicability” and of the extent to which 
assessment of evidence in general is dependent on non-scientific, contextual and personal 
knowledge, at the point of patient care.  
With regard to the EBP model as a whole, my analysis of the EBP debate demonstrates in 
particular two important features: firstly, that the confidence in and justification of 
randomized trials above other evidence sources is problematic and in need of adjustment. 
In particular, with regard to the hierarchical ranking of evidence sources, attention to 
constructive criticism should be based on and be more sensitive to an expanded set of 
criteria, e.g., by distinguishing between pragmatic and non-pragmatic trials. Secondly, it 
should be acknowledged that many controversies in the debate could be mitigated or 
eliminated by a more rigorous and unified terminology, whereby misinterpretations and 









The main claims set forth by Norwegian opponents are similar to the main kinds of 
criticism discussed above. In my view, the Norwegian EBP criticism does not exhibit more 
misunderstandings, simplifications, or straw man fallacies than in the international 
debate. However, since the number of participants in the EBP debate in Norway is 
considerable smaller than in other countries, skewed understandings of EBP are 
somewhat more noticeable, and therefore tend to be a more common part of the EBP 
debate as well. The following analysis may also serve as a demonstration of features in 
EBP criticism in general as well.  
In the Norwegian EBP debate, several people have participated, some more prominent 
than others. In particular, there are three critics who have been essential to the debate, 
creating a typical standard for a critical conception of EBP, often cited by others: Ekeli 
(2002), Ekeland (2009), and Martinsen (2009). In the following, I will attend to their 
criticism in chronological order, aiming for an overview of the central arguments in their 
criticism. When citing the Norwegian authors, I have translated the text into English. All 
translations are mine. In section 4.5, the analysis of the Norwegian critics will serve as 





4.1. Criticism addressing the conceptual unclarity of EBP definitions  
 
A common feature in all three critics is their claim that the definitions of EBP are too 
general, vague, and uninformative, covering up the essential content. As such, their 
criticism resembles the international criticism of the same topic (see section 3.2.) to a 
large extent.  
Of the Norwegian critics, Ekeland provides the most detailed criticism of conceptual 
unclarity. As part of his criticism, Ekeland addresses the uncontroversial character of EBP 
definitions, with regard to the relation between theory and practice:  
In the definition, little is said about what the clinician does when these conditions do 
not coincide, or about who determines the weighting and interpretation of the 
different dimensions. If the reality was as the definition suggests, and that these are 
assessments made autonomously by the individual practitioner set above the 
individual case, there is not very much new to discuss. (Ekeland: 2009: 151) 
 
Of course, what is implicated here, is that EBP definitions do in fact not suggest the 
realities of EBP. Central claims expressed by all three critics are that EBP evidence-sources 
are narrowly defined and exhibit limitations in clinical practice, and that the individual EBP 
practitioner does not possess any significant autonomy. In particular, Ekeland addresses 
“evidence” in EBP definitions, in which the “extremely specific rules” (ibid.,153) pertaining 
to evidence remain unclarified. 
All the Norwegian critics tend to specify the content which EBP definitions are covering 
up. They present variations of the following claim: Definitions of EBP cover up the fact that 
its basis lies within evidence-based medicine and its epidemiologic heritage (e.g., Ekeli 
2009: 145-152, Ekeli 2002: 8; Martinsen 2009: 88f). Such a specific criticism contributes to 
a characteristic difference from the international criticism of the same topic. 
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The Norwegian criticism also differs from the international criticism in that the Norwegian 
critics also comment on the Norwegian translation of EBP to “Kunnskapsbasert praksis” 
(literally: “Knowledge-based practice”). They consider this translation problematic, in that 
“kunnskap” (“knowledge”) is too inclusive and covers up that EBP is directed at scientific 
evidence specifically, and not “knowledge” in general (in particular, see Ekeli 2002: 55).  
Ekeland also states that the problem with the translation from “evidence” to “knowledge” 
is its implication of that that there is no alternative, that is, a practice that is not based on 
knowledge. (cf. Ekeland 2009: 154). 
As stated in 3.1., criticism of this kind is seldom the core subject of the critics’ 
argumentation. This is also the case with the Norwegian variation on this theme. Instead, 
main attention is on what EBP really amounts to – which is indicated but not argued for in 
their criticism of EBP definitions. All three critics identify and argue against what they 
consider untenable assumptions regarding the basis for clinical practice. It is the 
identification and alleged content of these assumptions, and the arguments provided 
against them, that constitute what I considers their essential criticism, which I will attend 






4.2. Ekeli’s criticism of EBP 
 
Ekeli’s analysis is comprehensive, ambitious, and rather original, covering a broad range 
of topics. Ekeli’s professional background is physiotherapy, and the main object of 
criticism is evidence-based physiotherapy. Indeed, the main motivation of Ekeli’s text is 
the initiation of evidence-based physiotherapy in Norway. In Ekeli’s own words, her book 
presents a study of the ideal of knowledge [kunnskapsidealet] that constitutes the basis 
for EBP (cf. Ekeli 2002: 5). Her main aim is to conduct a critical review of the understanding 
of knowledge in EBP (ibid), in particular in relation to “the insights and competence 
necessary to solve real-life health care issues” (ibid.). Ekeli’s conclusion is that EBP 
provides insufficient basis for individual patient care in clinical practice, and in particular 
with regard to complex health issues (cf. ibid, 62).  
The attention to real-life health care issues in clinical practice is formally similar to criticism 
targeting the scope and usefulness of research evidence. However, instead of discussing 
the extent to which epidemiologic evidence-sources (or in Ekeli’s own words: “medical 
research”),112 are sufficient as evidence in clinical practice in terms of scope and validity 
(as is the case in the international criticism; cf. sections 3.3.–3.3.5 above), Ekeli’s 
discussion takes place within a more comprehensive and theoretical framework, 
addressing what she considers implicit theoretical premises for the EBP system (cf. ibid., 
5). In broad terms, Ekeli’s general view of EBP is that it exhibits a one-dimensional and 
                                                          
112 In Ekeli’s text there are very few references to epidemiology (and only one to clinical epidemiology), 
and discussions about “methods” and “evidence” in EBP are made with reference to “medical” or 
“scientific” research” in general. “Medical research” refers to objective criteria and data (cf. ibid, 19) and 
attention to “[s]imilarity, generalizability, and precise definitions” (ibid, 67). These latter characteristics 
make is reasonable to infer that “epidemiologic evidence” is implied. Although her main criticism of 
evidence in EBP addresses population-based (i.e., epidemiologic) research, it is not clear whether Ekeli 
means to, or are fully aware of, the differences between non-epidemiologic and epidemiologic evidence-
sources.  This will also be discussed in my critical analysis of the Norwegian criticism. In the analysis of 
Ekeli’s criticism, I will refer to epidemiologic evidence only in the cases where Ekeli explicitly makes such 
references. In other cases I will refer to “biomedical research, which also includes epidemiologic research.  
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instrumental understanding of knowledge, insufficient to justify physiotherapy decision-
making in clinical practice (cf. ibid., 55).  
Ekeli is primarily concerned with evidence-based physiotherapy, and many of her own 
examples are from the field of physiotherapy. On the other hand, when she argues that 
EBP exhibits a one-dimensional and instrumental understanding of knowledge, 
insufficient to justify physiotherapy decision-making in clinical practice, she does so by 
presenting more general claims, addressing EBP in general. In the following analysis of her 
main claims, I will primarily attend to these general claims and arguments.  
Ekeli’s main criticism contains four main claims. The first claim is that there is lack of 
evidence for assertion that the EBP model provides the best available health care. Her 
second claim concerns the narrow scope of evidence in EBP. A third claim attends to the 
limited usefulness of biomedical (including epidemiological) evidence sources in general, 
and a fourth claim is aimed at practical implications of the use of evidence, which may 
lead to marginalization and instrumentalization of clinical expertise. I will conclude my 
analysis of Ekeli by providing a brief overview of the main elements of the criticism. 
In the following analysis of Ekeli’s criticism, I will thus attend to the following main 
sections: 
4.2.1. There is lack of evidence for that the effectiveness of EBP practice. 
4.2.2. EBP represents a narrow scope of evidence. 
4.2.3. The usefulness of applying biomedical evidence to individual patients is limited 
4.2.4. Evidence-based practice minimizes the use of clinical expertise and the autonomy 
of the patient. 
4.2.5. An overview of Ekeli’s criticism. 
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4.2.1. There is lack of evidence for the effectiveness of EBP practice  
In her initial discussion of the basis for EBP, Ekeli asks: “Where is the evidence for that […] 
knowledge [in EBP] makes us better physiotherapists or physicians?” (cf. ibid., 12).113 
According to Ekeli, the documentation for EBPs quality-improving effects is solely based 
on “belief, authority and strong opinions” – that is, attributes to what the EBP literature 
allegedly constitutes a reaction to (cf. section 2.1 above). On this basis, Ekeli claims that 
EBP proponents have provided neither scientific evidence, nor believable argumentation 
for their claim (cf. ibid., 16). In short: “[t]here is no documentation that EBP provides 
quality-improving effects” (ibid.). I consider this to be her main claim regarding lack of 
evidence for the effectiveness of EBP practice.114 As I will discuss in section 4.4.2. below, I 
consider this argument a variant of the international criticism I have analyzed in 3.3.4. 
above. 
 
4.2.2. EBP represents a narrow scope of evidence 
Ekeli provides two different lines of arguments to support this claim. The first is 
theoretical, based on an interpretation of EBPs biomedical ideal. The second is empirical, 
addressing the content of hierarchies in EBP literature. 
                                                          
113 It is interesting to note that whereas most critics in the international debate address the issue of lack 
of evidence about whether EBP provides the best available health care for patients, Ekeli addresses the 
question with attention to the EBP clinicians. 
114 Ekeli is not very precise at this point. The complete context from which I quote consists of a rather 
complex structure. After examining how three EBP authors present themselves by using anecdotes from 
previous experiences, Ekeli claims that these authors only refer to “confessions” (ibid., 15). On this 
background, she infers that: “Therefore, we stand before the paradox of a system that aims at 
communicating the pinnacle of medical research, conducted according to the strictest criteria, which is 
based on a basis of beliefs and experiences. […]. Thus, if it is not considered necessary to document the 
quality-improving effects of EBP; will this mean that one ascribes a priori status to that knowledge which 
is communicated through the system?” (ibid.,16) [italics mine]. There are a number of potential claims at 
this point. In my view, the most relevant implied claim here is expressed in the middle question 
(highlighted by italics).    
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Firstly, Ekeli presents a theoretical line of arguments, addressing what she considers to be 
the one-dimensional scope of EBPs view of evidence. According to Ekeli, EBP includes only 
“biomedical” (including epidemiologic) evidence-sources. Supported in part by readings 
of Foucault (cf. ibid., 17), biomedical research is characterized by its adherence to 
empiricism (cf. ibid., 59) and a strict attention to objective criteria and data (cf. ibid., 19), 
demanding objective signs of sickness (cf. ibid., 26; 66) and attention to “[s]imilarity, 
generalizability, and precise definitions” (67), while excluding any other forms of data.  
The main problem of such a view on evidence, Ekeli claims, is that it is characterized by an 
exclusive attention to objective criteria (cf. ibid., 19). These criteria are too narrow to 
include non-objective symptoms, such as “subjective symptoms”, “invisible pains” and 
“subjective pain”.115 Within EBP, such non-objective characteristics, Ekeli infers, would be 
considered as interfering with the methods and measurements, and would therefore 
implicitly be defined as irrelevant. Thereby, “[m]uch of what makes us humans – which is 
part of our intersubjectivity reality – falls outside the scope of science” (ibid., 22f), and 
hence, outside the scope of evidence in EBP.116  
In this line of criticism, Ekeli addresses what biomedical (including epidemiologic) methods 
can and cannot include. Although she does not explicitly refer to qualitative methods in 
                                                          
115 Ekeli stress that such qualitative criteria are common within the field of physiotherapy.  
116 Ekeli also discusses the narrow scope of EBP through Kuhn’s concept of “paradigm” and “normal 
science”. Ekeli describes EBP as representative of the biomedical paradigm. As a “normal science” within 
this paradigm, the main function of EBP is not to bring forth new theories, but to clarify what is already 
within the paradigmatic framework, i.e., “[t]o bring forth results which strengthen the paradigm’s 
position” (cf. ibid., 42). On this basis, EBP is described as a “[p]aradigmatic project, oriented towards 
keeping practitioners within the biomedical way of thinking” (ibid., 63). According to Ekeli, a scientific 
revolution is a necessary requirement for the development of new “medical theory” that is able to explain 
complex issues, such as fibromyalgia (cf. ibid., 45). I consider this line of argument to be a variant of 
addressing the narrow scope of evidence in EBP. This variant is not further developed in any detail, and I 
will not examine it further. 
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her criticism, it seems reasonable to interpret Ekeli as claiming that EBP excludes 
qualitative methods. 
Another theoretical approach in Ekeli’s criticism of the narrow scope of evidence in EBP is 
her claim that the EBP model represents only one of several kinds of propositional 
knowledge. Conversely, clinical practice must include knowledge of both the user’s 
experiences and of the communication which occurs between user and physiotherapist 
(cf. ibid., 66f). In such a practice, both propositional and non-propositional knowledge117 
are necessary. Ekeli stresses that the idea of an evidence-based physiotherapy will 
“[n]ever approximate the ability to fulfill the need for [both propositional and non-
propositional] knowledge […] in physiotherapy. It can only represent one among many 
kinds of propositional knowledge” (cf. ibid., 67). In this way, evidence in EBP exhibits a 
one-dimensional and narrow understanding of knowledge cf. ibid., 55.  
To sum up the theoretical argument Ekeli presents, EBP is described as being 
representative of a biomedical research ideal, with exclusive attention to objective, 
propositional knowledge. In effect, EBP exhibits a one-dimensional and narrow scope of 
evidence. The narrow scope of evidence is also demonstrated through Ekeli’s claim about 
that the EBP model represents only one of several kinds of propositional knowledge and 
ignores non-propositional knowledge. Compared to the international criticism, Ekeli’s 
theoretical line of arguments represents variants of what has been described above as a 
categorical claim that only epidemiologic evidence-sources constitute evidence in EBP (cf. 
section 3.3.1. above) – with the notable difference that evidence-sources are extended to 
biomedical evidence. 
                                                          
117 Ekeli refers specifically to two non-propositional kinds of knowledge: knowledge of acquaintance and 
skills [fortrolighets- og ferdighetskunnskap] (ibid.). The distinction between propositional and non-
propositional knowledge corresponds broadly to the distinction I made in 2.4.1. above, between 
“propositional knowledge” and “procedural knowledge”. 
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Secondly, Ekeli provides an empirical line of argument, where she addresses EBP’s scope 
of evidence by discussing the hierarchical ranking in two different EBP texts.118 In the first 
EBP text (Bjørndal, Flottorp, Klovning (2000), Ekeli recognizes that the evidence hierarchy 
contains eight levels, with systematic reviews of randomized studies on top and expertise 
and consensus statements at bottom. In a second EBP source, Ekeli describes a hierarchy 
on the evaluation of research in physical rehabilitation (Helewa, Walker 2000). In this 
latter hierarchy, there are five levels, with ‘Large randomized trials with low false-positive 
and low false-negative errors’ ranked on top and ‘Case series without controls’ at bottom. 
She notes that this latter source ascribes 100% trustworthiness (i.e. internal validity) to 
evidence-sources at the upper level, and 0% at bottom level (Ekeli 2002: 59). From these 
two sources, Ekeli infers that when non-epidemiologic evidence-sources (including non-
scientific knowledge) are, at best, included in the EBP evidence-hierarchy at all, such 
sources have a trustworthiness that equals zero (cf. ibid., 67).  
What is inferred here is highly central to Ekeli’s argument: Because non-epidemiologic 
evidence-sources exhibit a trustworthiness that equals zero, Ekeli can claim without 
contradicting her former two arguments about the one-dimensional scope of 
epidemiologic evidence in EBP, that non-epidemiologic evidence is deemed irrelevant in 
an EBP perspective (cf. ibid., 22). On the same basis, she also claims that “When 
champions of EBP demand documentation, it is typically only results of RCTs or cohort-
studies presented in the form of charts or curves that have assertive power” (cf. ibid, 66). 
In this way, Ekeli describes the scope of evidence in EBP by referring to the basis of medical 
research and epidemiologic evidence-sources exclusively. On the basis of Ekeli’s 
assumption that non-epidemiologic evidence-sources exhibit trustworthiness that equals 
zero, these sources can be considered irrelevant to the scope of evidence in EBP.  
                                                          
118 Ekeli also refers to an article introducing the concept of “Knowledge-based physiotherapy” (Jamtvedt, 
Hilde, Risberg 2000), which does not present a hierarchy but, according to Ekeli, in which experience is 
“zeroed out” as a valid basis for clinical decision-making  (Ekeli 2002: 58f). 
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In sum, Ekeli provides two lines of arguments in her criticism of the narrow scope of 
evidence in EBP, one theoretical and one empirical. The theoretical arguments are 
representative of a version of a categorical claim – only biomedical (including 
epidemiologic) evidence-sources are included in EBP. The empirical claim addresses the 
hierarchical ranking in the EBP literature, in which the criteria for assessing the quality of 
evidence are too reductive and restrictive, systematically favoring epidemiologic kinds of 
evidence to other kinds of evidence, to the point of irrelevance of non-epidemiologic 
sources.  
 
4.2.3. The usefulness of applying EBP evidence in complex clinical practice is limited  
Initially, Ekeli admits that the search for “proofs” of disease processes and treatment 
effects have achieved great success in medical science, by providing research results with 
minimum interference from random errors and from the subjectivity of the researcher (cf. 
ibid., 29). She also states that “[c]learly, it is useful to know about research and new 
knowledge within the field which one works. It is not a view of EBM as one evidence-
source among others that I argue against” (cf. ibid., 60).119 Instead, Ekeli addresses the 
one-dimensional attention to research-based knowledge and claims that this kind of 
knowledge is not representative for the knowledge necessary nor useful to understand a 
fibromyalgia patient and their complex, often comorbid, disorders (cf. ibid., 62). In her 
view, the one-dimensional understanding of evidence in EBP is insufficient to justify 
physiotherapy decision-making in clinical practice (55). 
As such, the target of Ekeli’s criticism is rather narrow, addressing the usefulness of 
epidemiologic evidence in a highly specified patient group. However, many of her 
arguments entail a considerable broader scope, arguing for the “[l]ack of correspondence 
                                                          
119 This statement is Ekeli’s reply to a question raised by two Norwegian EBP proponents, addressing 
whether Ekeli means that the results from research (their example is epidemiological research on Sudden 
infant death syndrome) should have relevance for clinical practice at all (cf. ibid.).  
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between the knowledge- and research-ideal which in EBP […] and the kind of knowledge 
necessary to understand humans with sufferings, which is not graspable by the biomedical 
paradigm” (ibid., 63). “Lack of correspondence” in this context resembles the problem of 
generalizability discussed above, as an attribute of external validity (section 1.4.1.2. 
above). Due to this lack of correspondence, Ekeli considers the (allegedly) narrow scope 
of evidence-sources in EBP to be of minimal usefulness in clinical practice.120  
Early in her text, Ekeli asks the following questions concerning the usefulness of EBP 
evidence:  
[The EBP system] presents “quality assured”, “valid”, and “useful” knowledge 
through systematic reviews, based upon the “newest and best” research. However 
– what is meant by scientific quality in this context? Is it given that knowledge which 
fulfills the scientific criteria of quality is in accordance with that [knowledge] which 
is relevant, useful, and valid with regard to clinical practice? (ibid., 12) 
Her first question about “quality” is answered by the biomedical ideal of science: Strict 
attention to objective signs, similarity, generalizability, and precise definitions (in line with 
her argument of the narrow scope of EBP). Her second question addresses issues of 
external validity. In the international criticism, this is typically discussed with regard to the 
extent to which it is possible to generalize from epidemiologic research-results about the 
average effects of interventions in a specific population and setting, generalized to 
individual patients in another clinical setting.121 In comparison to this, Ekeli’s criticism 
takes a more categorical form, claiming that there is no basis for such a generalization:  
[I] have yet to identify believable explanations regarding how results from 
statistical investigations on large populations can provide “more certain” [sikrere] 
                                                          
120 As such, her criticism is a variant of the international criticism that addresses the limited usefulness of 
epidemiologic research, with specific regard to comorbidity (cf. section 3.3.3. above).  
121 This is discussed in section 3.2.3. above. 
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basis for clinical expertise122 with regard to individual patients in life-situations, 
which lack any similarity to controlled standard conditions. (ibid., 60) 
 
In this way, Ekeli claims that scientific, population-based knowledge entails a severe 
limitation of the usefulness of applying biomedical (including epidemiologic) evidence in 
clinical practice. 123  
Ekeli also states that knowledge in EBP, with its basis in the biomedical ideal, is only valid 
within the realm of “the reality of medical science” (ibid., 21ff). Indeed, any fact generated 
through biomedical research is only valid within this realm (cf. ibid., 25). Research-results 
from the biomedical methods in EBP are “[s]haped by the scientific process, i.e. that the 
knowledge is created in the image of science, of the logic of the scientific reality, and not 
of that rationality which characterizes the field of practice” (ibid., 36).124  
Conversely, Ekeli describes a non-EBP physiotherapy as being in line with non-biomedical 
knowledge. When developing professional theoretical perspectives within (non EBP) 
                                                          
122 Notably, Ekeli does not refer to application of population-based research in relation to clinical practice, 
but to population-based knowledge in relation to expert knowledge. This is an important difference 
concerning the distinction she is addressing. This fully in line with her own ambition, described just above 
the citation above: “My claim is epistemological […]. It is not a description of practice” (ibid.). 
123 Notably, the last part of the latter sentence – “with regard to individual patients in life-situations, which 
lack any similarity to controlled standard conditions” – may be interpreted in two different ways: One 
interpretation would refer to patients with severe forms of co-morbidity, who de facto lack any similarity 
to the test conditions of a trial. In this case, the claim is a priori true, and redundant. Another interpretation 
refers to the fact that individual patients in general lack any similarity to controlled standard conditions. 
The first interpretation is highly specific and the second is highly general. I find the second interpretation 
most reasonable. However, as I will discuss in 4.4.4.2. below, there is a discrepancy in Ekeli’s arguments 
with regard to the specificity and generality of different claims and arguments in Ekeli’s criticism.  
I consider this quotation to be highly central in Ekeli’s text, addressing both the usefulness of EBP methods 
as well as what she considers to be the “basis for clinical expertise”. In the current analysis, I will only 
address the first claim. The latter point is related to her criticism of expertise in EBP, which I will attend to 
in the following section 4.2.4. 
124 At this point, Ekeli alludes to philosophical theories she presents in the opening of her text: Shutz’ 
“multiple realities” (cf. ibid., 21f) and Bourdieu’s distinction between common and scientific reasoning as 
different “universes of meaning” (cf. ibid.,). On basis of these theories, Ekeli claims that knowledge 
produced by EBP methods is considered fundamentally different to daily-life knowledge 
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physiotherapy, Ekeli continues, non-propositional knowledge, addressing the subjective 
and intersubjective character of the clinical encounter, is to be considered equally 
essential as scientific propositional knowledge (cf. ibid., 50f). Without such knowledge, 
Ekeli claims that EBP evidence is not adapted to the practice field it attempts orienting 
itself towards (cf. ibid., 41). This is also presented as a stronger claim: “To understand 
phenomena, especially sick people, or how treatment has effect on them, lies far beyond 
EBPs field of interest and capacity” (ibid.,58). Indeed, the main reason for which “[s]everal 
decades of biomedical research has contributed so little to increase understanding of 
[fibromyalgia] issues” is because “these health issues fit poorly within the biomedical 
formula for knowledge and knowledge-searching” (ibid.,61).  
Ekeli also provides an empirical support for her claims, by referring to a personal 
conducted case-study where physicians are interviewed about their clinical interactions 
with fibromyalgia patients (ibid., 26-36). In her descriptions of these interviews, Ekeli 
points to the fact that research to a large extent is lacking, and that most of current 
research has been focused on finding biological changes defined as causes, which 
constitute basis for treatment (ibid., 32). The key point of these interviews, Ekeli claims, is 
that physicians rather than making use of such research findings, base their patient-
interaction on personal experience. In Ekeli’s own words, the physician is left with “[t]he 
intersubjective reality of daily life”, in which non-scientific propositional and non-
propositional knowledge are being used (cf. ibid., 32). As such, these interviews also serve 
as empirical examples of her theoretical claim above, concerning EBP’s sole attention to 
scientific knowledge as being less useful. In Ekeli’s view, the interviews also demonstrate 
that the EBP ideal of standardization and objectivity does not cohere with the reality of 
clinical practice (ibid., 28), and that EBP evidence is not fit to handle the kinds of clinical 




4.2.3.1. The limited usefulness and the instrumentalist mistake of clinical questions in 
EBP 
In extension of this criticism, Ekeli also addresses the limited usefulness of the clinical 
questions in EBP. In Ekeli’s view, all the clinical questions125 in EBP are understood in strict 
correspondence to EBPs scientific reductionist character126 (cf. ibid. 61). In Ekeli’s 
interpretation of the clinical questions in EBP, all the different questions are answerable 
by the same reductionist standard, focused on “biology and double blinding” (cf. ibid., 64). 
“However,” Ekeli continues, “the conscious human will never become “pure biology” 
(ibid.). According to Ekeli, questions concerning humans and things belongs to different 
categories, which are conflated through the reductionistic character of the clinical 
questions in EBP. This conflation, Ekeli claims, is tantamount to an “instrumentalist 
mistake”. Such an instrumentalist mistake is said to occur when human beings are reduced 
to “[a] thing in technical actions”, i.e., objectified through quantitative research (cf. ibid., 
65).127 Through this mistake, EBP proponents allegedly ignore that humans and objects 
belongs to different categories, answerable through different kinds of knowledge (cf. 
ibid.).  
The problem of the clinical questions of EBP, then, is that they all imply such an 
“instrumentalist character”, which reduces any clinical question to biology and double 
blinding methodology. In other words: All clinical questions are limited to biomedical 
(including epidemiologic) methods. In effect, this is not only problematic due to the 
                                                          
125 Ekeli refers to an expanded list of clinical questions with five specific types, including “experience and 
meaning”. This list resembles the kind of clinical questions I have discussed in sections 1.2 and 2.4.2. above.  
126 “Reductionist character” is described as “[t]hat the phenomena which are studied, are subdivided and 
reduced to something less than they are” (cf. ibid., 44). While Ekeli considers such a reductionist method 
to be useful to solve medical problems, she claims that the same methods exhibit minimal usefulness for 
non-medical problems (cf. ibid. 44; 61). 
127 Ekeli also makes use of the instrumentalist mistake in her criticism of clinical expertise and patient 
preferences in EBP. I will examine this criticism in section 4.2.4 below. 
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limited usefulness of biomedical evidence, but also due to that other kinds of potentially 
more useful knowledge thereby are omitted.128 
In this way, neither the knowledge provided through EBPs narrow scope of evidence, nor 
its clinical questions, are representative for the knowledge necessary to understand 
fibromyalgia patient and their complex disorders (cf. ibid., 62). Hence, neither the clinical 
questions nor the evidence used to answer them are representative of what Ekeli 
considers to be useful knowledge in clinical practice. Due to this, Ekeli claims that there is 
a lack of correspondence between knowledge provided by EBP research standards and 
the knowledge necessary to understand complex health issues.  
On the basis of these arguments, Ekeli argues that the usefulness of applying biomedical 
evidence in clinical practice is severely limited, in particular in relation to complex clinical 
interventions, such as with fibromyalgia patients. 
 
4.2.4. Evidence-based practice exhibits minimal room for clinical expertise and patient 
autonomy  
According to Ekeli, the EBP model’s one-dimensional attention to scientific objective 
knowledge also leads to deterioration of the practitioner’s expertise and of the patient’s 
autonomy (cf. ibid., 45f). I consider this to be her main claim with regard to the roles of 
the clinical experts and patients in EBP. Ekeli provides one empirical and two theoretical 
arguments for this claim.  
                                                          
128 Ekeli provides several examples of questions which is not represented within EBP, and which she 
considers to be of far more importance than the clinical questions of EBP (cf. ibid., 62). For instance, Ekeli 
presents the following three questions as examples: (1) “Which effect does the physiotherapist’s 
understanding of the bodies have, with regard to facilitation of preventive interventions and treatments?” 




The empirical argument addresses the elements of ‘clinical expertise’ and ‘patient 
preferences’ in the tripartite model of EBP literature (similar to the figure I present in 2.1. 
above). She quotes from a Norwegian book on Knowledge-based practice (i.e., the 
Norwegian translation of EBP), which states that:  
The [EBP] figure illustrates that knowledge-based practice is more than just 
research-based practice. The main message is nevertheless that one should use 
research as a knowledge-source to a greater extent within professional practice”. 
(Jamtvedt, Hilde, Risberg 2000: 24; in Ekeli, cf. ibid., 60) 
Ekeli interprets the last statement in this quote as implicating the one-dimensional priority 
to research-based knowledge she argues for: “This [last statement] is indeed the main 
purpose of the EBP system altogether”. (ibid., 60). In this way, Ekeli interprets “one should 
use research knowledge as a knowledge-source to a greater extent” in EBP literature as 
the main purpose of EBP, through which research-knowledge is said to provide “more 
certain” basis for clinical expertise. According to Ekeli, this demonstrates that the EBP 
model implies a distinct priority to research-based knowledge (ibid., 58f), through which 
research evidence is made the main priority, at the expense of the relational aspects of 
clinical practice. Thereby, attention to the practitioner’s expertise is deteriorated.  
In a second line of arguments, in direct extension from the first, Ekeli claims that the 
priority of research evidence at the expense of the relational aspects of clinical practice 
represents a shift of attention away from the relational dimensions in practice (cf. ibid., 
60). According to Ekeli, this shift of attention must be considered as an instrumentalist 
mistake, through which the “[i]nstrumentalist rationality becomes directional for human 
communication and social interaction” (ibid., 68). According to Ekeli, the instrumental 
rationality in EBP entails that objective knowledge will deteriorate attention to and 
confidence in clinical expertise. In Ekeli’s own words: “With the final victory of objective 
knowledge, experience-based knowledge and clinical expertise will be “expired”. Then, 
the physician will be reduced to a technician. Professional assessments […] will be 
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safeguarded by electronics” (cf. ibid., 46). Thus, according to Ekeli, the clinical expertise is 
replaced by scientific knowledge.  
A third argument addresses the implications of the instrumentalist mistake with regard to 
the individual patient. Ekeli claims that the individual patient must be understood as 
autonomous individuals and in the context of their daily life. Because of EBP’s scientifically 
one-dimensional way of thinking, such an understanding of the patient is minimal: Within 
the statistical research studies provided from EBP, “[t]he “human factor” is reduced to the 
minimal” (38). In such research studies, patients are only present as test-groups and 
clinicians only as interpreters of the results. According to Ekeli, this demonstrates that de-
contextualization and fragmentation are preconditions for clinical practice in the EBP 
system (39), delimiting attention to both clinical expertise and patient autonomy. Indeed, 
through the “instrumental system” of EBP, the patient will be reduced to an object and 
treated only within a technical (evidence-based) practice (cf. ibid., 65). On this basis, Ekeli 
concludes that, “To understand the patient’s symptoms in a contextual way is 
uninteresting or irrelevant in an EBP perspective” (ibid., 46). In this line of argument, then, 
the ideal of objective knowledge in EBP makes personal and contextual relations 
incompatible with the EBP model,129 thus minimizing the roles of the patient.  
  
                                                          
129 Ekeli expresses this even stronger in the form of a (rhetorical) question: “How can research whose ideal 
is to reduce the “human factor”, in any component, to the minimal, provide a valid basis for understanding 
human suffering?” (cf. ibid., 47) 
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4.2.5. An overview of Ekeli’s criticism 
In sum, Ekeli provides a theoretical analysis of what she considers implicit assumptions 
inherent in the EBP “system of knowledge”. Partly based on these considerations, Ekeli 
puts forth four claims against EBP. These four claims address (1) the lack of evidence for 
the effectiveness of EBP practice; (2) narrow scope of evidence; (3) limited usefulness of 
EBP evidence; and (4) minimal room for clinical expertise and patient autonomy. The 
arguments provided in support of these claims are to a large extent based on the 
theoretical constructs about EBPs “system of knowledge”, while other arguments are 





4.3. Analysis of Ekeland’s criticism 
 
Ekeland has criticized EBM and EBP in several publications, primarily in relation to 
psychiatry and social work (e.g., Ekeland, Bergem & Myklebust2018; Ekeland 2015; 
Ekeland, Stefansen & Steinstø 2011; Ekeland 2013; 2009; 1999). Of these publications, 
Ekeland 2009: “What is the evidence for evidence-based practice?” [Hva er evidensen for 
evidensbasert praksis?”] is the most comprehensive attack on EBP. In the following 
analysis of Ekeland’s main critical points, I will take this text as my point of departure.  
Ekeland’s main issue is the complex relation between research and practice, which in his 
view is deeply problematic with regard to the model of EBP (cf. Ekeland 2009: 149). His 
main arguments for this are: (1) EBP exhibits a narrow scope of evidence; (2) In EBP, the 
RCT is over-estimated as useful evidence in clinical practice; and (3), contextual complexity 
in EBP clinical practice is under-estimated.130 Whereas (2) primarily addresses the 
question of usefulness of the RCT in clinical practice, (3) addresses what he considers to 
be limited attention to the clinician and to the patient in EBP. As such, Ekeland’s criticism 
resembles three of the main kinds of criticism discussed in Chapter 3 above, concerning 
the limited scope of evidence-sources in EBP, the limited usefulness of applying evidence 
to individual patients, and the limited autonomy of the clinical expert. I will conclude my 
analysis of Ekeland’s criticism by providing a brief overview of his main claims. 
Before I turn to these topics, I will examine Ekeland’s criticism of two additional topics: 
That the confidence in RCTs in EBP is unjustified, and that there is of lack of evidence for 
the effectiveness of EBP practice. Ekeland discusses these issues only briefly, and I do not 
                                                          
130 Ekeland also addresses ethical and political-ideological issues, warning about that standardization (both 
of evidence and of clinical expertise) may lead to a New Liberalism and New Public Management “control 
regimen” [styringslogikk] which in turn may reduce clinical practice to production, and evidence-based 
knowledge to commercial interests. These issues are addressed on the basis of his main claim regarding 
limitations of evidence in EBP and is not developed in any noticeable detail (but see: Ekeland 2014: 217). 
In the (2009) text, statements concerning these topics are few and scattered. I will not examine these 
issues in any further detail.  
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consider them as part of his main criticism. I will present a brief analysis of Ekeland’s 
treatment of these additional claims just below, in sections 4.3.1, and 4.3.2., before I turn 
to what I consider to be his main claims in the subsequent sections 4.3.3., 4.3.4., and 4.3.5.  
 
4.3.1. The confidence of RCTs in EBP is unjustified 
Regarding the justification of the superiority of RCTs, Ekeland discusses risk of bias with 
regard to randomization in RTCs. This is done briefly, by stating that RCTs may contain 
methodological errors and that meta-analyses aggregating the findings of several RCTs, 
are ill-suited to identify these errors in RCTs (Ekeland 2009: 156). In addition, he refers to 
La Caze (2008), who has confirmed challenges to randomization in RCTs (ibid., cf. 155).131 
On the basis of these two arguments, Ekeland claims that the confidence of RCTs in EBP is 
unjustified. These two arguments are fully comparable to the international debate which 
addresses the justification of the superiority of RCTs (cf. section 3.3.2.).  
 
4.3.2. There is lack of evidence for that EBP practice is effective 
Ekeland also targets the lack of evidence for that EBP practice is effective. According to 
Ekeland, the one-sided attention to outcome-based methods – to what “what works” – 
makes the EBP practitioner ignorant in relation to “in relation to what?” (Ekeland 2009: 
149). This is, Ekeland claims, tantamount to “[a] critical breach in the logic of evidence” in 
EBP: “One takes for granted that if research evidence is implemented, one will, ipso facto 
[i.e., by that very fact] create better practice” (ibid.). On this basis, Ekeland states that the 
                                                          
131 La Caze is a central figure in the EBP criticism. In the sections 3.3.1. and 3.3.2. above, several central 
claims criticizing the scope of epidemiologic evidence-sources and the internal validity of RCTs is made by 
La Caze. It should be noted, however, that La Caze is considerably less negative towards the justification 
of RCTs than other critics, such as Worrall (cf. section 3.3.2. above). Indeed, together with Djulbegovic and 




question of whether an “implemented EBP really works” is an empirical question which is 
not often examined, just taken for granted at the outset. As such, Ekeland concludes, the 
“evidence-movement” is without any evidence-basis (ibid.). This kind of criticism is a 
variant of the international criticism of the same topic (as analyzed in section 3.3.4 above).  
 
4.3.3. EBP exhibits a narrow scope of evidence 
Regarding the scope of evidence, Ekeland states that evidence is highly specified in EBP, 
restricted to specific research designs and statistical methods (cf. ibid., 151). Moreover, 
these designs and methods exhibit a one-sided attention to “what works” (cf. ibid., 147) 
– i.e., only to research results from epidemiologic, outcome-based, research.  
In Ekeland’s view, the most essential attribute in EBP consists of a “gold standard”, which 
refers to “[a] hierarchy of methodical standards and designs that research must fulfill in 
order to declare the intervention or treatment as evidence-based” (cf. ibid., 154f).132 
Ekeland’s main problem with this hierarchical structure is that randomized trials are 
considered better and more valid than other kinds of knowledge (i.e., with regard to 
internal validity). 
According to Ekeland, the hierarchical structure of evidence in EBP entails a one-sided 
attention to epidemiologic research, which will lead to an eradication of alternative 
methods, thorough which potentially important insights are disregarded due to strict 
criteria of validity, such as risk of bias (cf. ibid., 148). Because of this, Ekeli argues, EBP 
conflicts with the broad accept of “methodical pluralism” in modern science (cf. ibid. 
                                                          
132 Ekeli presents a similar description of the “gold standard”, as the standard for all development of 
knowledge within medicine. 
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157f).133 EBPs narrow view on evidence is thus contra-productive to the inclusion of other 
methods in clinical practice.  
Ekeland claims, similar to Ekeli, that the view on evidence in EBP is based on the 
biomedical ideal of context-free science (cf. ibid., 165). By “context-free” here is meant 
“control for all or most variables in a study”, such as risk of bias in RCTs. This context-free 
ideal is demonstrated by the RCT, as a “[r]esearch design […] suitable to test drugs is 
exalted as the best approach, regardless of the complexity and character of the 
intervention” (ibid., 147). Ekeland claims that in effect of EBPs narrow view of evidence, 
with its context-free ideals, EBP is comparable to traditional positivism, in which research 
methods are the only decisive element (cf. ibid., 153). 
Ekeland’s attention to the RCT as “best evidence” and the conflict with “methodical 
pluralism” resembles the categorical claim in the international criticism (discussed above, 
in section 3.3.1). Ekeland’s comparison between EBP and positivism is similar to the 
criticism discussed in section 3.3.1.1 above.  
 
4.3.4. In EBP, epidemiologic evidence-sources over-estimated as useful evidence in 
clinical practice 
Ekeland claims that the evidence-sources in EBP have limited usefulness in clinical 
practice. He argues for this in two ways. Firstly, he addresses the problem of usefulness 
by attending to what he views as the “context-free ideal” of scientific knowledge in EBP. 
Secondly, he addresses specific challenges of external validity with regard to application 
of RCTs. 
                                                          
133 It is not further specified what other kinds of evidence that are included. In light of Ekeland’s attention 
to “context-free methods”, it seems reasonable to interpret Ekeland’s view as implying that methods in 




 Context-free research knowledge has limited usefulness in clinical practice 
As a consequence of EBPs narrow scope of evidence, with its biomedical research ideal of 
context-free research-evidence, Ekeland maintains that there is minimal attention to 
contextual understanding in EBP. He demonstrates this by addressing the lack of attention 
to external validity in the hierarchical ranking of evidence in EBP, which in Ekeland’s view 
is representative of the ideal of context-free evidence-sources, such as the RCT). Thus, the 
evidence hierarchy of EBP ignores the fact that every research method exhibits unique 
strengths and weaknesses regarding research questions and different contexts (cf. ibid., 
157f).  
Without attention to context, biomedical research evidence is considered problematical 
with regard to its usefulness in individual clinical practice. He admits that the scientific 
ideal of a universal or context-free medicine has provided great progress within 
biomedical research, through which drugs can be tested without regard for the complexity 
and character of clinical interventions. The problem, however, Ekeland states, is that there 
is no context-free treatment in clinical practice (ibid., 164f). 
In particular, Ekeland states that the RCT is not suited for psychotherapy, because the RCT-
design will “[s]uppress essential elements in psychotherapy as a phenomenon, such as the 
idea that the individual variation is categorized as systematic errors [feilvarians]” (cf. ibid., 
160). Rather than basing psychotherapy on epidemiologic evidence, psychotherapy must 
be understood as a “contextual medicine”. ‘Contextual science’ refers to any practice in 
which the methodological and technical aspects of an intervention cannot be separated 
from its relational aspects e.g., conversations with the patient (cf. ibid.). Ekeland stresses 
that such contextual knowledge should be considered equally important evidence as 
scientific knowledge. In EBP, however, Ekeland claims, there is strikingly little interest in 
such knowledge (cf. ibid., 165). In this way, the context-free ideals of EBP is highly 
problematical with regard to application of research in contextual clinical practice.  
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 In EBP, the RCT is over-estimated as useful evidence in clinical practice 
Ekeland also provides more specific arguments against the usefulness of RCTs, from a 
methodological perspective, attending to inherent limitations regarding external validity 
and usefulness due to their design. In particular, Ekeli identifies three problems with 
regard to external validity:  
Firstly, internal validity does not imply external validity nor clinical usefulness (cf. ibid., 
155f). According to Ekeland, many proponents seem to misunderstand this issue, and 
interpret internally valid RCT-results as being externally valid and useful in each individual 
case (cf. ibid., 156ff).  
Secondly, the statistical documentation provided by RCTs is often incorrectly interpreted 
as prediction of that the effect of the intervention under testing will be reproduced in the 
future. Ekeland states that the statistical models used in RCTs do not account for such 
conclusions (156), and that such predictions can only be interpreted in light of theories 
about the (pathophysiologic) mechanisms (i.e., its causal inference) that generate the 
effect of the outcome in the first place.  
In contrast, knowledge provided from RCTs supports knowledge of the association 
between intervention and outcome. On basis of such knowledge, statistical (probabilistic) 
predictions are made with regard to how a clinical intervention is likely to have effect 
when recommending a certain intervention to individual or groups of patients, regardless 
of knowledge of the causal mechanism.134 The core of Ekeli’s claim here is that EBP 
clinician conflate these two different kinds of predictions.135  
                                                          
134 This is discussed in the sections 1.2.1. above. 
135 The description of predictions based on RTCs (which in turn is based on outcome-based research) is my 




Thirdly, RCTs provides knowledge of the average effect of an intervention in one test-
population, compared to the average effect of an alternative intervention (or placebo 
treatment) in another test-population. Such knowledge, Ekeland claims, is characterized 
by a one-sided attention to outcome-based methods, or to “what works” – at the expense 
of understanding “in relation to what” (cf. ibid., 149). Ekeland considers this one-sided 
attention to “what works” to be less problematical in medicament treatment136 but is 
highly problematic in other fields of health care, such as social services and psychiatry (cf. 
ibid., 147ff). In non-medical fields, Ekeland continues, such objective, context-free 
knowledge is less central, and questions of effect and outcome will not necessarily be as 
useful in clinical practices.  
According to Ekeland, the central point is that there is different ways in which knowledge 
is used. “For example”, Ekeland claims, “there is an essential difference between 
recommendations on population-level and clinical practice” (cf. ibid., 158). In other words, 
outcome-based methods (and RCTs in particular) are only considered useful to the 
“average patient” on population-level, not on the level of the individual.  
What does this more specifically entail? On the one hand, Ekeland addresses “drug-
treatment” and then contrasts between “population-level” and “clinical practice” on the 
other. It seems that what Ekeland has in mind when referring to “drug treatment”, is 
recommendations for public health interventions (e.g., vaccination programs), where the 
intervention is provided to a group as a whole (cf. Frohlich 2014). Thus, Ekeland seems to 
imply that epidemiologic research knowledge is useful only within clinical practices that 
                                                          
136 It is not entirely clear what Ekeland means by “less problematical in drug treatment” [medikamentell 
behandling] (ibid., 158). He states that “[i]t may be seemingly unproblematic to define baseline or criteria 
for “positive effect” in medical treatment […]” (cf. ibid., 147; italics mine), which seems like a heavily 
qualified claim concerning whether or not attention to “what works” is considered useful. Presumably, 
Ekeland implies that it seems unproblematic only at the outset. As I will discuss immediately in the 
following, Ekeland argues that the relevance of knowledge about “what works” (i.e., on basis of 
population-based data on average effect of clinical interventions) is limited to population-level exclusively.  
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have to do with drugs. In any other clinical practice, the generalizations from RCT-findings 
to the individual patient are a complicated matter and associated with very high risk137 – 
and can only be accounted for by the clinical expert – which according to Ekeland has been 
discredited in EBP (cf. ibid., 158). Without the flexibility and individualization of the clinical 
expert, the problem of external validity when applying population-based research on the 
level of the individual patient cannot be mitigated (ibid.).  
These three arguments addressing problems with regard to the RCT-design support 
Ekeland’s main claim that the RCT is over-estimated as useful evidence in clinical practice. 
Ekeland’s arguments are variations of the argument that the usefulness of applying results 
from randomized comparative evidence-sources in clinical practice is limited (as analyzed 
in section 3.3.3. above).  
Noticeably, the latter argument also includes criticism concerning the lack of autonomy of 
the EBP clinician. This topic is further developed in Ekeland’s criticism concerning the 
under-estimation of contextual complexity in clinical practice. 
 
4.3.5. Contextual complexity in clinical practice is under-estimated in EBP, leading to 
limited attention to clinician and patient.  
Ekeland claims that contextual complexity in clinical practice is under-estimated in EBP, 
which in turn leads to a limited attention to clinical expertise and patients. One of the 
main problems with the use of epidemiologic evidence in general, is what Ekeland labels 
EBP’s “empirical pragmatist character”; that is, the attention to documenting what works, 
rather than an attention to why (ibid.,149). The one-sided attention to “what works” 
makes the EBP practitioner ignorant in relation to “in relation to what?” (ibid.). According 
                                                          
137 Ekeland does not explain what he means by “high risk” (cf. ibid., 158), but it seems reasonable that he 
implicitly refers to risk of misinterpretations when the research information is to be applied at the point 
of individual patient care. 
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to Ekeland, this is in essence the problem of practice in biomedicine, extended directly to 
EBP: “One is good at treating diseases but bad at treating sick people. A stronger turn to 
evidence may enhance this problem” (ibid., 150).  
As a consequence of the lack of considerations concerning how something works, Ekeland 
claims, clinicians may become alienated from what they do, and from why they do it (cf. 
ibid., 156). According to Ekeland, this lack of attention concerning how something works 
also entails an objectification of patients. In Ekeland’s view, this objectification is directly 
related to the attention to outcome-based research. While the researcher (producing 
“context-free medicine”) may view the patient abstractly as an object, the clinician in in 
her clinical practice must view the patient as a living subject (cf. ibid., 150). 
According to Ekeland, the relation between research and practice in EBP entails a 
symbiotic relationship, in which clinical practice is instructed from research (cf. ibid.). In 
this way, Ekeland claims, the relation between clinician and patient becomes a “technical-
instrumental matter of affairs” (ibid., 147), in which clinical practice becomes standardized 
on basis of research evidence.  
These arguments are similar to what was above described as the so-called “cookbook 
approach”-argument, in which the practice of the EBP clinician becomes controlled by 
formal rules of conduct (cf. 3.4.2.) and that the use of epidemiologic evidence limits 
attention to patient preferences (cf. 3.5.2.). However, instead of referring to guidelines as 
the main source of formalization of clinical practice, Ekeland claims that the “technical-
instrumental matter of affairs” coincides with Skjervheim’s “instrumentalist mistake” (cf. 
ibid.,147f),138 through which individualization of both clinician and patient is ignored. 
In particular, due to the minimal interest in EBP literature to include “non-instrumental 
methods” (such as use of context as a health-resource in clinical practice; cf. ibid.,165), 
                                                          
138 This reference is similar to Ekeli’s use of the same term; cf. section 4.2.3.1. above. 
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the practice of EBP will “eliminate the autonomy of which is a prerequisite for [both] 
communicative practice and for realizing important aspects in medicine, such as empathy, 
ethics, and care” (165).  
On basis of these arguments, Ekeland’s criticism of the limited attention to the clinician 
and the patient must be considered quite fundamental, leaving the EBP model as a strictly 
scientific approach to clinical practice, with close to no room for neither clinical expertise 
nor attention to the individual patient. 
 
4.3.6. An overview of Ekeland’s criticism  
In sum, Ekeland’s criticism consists of three main claims: the criteria for assessing evidence 
are too restrictive, the confidence in RCT is over-estimated, and contextual complexity is 
under-estimated. The over-estimation of the RCT has primarily to do with problems of 
external validity and usefulness in clinical practice. The under-estimation of contextual 
complexity has to do with how the evidence in EBP is ignorant of contextual issues, 
thereby demonstrating minimal attention to usefulness of evidence in clinical practice. 
The narrow, context-free and limited usefulness of EBP evidence also have implications 
the role of the clinician and the patient in an EBP clinical practice. Within EBP, clinical 
practice is in danger of being subdued to scientific research in that practice in EBP is 
instructed, and not only informed, from this scientific basis (cf. ibid., 148). In turn, this 
entails an objectification of patients, and a reduction of flexibility and individualization, 
which in turn potentially leads to increased potential for clinical malpractice. Indeed, 
according to Ekeland, if EBPs scientific ambitions are implemented, the result could be 




4.4. Analysis of Martinsen’s criticism 
 
Martinsen has criticized EBP in several publications, addressing the field of nursing in 
particular (e.g., Martinsen 2005; 2006; 2009). Her essay “Evidence – delimiting or 
enlightening?” (“Evidens – begrensende eller opplysende?”)139 is one of her most 
comprehensive works on this issue. The main aim of Martinsen’s criticism is “to explore 
and to challenge the evidence-basis of EBP” (cf. Martinsen 2009: 81f), in light of what she 
labels “evidentialism” (I will clarify this term below, in section 4.4.1.).140  
The essay is divided in three parts. The first part investigates the concept of evidence in 
EBP, where Martinsen’s main claim is that EBP’s view of evidence has turned into what is 
labelled “evidentialism”. The second part is presented as a historical contextualization of 
EBP (cf. ibid., 100), whereby Martinsen discusses how the rise of modern clinical medicine 
has changed and narrowed down what is considered relevant clinical knowledge, through 
which controlled experiments and statistics are considered in terms of usefulness and 
profitability, at the expense of personal and bodily experience (cf. ibid., 113f).141 In 
                                                          
139 This essay is published as a second half of the book To see and to realize – On different forms of evidence 
(Å se og å innse – Om ulike former for evidens); Martinsen & Erikson: 2009. 
140 The criticism presented by Martinsen differs from the former critics by having a more philosophical 
scope, exploring the basis of EBP through a more abstract terminology. In the same vein as Ekeli, Martinsen 
makes extensive use of several theoretical thinkers: Foucault, Løgstrup, Ricoeur, Skjervheim, and Weber. 
With these thinkers, Martinsen explores the philosophical implications of the biomedical basis of EBP’s 
view on evidence, as well as alternative ways of “working with evidence” on the other. With exception of 
Skjervheim’s “instrumental mistake”, the other thinkers are used as contextual back-drops when building 
up to her own argumentation. In the following presentation of Martinsen’s criticism, I will not attend to 
her use of these thinkers. 
141 Readers of Martinsen may argue that I am simplifying Martinsen’s essayistic and philosophical 
explorations. Martinsen conducts the historical contextualization by way of a “criticism of modernity” 
(ibid., 82), to a large degree on basis of readings of Weber, Foucault and Løgstrup. Also, Martinsen’s style 
tends to be richly theory-laden with concepts uncommon in most EBP criticism. In particular, Martinsen 
propose a reading of modern western medical history as a “dechantment of knowledge” (ibid.,113), and 
in particular, “[d]echantment of the perception, intangibility, and enigmatic character of the body” 
[“[a]vfortylling av kroppens sanselighet, uhåndgripelighet og gåtefullhet”]; ibid.,99). Her claim here, 
however, can be condensed to that knowledge in the medical profession has been reduced (or in 
Martinsen’s word: “disenchanted”) to statistical and quantifiable connections (cf. 156) – which contains 
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essence, this main topic in the contextualization resembles claims of limited usefulness 
and the narrow scope of evidence in EBP.142 In the third part, Martinsen discusses ways of 
working with evidence in another fashion than “evidentialism”.  
As an alternative and reaction to “evidentialism”, Martinsen also brings forth an 
alternative concept of evidence, based on humanistic and philosophical traditions (cf. 
ibid., 10). I will attend to Martinsen’s alternative view on evidence as part of her criticism 
of the narrow scope of evidence-sources in EBP.  
Martinsen identifies in particular three limitations with regard to this kind of knowledge, 
all of which mirrors the main kinds of topics from the other Norwegian critics: a narrow 
scope of evidence-sources; limited usefulness of research evidence in clinical practice, and 
limited room for clinical expertise.143  
On this basis, the following analysis of Martinsen’s criticism is divided into three main 
sections: (4.4.1.) EBP exhibits a narrow scope of evidence-sources; (4.4.2.); application of 
research evidence has limited usefulness in clinical practice; and (4.4.3.) EBP represents 
an instrumentalization of clinical practice with limited room for clinical expertise. These 
three claims are comparable to the typical kinds of claims in the international criticism 
analyzed above, in sections 3.3.1, 3.3.3., and 3.4.2., respectively).  
                                                          
the same content as I address in the subsequent sections below. In the following analysis of Martinsen’s 
criticism, one of the underlying aims is to clarify such condensed argumentative structures, and make them 
fit for comparison to similar kinds of criticisms. 
142 Through this contextualization, an ideological criticism is also suggested, in which political and 
economic interests are embedded in EBP (e.g., ibid.,156) – in the same manner as in Ekeland (see footnote 
31). These suggestions, however, constitute no clear criticism by themselves, other than indicating a 
variation of criticism of EBPs stance on evidence in general, i.e., with regard to potential weaknesses in 
the production and application of evidence. These indications are made apparent by other arguments as 
well, more directly related to the topics of which I will attend to in the following analysis. On this basis, I 
do not consider it necessary to attend to Martinsen’s ideological criticism. 
143 Martinsen’s claims are often interwoven in such a way that several characteristics of EBP are criticized 
at once. The separation of Martinsen’s claims into three main topics are based on my interpretations of 
the text, motivated by the attempt to analyze her criticism in a manner that comparable to other critics in 
the EBP debate. 
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4.4.1. EBP exhibits a narrow scope of evidence-sources 
The main concern in Martinsen’s criticism has to do with the claim that EBP equals the 
content of EBM, but is applied outside the field of medicine. The problem, Martinsen 
claims, is that “The concept of […] EBP conceals that the standard for evidence is located 
in the evidence-based medicine” (cf. ibid., 89). Thus, when Martinsen claims that EBP 
entails a narrow view of evidence, it is because “evidence” only refers to “medical 
research-based knowledge” (cf. ibid., 95). Such evidence is described as being based upon 
statistical methods and randomized trials (cf. ibid., 86), which presumably refers to 
epidemiological evidence-sources exclusively.144 
When epidemiologic EBP extends to non-medical health care professions, its narrow view 
of (medical, epidemiologic) evidence becomes “directional and decisive” (cf. ibid., 83) for 
clinical practice. That evidence becomes “directional and decisive” entails that it excludes 
other kinds of evidence-sources.145 When this occurs, Martinsen states, “evidence” 
becomes “evidentialism” (ibid.). According to Martinsen, evidentialism represents a 
certain attitude towards “only one way of working with the problem of evidence [that] 
becomes standardizing and universal […] which over-simplifies and covers up what should 
be considered diverse and complex” (cf. Martinsen 2009: 26). Consequentially, such an 
attitude entails a narrow scope of what should be considered evidence-sources in clinical 
practice. In particular, non-scientific beliefs based on perception [sansning] and 
experience is under-played as evidence-sources (cf. ibid., 82). 
                                                          
144 It must be noted that Martinsen does not refer explicitly to “epidemiology” or “epidemiologic evidence” 
at all. In her essay, Martinsen primarily refers to evidence in EBP as “medical research” and “research 
knowledge”. However, she describes “research knowledge” and “medical knowledge” as being based on 
“statistical methods and randomized trials” (cf. 86). I consider it reasonable to interpret these 
characterizations as referring to epidemiologic evidence-sources (see also section 4.3.1. below). On this 
basis, and for maintaining terminological coherency to the treatise at large, as well as for comparability to 
other critics, I will refer to epidemiologic evidence in cases where Martinsen refers to “research 
knowledge” and “medical knowledge”. 
145 As I will discuss in the following section 4.4.2., being “directional and decisive” also has to do with the 
application evidence, and its (allegedly) limited usefulness. 
200 
 
With its narrow view of evidence-sources, several phenomena fall outside EBPs scope: 
patient groups with complex or vague conditions, as well as “unlimited and intangible” 
phenomena such as suffering, sorrow, shame, longing, and hope (cf. ibid., 114f). Also, “the 
residential and local, bodily and experience-based knowledge is not evident for the 
medical gaze” (ibid.,114), and is placed outside the scope of EBP.  
Slightly paraphrased, Martinsen’s claim can be expressed as: EBP has a narrow scope of 
evidence, in which only epidemiologic evidence-sources are considered adequate as 
evidence to be applied in clinical practice. As such, Martinsen’s claim is a variation to the 
categorical claim concerning the narrow scope of evidence in EBP (cf. section 3.3.1. 
above). According to Martinsen, the central problem of the narrow scope of evidence in 
EBP, is that it – in its evidentialism – ignores several phenomena in its belief that 
everything can be evident in the same way (cf. ibid., 89). 
 
4.4.1.1. Martinsen’s alternative view of evidence 
Martinsen also discusses alternative kinds of «working with evidence» (cf. ibid., 82), 
through which she addresses what kind of evidence she considers to be useful in clinical 
practice. For the purpose of analyzing Martinsen’s view of evidence in EBP, her exploration 
of alternative evidence provides relevant information about what Martinsen consider to 
be lacking in the evidence-basis of EBP.146 
                                                          
146 Martinsen’s exploration of this problematic is comprehensive, covering almost half of her essay. Her 
exploration relies heavily on interpretations of Løgstrup’s philosophy or perception, demonstrates a kind 
of phenomenological analysis of perception of daily-life and art, without explicit relation to her view on 
EBP. Indeed, Martinsen’s main aim in large parts of her essay (in particular pp. 127-155) is to discuss 
various aspects of Løgstrup’s philosophy. These discussions are not explicitly related to her criticism of 
EBP. Rather, these discussions serve as a thematic and conceptual framework for her alternative view of 
evidence. In the presentation, I limit my analysis to the elements of Martinsen’s analysis which explicitly 
relates to EBP.  
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According to Martinsen, the challenge is to provide other forms of evidence, which does 
not reduce individual perception to a question of controlled observations (cf. ibid., 137). 
Through a phenomenological perspective, Martinsen explores an alternative concept of 
evidence, in which perception is explored in a more proper way than within EBP (cf. ibid., 
126). One main problem in EBP, Martinsen claims, is that perceptions, through EBPs 
tendency towards instrumentalization, are “[r]educed to technique and controlled 
knowledge” (ibid., 137). In this way, EBP clinicians are able to articulate findings from 
research-data, but unable to apply expertise [skjønn] and to be open towards other kinds 
of knowledge (cf. ibid., 148). As an example of perceptions alternative to the narrow 
concept of evidence in EBP, Martinsen suggests “evidence by experience” 
(erfaringsevidens”), which are based on impressions:  
[Evidence] has among other things to do with the power of impression [inntrykkets 
kraft], with vulnerability, sorrow, shame, joy […], but in different ways. This is 
evidence by experience based on impressions. It is a [kind of] evidence which 
continually is created with innovative words, that others can receive, resonate to, 
reshape, and pass on, anew, in other combinations of words. (ibid.,161) 
 
The main point here is that instead of using scientific, instrumentalist reason, the 
practitioner has to think and resonate for herself, in a way that opens up for alternative 
perceptions. “Practice”, Martinsen explains, “[m]ust be continually invented; the 
practitioner has other ways to solve the situation than the researcher […]” (ibid., 97). Such 
practices, based on evidence by experiences, Martinsen maintains, are not based on 
scientific rules, only contextual information (cf. ibid., 98). Following Martinsen’s train of 
thought: To the extent EBP does not include such alternative evidence, its narrow scope 
of evidence is thereby demonstrated. 
Martinsen’s conception of a non-EBP practice are further explored through the 
autonomous practice of the clinician, labeled as “freedom practice”. According to 
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Martinsen, freedom practice is about resistance to the current evidence-base epistemic 
hegemony of knowledge; a practice of resistance, of obstinacy, of self-formation and new 
ways of expressing oneself (cf. ibid., 123ff), which aims at other ways of encountering the 
problem of evidence (158). Somewhat more concretely, freedom-practice consists of 
resistance to the constrictions of the rigorous model of EBP, in which clinical practice is 
reduced to following procedures and applying scientific research knowledge (cf. ibid., 
157).  
The concept of freedom-practice is further described as a philosophical-
phenomenological way of working with words, to gain closer access to impressions that 
surround the clinician (ibid.,159). Freedom-practice, Martinsen describes, “[s]hows itself 
when the nurse dears to encounter the patient’s vulnerability, affectedness, and shame” 
(ibid.,125). A somewhat more concrete example is provided in the context of nursing:  
The nurse listens to find the tunes of the patient, not primarily to “confess” to the 
physician, but to come into tune [komme i samklang] with the patient. In this 
encounter, the nurse disciplines herself, in that she shapes and leads her body for 
the sake of the other, and for […] finding the rhythm together. Thereby, the patient 
is also able to find his shape, in such a way that he does not become shameless, 
that he does not become shapeless. (ibid.,124f) 
 
In this example, the “freedom-practicing” nurse observes the individual person, and does 
not reduce him to an object of scientific knowledge. Such an example demonstrates an 
important point to Martinsen’s criticism: Instead of an evidence-based encounter, in 
which both the patient and clinician become “intrumentalized” and objectified, the clinical 
practice in Martinsen’s example aims at demonstrating an encounter in which both the 
clinician and the patient maintain their individuality. Her examples also demonstrate an 
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approach to the “unlimited and intangible” phenomena such as suffering, sorrow, shame, 
longing, and hope, which she claims are placed outside the scope of EBP (cf. 4.4.1.).147 
 
4.4.2. Application of research evidence has limited usefulness in clinical practice 
Similar to Ekeli and Ekeland, Martinsen addresses the challenges of generalizing research 
results from population-based studies to the individual. She notes that epidemiologic 
research provides knowledge about the average patient, not of the individuality of and 
difference between the individual (cf. ibid., 26). She also states that “[t]he individual 
human being is something more than only a statistical average human”, and that it is 
deeply problematic to recommend such research knowledge in individual clinical practice 
(cf. ibid., 85). 
Also similar to the two other Norwegian critics, Martinsen is not opposed to the idea that 
evidence in evidence-based practice is useful within the medical field, i.e., when delimited 
to evidence-based medicine [EBM]. On the contrary, Martinsen notes that “[e]vidence-
based medicine, of course, demonstrates evident insights within its area of validity 
[gyldighetsområde]”148 (cf. 99). In this particular context, to exhibit “evident insights 
within its area of validity” has to do with being applicable or useful in clinical practice.  
Within evidence-based medicine, then, applications of epidemiologic evidence-sources 
are considered useful (or, in Martinsen’s terminology, “evident”). Conversely, the same 
evidence-sources are not considered useful in other health care professions (cf. ibid.,99). 
                                                          
147 Also, the highly metaphorical language in Martinsen’s examples seems to cohere with the main aim of 
her examination, which is to explore alternative ways of working with the problematic of evidence. 
Presumably, the metaphorical examples are meant to demonstrate stark contrast to the scientific 
terminology of EBP, and thus demonstrate alternative ways of understanding evidence. 
148 Martinsen (ibid., 96) refers to “validity” but not to “internal” or “external” validity. Instead, “validity” is 
used generically, relating to the validity of both research knowledge (i.e., internal validity) and clinical 
knowledge (i.e., external validity). When Martinsen discusses validity in relation to application of research 
knowledge, I consider this to be a question of external validity.  
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According to Martinsen, the attention to epidemiologic knowledge-sources becomes 
“evidentialism” when evidence-sources (the “evident insights”) are applied in a broader 
field of healthcare, through which the area of validity is transgressed. Following 
Martinsen’s line of thought, this would imply that if epidemiologic evidence-sources are 
applied within, say, nursing, this application is considered representative of evidentialism. 
In general, Martinsen is highly skeptical of any application of epidemiologic research 
evidence into non-medical clinical practice. Similar to Ekeli above (section 4.2.1.), she 
claims that research knowledge and practical knowledge are of fundamentally different 
kinds, based on different logic (cf. ibid., 96). According to Martinsen, “research practice”, 
with its attention to methodological rules and conduct, is governed by instrumental 
practice, while “clinical practice” is governed by practical reason, and which cannot be 
reduced to neither research knowledge nor applied research (cf. ibid., 96). In effect, 
generalization – and thereby the usability – of any scientific knowledge, including 
epidemiologic evidence, into non-medical clinical practice is deemed extremely 
problematic.  
Notably, Martinsen does not only address epidemiologic evidence (which in her case 
refers to medical research only), but to research knowledge in general. Martinsen claims, 
that “[o]ften, application of scientific results is neither possible nor desirable” (ibid.,96). 
In line with her concept of “freedom practice” (discussed in the previous section), the 
nurse must invent her own practice, and be able to think for herself (cf. ibid., 97). Indeed, 
Martinsen’s negative attitude towards the application of research evidence corresponds 
to a positive attitude towards the autonomy of the clinician: 
In the clinical practice, one may refer to research […] but not bring practical solutions 
from research. Because clinical practice is not applied research. […] Research is not 
irrelevant to clinical practice. But through her critical way of asking, it is the clinical 





Thus, Martinsen insists that the decision of whether research-knowledge is relevant for 
application is entirely up to the individual clinician. Martinsen does not address the 
question of whether or how the practitioner should assess research. Her main point here 
is that it is up to the practitioner whether she should relate to research at all. Thus, the 
question of valid knowledge within clinical practice is only answerable by the individual 
clinician, based on her practical reasoning. In effect, the assessments of the usefulness of 
research-based knowledge (generated through research practice) are also up to the 
individual clinician alone.  
In sum, and in more common terminology, what is at stake in Martinsen’s criticism is the 
justification of the application of scientific evidence into clinical practice. While 
epidemiologic evidence may be useful the medical field (i.e. as evidence-based medicine), 
it is considered problematic with regard to any other health care profession. In 
Martinsen’s view of a sound clinical practice, what is considered useful evidence should 
be fully up to the individual clinician, on the basis of her practical reasoning alone. 
 
4.4.3. EBP represents an instrumentalization of clinical practice that entails limited room 
for clinical expertise and patient individuality 
Martinsen claims that application of epidemiologic evidence entails an 
instrumentalization of clinical practice, which in turn entails a minimizing of the role of the 
EBP clinician and of the patient. Allegedly, this occurs when clinical practice is subjugated 
to a scientific clinical practice (cf. ibid., 94). Such a scientific clinical practice refers to an 
idea of clinical practice that is fully reducible to scientific knowledge, which “[c]onstructs 
and absolutizes which [clinical] practice that should prevail” (ibid.). This idea, Martinsen 
continues, is tantamount to Skjervheim’s “instrumentalist mistake”, in which pragmatic, 
206 
 
instrumental, reasoning (as opposed to practical reasoning) is considered superior and 
directional to any clinical practices and relations (ibid.). 
Through this instrumentalist mistake, a technification and control of clinical practice 
occurs, in which clinical practice is “manualized”, i.e., reduced to scientific standards and 
rules (cf. ibid., 95). Thereby, the subjectivity and clinical expertise of the clinician is 
marginalized, and the patient is “instrumentalized” through statistical research, 
“[r]educed to an average human being” (ibid.).  
In addition, the (alleged) scientific clinical practice of EBP also lacks attention to contextual 
knowledge with respect to the social field in which the method is to be applied (cf. ibid., 
94). In effect, attention to “understanding, interpreting and applying, all at once” (ibid.) is 
excluded for the EBP clinician. In these ways, Martinsen concludes, methods are used 
without any reflection, without regard to professional expertise nor situational analysis 
(cf. ibid., 94).149  
In the same vein of criticism, Martinsen warns: “To directly recommend technologies or 
procedures for an actual practice on basis of research results leads to impelled 
instrumentalization” (ibid.,96). Martinsen does not provide clarification to what “direct” 
recommendation of procedures amounts to, but it seems that Martinsen views the EBP 
application of research evidence as a recommendation without any sort of autonomous 
reflection from the clinician who make use of such evidence. My interpretation of 
Martinsen at this point seems rather extreme but is supported by other claims: The strain 
toward instrumentalization approximates “practice according to rules and standards, and 
                                                          




to ignore anything else” (98). Another passage states that EBP clinicians “[d]o not think. 
To think is think beyond the outcome measurement […]” (ibid.,148).150  
In line with her own alternative view on evidence (see section 4.4.1.1.), Martinsen 
contrasts expertise in EBP and non-EBP practice: Instead of the non-reflective EBP 
clinician, Martinsen states that the (non EBP-) clinician “[m]ust be able to act reflectively 
[ettertenksomt] (as opposed to only act “knowingly”), in concrete situations which 
demand commitment” (cf. ibid.,157f). To support her claim, Martinsen also refers to 
research by Glasdam, who demonstrates how physicians apply personal expertise in their 
clinical practice, and that use of such expertise provides a basis for recommending a 
specific treatment, different to what kind of treatment that research may predict. In 
Martinsen’s view, such a demonstration of a clinician’s autonomy is beyond the scope of 
EBP (cf. ibid.). 
 
4.3.5. An overview of Martinsen’s criticism  
In Martinsen’s criticism of EBP, she addresses three topics: The narrow scope of evidence, 
limitations of the usefulness of epidemiologic evidence-sources in clinical practice, and 
the limited room for expertise and patient autonomy. According to Martinsen, EBP only 
applies epidemiologic evidence-sources, which becomes directional and decisive for 
clinical practice, which in turn excludes other evidence-sources and minimizes the roles of 
both clinician and patient. 
 
  
                                                          
150 As such, this kind of criticism is an extreme version of what has been discussed in the international 
criticism as arguments against the standardization of clinical practice in EBP (cf. section 3.4.2. above). 
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4.5. Critical analysis of the Norwegian criticism 
 
Through the analysis of the three Norwegian critics, variations of all the four main topics 
of EBP criticism discussed in Chapter 3 have been demonstrated: Criticism addressing (1) 
unclarity of EBP definitions, and limitations to (2) evidence, (3) expertise, and (4) patient 
autonomy. When reading these critics, a number of characteristic features appear, which 
I will attend to in the following. Most of these features are comparable to the international 
criticism, but often presented in variations that differ with respect to the broadness and 
the precision of their claims and arguments.   
There is one line of argumentation that I consider both unproblematic and valid: Ekeland’s 
argument addressing the justification of RCTs. He presents two arguments in support of 
his claim: that RCTs may contain methodological errors and, by reference to La Caze 
(2008), that there are challenges to randomization in RCTs (cf. 4.3. above). Both of these 
claims are valid and relevant. These two claims are similar to claims in the international 
debate, addressing the justification of the superiority of RCTs (cf. section 3.3.2.), and 
therefore equally relevant as well.  
As I will demonstrate in the following critical analysis of their arguments, all other claims 
presented by the three critics include elements that I find problematic, either due to too 
broad descriptions for an adequate discussion of specific challenges to EBP, or due to 






4.5.1. Critical analysis of the claim that the concept of EBP is uninformative  
Common to all three critics is the claim that the concept of EBP, through its various 
definitions, is too broad and uninformative (cf. 4.1). This claim is similar to the 
international debate, discussed in 3.1. above.  
On the same basis as with the international criticism of the same topic, discussed in in 
3.1., this is a relevant kind of criticism: The lack of consensus on a singular standard 
definition of EBP, exhibiting necessary and sufficient requirements for a clinical practice 
to be evidence-based, makes an adequate understanding of EBP difficult, and the EBP 
debate unnecessarily imprecise at the outset.  
The Norwegian critics also provide an additional claim, not usually addressed in the 
international debate: Definitions of EBP cover up the fact that its basis lies within 
evidence-based medicine and its epidemiologic heritage (cf. 4.1.). This additional claim is 
not as straightforward as the first claim. Notably, the additional claim is not a claim about 
that definitions of EBP are uninformative, but about that they are disinformative. The 
Norwegian critics seem to imply that, instead of including general characteristics, EBP 
definitions should address more specific criteria, explicitly exhibiting epidemiologic 
elements. 
My response to this kind of criticism is twofold. Firstly, I do not agree that the broad EBP-
definitions are disinformative. Rather, the problem with broadness of these broad 
definitions is that they do not make the demarcation between EBP and non-EBP models 
sufficiently clear.  
Secondly, I am disagreeing with that EBP definitions should be changed to EBM. Their 
claim at this point are based on an understanding EBP principles as identical to EBM, 
clinical epidemiology, and even to biomedicine in general. On the other hand, I am 
sympathetic to the idea that an EBP definition may demonstrate more distinct criteria – 
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such as my definition suggests in Chapter 2.151 By including specific criteria, clarifications 
about specific differences between EBP and non-EBP models would clearer, and members 
of the EBP debate would have the opportunity to base their disagreements on a more 
clarified common ground. However, this argument presupposes that proponents and 
opponents do read definitions as well as accept the content of them. As the following 
analysis of the Norwegian EBP debate will demonstrate, these presuppositions are not 
always fulfilled. 
Another interesting feature in their criticism of EBP definitions is that they also address 
the Norwegian translation from EBP to “Knowledge based practice” (KBP). More 
specifically, their claim here is that the translation from “evidence” to “knowledge” is 
problematic in that “knowledge” (“kunnskap”) is too inclusive and covers up that EBP is 
directed at scientific evidence specifically and not “knowledge” in general (cf. 4.1.).  
I agree with that the translation may be considered problematic: There are at least two 
important nuances between “evidence” and “knowledge” that is under-communicated in 
the translation:  
In ordinary language, “knowledge” refers to a larger class of potential objects than 
“evidence” (both in English and in Norwegian). For instance, knowledge in ordinary 
language usually refers very broadly to something one knows or is able to do (cf. Ichikawa, 
Jenkins & Steup 2018) whereas evidence refers more specifically to certain discourses, 
such as within scientific research and law.152 Another important difference is that whereas 
                                                          
151 In section 2.3.5. above, EBP is defined as an “Approach to clinical decision-making, in which the clinician 
recommends clinical interventions to individual patients, based on the best evidence available, assessed 
according to methodological criteria of evidence quality, where the evidence is integrated into clinical 
practice by a clinician, who, by making use of clinical experience, identifies, assesses and applies the 
evidence, in accordance with the patient’s preferences and circumstances.” The clause marked in italics is 
not explicitly referring to Clinical epidemiology, but nonetheless makes the methodological elements of 
EBP more apparent. 
152 However, from a commonplace philosophical point of view, the opposite is the case: “Evidence” is more 
inclusive than “knowledge”. “Knowledge refers to “justified, true belief” whereas “evidence refers to “that 
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“knowledge” refers to “objects one can think about”, evidence refers to its justificatory 
function of being evidence for something else (cf. 2.4.3.).  
I consider both of these issues to be implied when Ekeland states that the problem with 
the translation from “evidence” to “knowledge” is its implication that that there is no 
alternative, i.e., that there is no practice that is not based on knowledge (cf. Ekeland 2009: 
154). While one could separate clearly between an evidence-based practice and any 
clinical practices based on (some non-evidential kind of) knowledge, this is not possible 
with regard to Knowledge-based practice. It is “[a]s if not all professional practice has been 
and is knowledge based” (Martinsen 2009: 88). The problem, then, has to do with the 
wide scope of “knowledge”, which is broader than “evidence”  
While I agree to such a criticism with regard to the term “knowledge” in isolation (cf. 
“knowledge” in ordinary language, just above), I disagree with that the definition of KBP 
exhibit the same problem. In the Norwegian translation of the three elements in the EBP 
model, “evidence” are translated to “forskningskunnskap” (literally: “research 
knowledge”), “expertise” to “erfaringsbasert kunnskap” (literally: experience-based 
knowledge), and patient preferences to “brukerkunnskap” (literally: user-knowledge). 
There are two points to be made with regard to these Norwegian terms: 
                                                          
which justifies belief”. An “evidence-based practice”, then, includes any beliefs that may function as 
evidential support for another claim (cf. section 1.3.), in principle regardless of the inherent justification 
of the particular piece of evidence. On the other hand, a “Knowledge-based practice” would only include 
beliefs that are justified (by other beliefs). From this point of view, “knowledge” is actually less inclusive 
than “evidence”. In the same line of argument, “knowledge” in “Knowledge based practice” would not 
coincide with Guyatt et al.’s (2015) wide definition of “evidence” (see section 2.4.2.), due to that 
“justification” is not a necessary attribute to evidence-sources in this definition. For instance, Guyatt et 
al.’s definition of “evidence” includes “empirical observations”, regardless of whether these observations 
are justified or not. This philosophical point of view, however, is not what critics nor KBP proponents have 




Firstly, “Research knowledge” is significantly more precise and less extensive than 
“knowledge” in general. The novel idea of KBP – analogous to EBP – is to base clinical 
decisions on research knowledge (when available), and not knowledge in general.  
Secondly, in the same manner as with the international definitions, the main purpose of 
the definition is to consider the three elements in relation to each other (cf. Chapter 2). 
Thus, another novel idea of KBP –also analogous to EBP – is that a clinical practice should 
be based on a combination of these kinds of knowledge.  
Both of these points address features of which is easily distinguishable from other kinds 
of (non EBP/KBP) clinical practices. On this background, then, Martinsen’s complaint 
about that “all professional practice has been and is knowledge based” (Martinsen 2009: 
88) is incorrect.  
As stated above, I consider the criticism concerning EBP and KBP definitions more as 
expressions of the critics’ initial attitude towards EBP, than a main argument on its own. 
The content of this implication has to do with their main criticism against EBP. As 
mentioned in 3.1. (regarding the international criticism) and 4.0. (regarding the 
Norwegian criticism), the core arguments critics present are oriented toward specific 
elements of evidence, clinical expertise and patient autonomy rather than on concrete 
arguments about the concept of EBP or of Knowledge-based practice. The structure of 
argumentation of all of the three Norwegian critics is mainly about identifying and arguing 
against what they consider untenable assumptions regarding the basis for clinical practice. 
It is the identification and alleged content of these assumptions, and the arguments 
provided against them, that constitute what I considers their essential criticism, of which 
I will attend to in the following sections in this chapter. 
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4.5.2. Critical analysis of the claim that there is lack of evidence for the effectiveness of 
EBP  
Ekeli addresses the question of whether knowledge in EBP “[m]akes us better 
physiotherapists or physicians”. Ekeli argues that EBP is based solely on “belief, authority 
and strong opinions”, and concludes that there is no documentation that EBP provides 
quality-improving effects (cf. 4.2.2. above). While Ekeli’s argument in some ways 
resembles the international criticism, there is an important difference: The central critical 
claim in the international criticism is comparative, addressing whether epidemiologic 
methods produce better outcomes than non-epidemiologic methods. Ekeli’s claim on the 
other hand attends to whether EBP provides documentation for its quality-improving 
effects at all, that is, in a non-comparative manner. Presumably, Ekeli means that non-EBP 
methods provides better documentation, but this is not part of her argument.  
As noted in 3.3.4., there is in fact documentation for that epidemiologic evidence does 
improve clinical care.153 In turn, the documentation of the effect of EBP health care 
contradicts Ekeli’s argument that EBP is solely based on “belief, authority and strong 
opinions”. Of course, Ekeli may reply by stating that this evidence is not sufficient, but that 
is not relevant to her claim as it currently stands.  
Ekeland claims that the question of whether an “implemented EBP really works” is an 
empirical question not often examined, just taken for granted at the outset. Thus, 
according to Ekeland, EBP is without any evidence-basis (ibid.). Ekeland also addresses the 
question in a non-comparative manner (see section 4.3. above) and is thus open to the 
same criticism as of Ekeli’s claim above: Ekeland is incorrect with regard to the claim that 
this question is taken for granted: There is in fact research on the subject. As discussed in 
section 3.3.4. above, this belief cannot itself be documented by clinical trials (based on 
                                                          
153 For instance, EBP proponents refer to historical documentation of the impact of epidemiologic studies, 
and to studies that document that patients who receive proven efficacious therapies have better 
outcomes than those who do not (section 3.3.4).  
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epidemiologic methods), but is documented through other kinds of research. Thus, 
Ekeland’s claim is incorrect (or imprecise), missing the central point of the international 
criticism about whether epidemiologic methods produce better outcomes than non-
epidemiologic methods.  
On this basis, I consider both Ekeli’s and Ekeland’s claim to be of low relevance to the EBP 
debate. 
 
4.5.3. Critical analysis of criticism regarding the narrow scope of evidence in EBP 
When addressing the scope of evidence in EBP, all three critics present categorical claims 
about evidence in EBP: In her theoretical lines of argument, Ekeli states that EBP only 
addresses biomedical evidence-sources. Ekeland claims that evidence is restricted to 
specific outcome-based research designs and statistical methods, and Martinsen presents 
a variant in which only quantitative medical research is included.  
All three critics seem to share the assumption that there is only one evidence-hierarchy in 
EBP, and that evidence-sources within this hierarchy are synonymous with evidence-
sources in EBM. Both assumptions are incorrect. Firstly, evidence-sources may vary 
between evidence-based medicine and other evidence-based models. Secondly, even 
within EBM it is common to include non-epidemiologic evidence-sources.154 
In the same manner, all three critics tend to ignore the broader definition of “evidence” 
in EBP (see section 2.4.2.). In addition, both Ekeli and Ekeland seem to misunderstand 
what “gold standard” is when they describe it as a standard for all kinds of evidence-
sources.155 As discussed in 1.2., the gold standard refers to a certain method, test, 
                                                          
154 I have discussed this topic above, in section 3.3.1. above. 
155 Ekeli’s description of the “gold standard” is not a central development in any of her main arguments. I 
have made a brief notice of Ekeli’s description of “gold standard” in a footnote in section 4.4.3, when 
commenting on Ekeland’s use of the same term. 
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measure, or procedure that is considered the best available, by which scientific evidence 
is evaluated with regard to different clinical questions. For instance, the RCT is typically 
referred to as the gold standard with regard to therapeutic questions, but not with regard 
to qualitative questions.  
On this basis, their criticism of the narrow scope of evidence in EBP is based on 
misperceptions of central elements in the EBP literature. 
A common feature in all of the Norwegian critics, is that they address the lack of attention 
to evidence-sources necessary to encounter complex health care issues. The critics differ 
slightly in what they specifically address as lacking: Ekeli addresses the lack of attention to 
“non-objective criteria”, Ekeland claims that “context-sensitive evidence” is lacking, and 
Martinsen provides a number of examples of non-scientific beliefs based on perception, 
which allegedly is “underplayed” (to the point of omission) in EBP (cf. section 4.4.1.). 
It is not clarified what kind of evidence “non-objective”, “context-sensitive” and 
“perception-based” evidence entail. Presumably, the critics intend to refer to qualitative 
methods and non-scientific knowledge as evidence, and then claim that such kinds of 
evidence-sources are excluded in EBP. This latter claim is incorrect: As discussed in 
Chapter 1 and 2, most EBP hierarchies include several non-epidemiologic evidence-
sources, such as qualitative methods and clinical expertise (ranked lower than 
epidemiologic evidence due to higher risk of bias). Their arguments also ignore that 
different questions are answered by different kinds of evidence (see sections 1.2. and 
2.4.2. above). Moreover, a large part of the context-sensitive and non-scientific 
knowledge and beliefs that are used in a clinical practice, is provided by the clinician and 
the patient, in addition to the evidence, as non-evidential knowledge and beliefs (cf. 
section 2.4.). Indeed, the Norwegian critics seem to conflate the differences between 
evidential and non-evidential knowledge altogether, by attending only to evidential 
knowledge. This demonstrates not only ignorance with regard to the tripartite model of 
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EBP, but to a lack of basic understanding of the different kinds of knowledge within clinical 
practice in general. 
In essence, all the claims provided from the Norwegian critics regarding the narrow scope 
of evidence in EBP are variants of what have been described in chapter 3 above as 
categorical claims. In 3.1.1., I described the categorical claim as stating that only 
epidemiologic evidence-sources constitute evidence in EBP. As discussed in that section, 
such categorical claims are only justifiable with regard to the minimal concept of EBP. 
Conversely, such claims do not reflect the moderate concept of EBP, which is by far the 
most reasonable version.156 As such, their criticism of evidence in EBP can be dismissed 
due to an incorrect understanding of what evidence in EBP amounts to. 
There are, however, certain distinguishing features to all three critics, which deserve more 
detailed attention. In my view, these features exhibit interpretations of EBP that are 
typical to the Norwegian debate. In the following, I will address five such features, and 
provide corrections to claims that are based on incorrect or imprecise understanding of 
what evidence in EBP is and is not. 
 
 Correction to the use of a “biomedical research ideal” 
A challenge when analyzing the three Norwegian critics has been to identify what kind of 
evidence-sources they address, and to what extent they actually disagree with the 
usefulness of epidemiologic evidence. When they are not specifically addressing 
challenges in RCTs, they tend to discuss “evidence” in terms of “biomedical” or “medical” 
research. Conversely, there are very few references to “epidemiologic research”. 
                                                          
156 The narrow and moderate concept of EBP is discussed in section 2.4.4, above. 
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References to “biomedicine” and “medical research” are sub-optimal when discussing 
evidence-sources in EBP. “Biomedicine” is a broad term, sometimes referring to 
“mainstream medicine”, “western medicine” in general, or to “clinical medicine based on 
the principles of the natural sciences, such as biology and biochemistry” (“biomedicine” 
in medical-dictionary 2019). While “biomedicine” may refer to epidemiologic evidence-
sources, “biomedicine” is neither sufficiently broad to include all potential evidence-
sources in EBP, nor specific enough to the specific epidemiologic evidence-sources that 
are characteristic of EBP.  
In particular, references to “biomedicine” are insensitive to the distinction between 
epidemiologic and pathophysiological research. A central feature in clinical epidemiology 
and EBP literature is that pathophysiological reasoning is considered less trustworthy than 
epidemiologic evidence. 
When Ekeli states that “knowledge” in EBP refers to the “biomedical research ideal” and 
its strict attention to objective criteria and data (see section 4.2.1.), this is, at best, 
imprecise. “Biomedical research”, for instance, outcome-based reasoning of clinical 
epidemiology and the mechanistic reasoning of pathophysiology, differs substantially (cf. 
section 1.4.1. above). Thus, when Ekeli points out that the tendency in “medical research” 
is exclusively to attend to “objective criteria”, it is unclear whether such criteria are 
typically included in outcome-based methods or not. In other places, Ekeli explicitly refers 
to pathophysiologic principles, for instance when stating that “effective treatment of 
disease” pertains to “finding the causes for the disorder” (Ekeli 2002: 30). As stated in 
1.2.1., attention to causes is a typical feature within pathophysiologic reasoning, not 
outcome-based research.  
Similarly, when Ekeland describes EBPs attention to context-free treatment within clinical 
practice, and claims that this is in essence the problem of practice in biomedicine, in which 
“one is good at treating diseases but bad at treating sick people (cf. 4.3.2.), it is equally 
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imprecise with regard to the EBP debate. In clinical epidemiology and EBP, 
pathophysiological reasoning is considered less trustworthy than epidemiologic 
evidence.157 Related to the same issue, Martinsen sometimes conflates biology and 
epidemiology. For instance, she states that the relation between research and research-
application “[b]ecomes deductions from biological theories, that is, technique” 
(Martinsen 2009: 85). This conflation is enabled precisely because of an imprecise 
distinction between biology and epidemiology, and a correspondingly vague 
understanding of what outcome-based research is and is not. In turn, it also makes her 
concept of “technique” inadequate with regard to clinical epidemiology and EBP. 
My point here is not that their references to “biomedicine” are incorrect, but that the use 
of “biomedicine” in their criticism is too broad for an adequate discussion of specific 
challenges to EBP.  
 
 Correction of Ekeli’s assumption about non-propositional knowledge in EBP 
Ekeli provides the most original and least precise criticism of evidence in EBP, stating that 
the EBP model represents only one of several kinds of propositional knowledge, and 
excludes any other kinds of propositional knowledge as well as non-propositional 
knowledge. Presumably, Ekeli means that the “one kind of propositional knowledge” in 
EBP refers to outcome-based epidemiologic evidence-sources. This is not only 
grammatically wrong, but ignores the obvious fact that different epidemiologic methods 
make use of different kinds of propositional knowledge, in particular concerning 
methodical terminology.158 I find it difficult to interpret what is included and excluded in 
                                                          
157 Such impreciseness is also occurring within EBP literature. Ekeli provides several citations from EBP 
proponents who makes use of “biomedical research” in the same imprecise manner (e.g., Ekeli 2002: 12; 
54). I must stress that reference to biomedicine is not incorrect, just imprecise.  
158 For instance, non-interventional observational studies include quite different propositions than, say, 
analytical observational studies, such as an RCT.  
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EBP with regard to Ekeli’s “propositional knowledge”, as anything else than quantitative 
and qualitative methods. As such, her criticism is identical to Ekeland and Martinsen, 
opening up to the same response as I presented in the section just above.  
With regard to “non-propositional knowledge”, Ekeli is correct that such knowledge is not 
included as evidence in EBP hierarchies.159 Ekeli provides no examples of what she means 
by “non-propositional knowledge”. Presumably, such knowledge refers to non-scientific 
knowledge that is considered necessary to clinical practice. As I have discussed in my 
analysis of expertise in EBP, such knowledge is commonly included in descriptions of 
clinical expertise in EBP literature, as necessary non-evidential elements, in addition to 
evidential knowledge.160 To the extent Ekeli would disagree to this, she would have to 
argue for how tacit knowledge would constitute evidential knowledge. In her text, Ekeli 
does not provide any clarifications on this matter. On this basis, Ekeli’s criticism of that 
EBP exhibits a narrow scope of evidence because it excludes non-propositional 
knowledge, is of minor relevance. 
 
 Correction to Ekeli’s view on evidence hierarchies in EBP 
Ekeli is correct that there are some evidence-hierarchies that are more restrictive than 
others, and do not include, for instance, expertise. However, Ekeli also explicitly identifies 
hierarchies that include non-epidemiologic evidence-sources.  
In Ekeli’s empirical line of argument, she discusses how two different EBP sources rank 
evidence-sources hierarchically. Firstly, she identifies two different hierarchies, one 
containing non-epidemiologic evidence-sources (including expertise), and another that 
                                                          
159 As discussed in 2.4.2. above, there are some EBP authors who include “tacit” or “private” beliefs based 
on “hunches” as evidence (e.g. Greenhalgh 1999; Djulbegovic et al. 2009). To be considered evidence, 
however, these beliefs have to be articulated. 
160 This is discussed in detail in section 2.4.3., and in the following subsections. 
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only includes epidemiologic evidence-sources.161 In the second EBP-source that Ekeli cites, 
trustworthiness (i.e., internal validity) is ascribed as 100% to evidence-sources at the 
upper level, and 0% at bottom level. Secondly, Ekeli infers the general claim that when 
non-epidemiologic research and non-scientific knowledge-sources in general are, at best, 
included in the “EBP system” at all, such sources have a trustworthiness that equals zero 
(cf. ibid., 67). As discussed in 4.2.2., this is an important inference in Ekeli’s criticism, on 
the basis of which she claims that non-epidemiologic evidence is deemed irrelevant, and 
that only epidemiologic evidence exhibits assertive power in an EBP perspective. 
The problem, however, is that the inference is invalid: The inference from one source, 
which ascribes 0% trustworthiness to the bottom level of the hierarchy (including only 
epidemiologic evidence-sources) to another hierarchy (including both epidemiologic and 
non-epidemiologic evidence-sources) is erroneous. In fact, it seems that Ekeli conflates 
the two different EBP sources she is citing: The two hierarchies are highly different, and 
there is no reason to assume that what is ranked at the lower levels in the first hierarchy 
is ascribed as identical to the second hierarchy. On the contrary, the inclusion of any 
source in a hierarchy usually implies that different evidence-sources at lower levels in a 
hierarchy exhibit relative lower degrees of trustworthiness, compared to higher levels. As 
discussed in chapter 2.4., this is a question of what is considered best available, and when 
evidence-sources ranked at the upper levels are not available, lower ranked evidence-
sources are considered adequate.162  
                                                          
161 As noted in a previous footnote, Ekeli also refers to an article introducing the concept of “Knowledge-
based physiotherapy” (Jamtvedt, Hilde, Risberg 2000), which does not present a hierarchy but, according 
to Ekeli, in which experience is “zeroed out” as valid basis for clinical decision-making (Ekeli 2002: 58f). 
This is an erroneous reading of the text. The text explicitly states that research-based knowledge is not 
sufficient for clinical decision-making, and that without clinical expertise, there is a danger of that the 
“[p]ractice-field becomes tyrannized by research” (Jamtvedt, Hilde, Risberg 2000). In addition, the authors 
stress the importance of qualitative evidence-sources as well. 
162 I consider Ekeli’s example of the hierarchy that ascribes “0 % trustworthiness” to be an exception to 
the rule. I have not read the source Ekeli is citing (Helewa, Walker 2000). If it is correct that the EBP authors 
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Thus, the basis of Ekeli’s empirical lines of argument is erroneous due to an invalid 
inference. Her claims that non-epidemiologic evidence-sources exhibit trustworthiness 
that equals zero, and that these sources therefore can be considered irrelevant to the 
scope of evidence in EBP, are not representative of common EBP literature.  
 
 Correction to Ekeland’s assumption of that EBP is comparable to traditional 
positivism 
In extension of the misperceived view of the scope of evidence in EBP, Ekeland also claims 
that EBP is comparable to traditional positivism, in which quantitative research methods 
are the only decisive element (cf. 4.3.3.). Such a claim is synonymous with what was 
discussed with regard to the international criticism, in section 3.3.1.1 above. In that 
section, I dismissed such an argument because it is based on a misunderstanding of what 
EBP amounts to, both with regard to its evidence-scope and to the tripartite EBP-model. 
Such a claim entails an over-simplified straw man of EBP, contributing to an unnecessary 
polarization in the EBP debate.163 
 
  
                                                          
state that the lowest level exhibits no degree of trustworthiness, I find it strange it is included as an 
evidence-source at all. 
163 The latter point is somewhat ironic in that Ekeland in his text states that the EBP debate is too complex 
for polarization (Ekeland 2009: 162).  
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 Correction to Martinsen’s alternative view on evidence  
As analyzed in section 4.4.1.1., Martinsen’s alternative evidence consists in “evidence by 
experience”, which is based on sense impressions and contextual information, not 
scientific knowledge or rules. As a part of her criticism of EBP, references to such evidence-
sources are irrelevant. In fact, “evidence by experience” seems identical to what I have 
described above as non-scientific knowledge in EBP (section 2.4.3 above). 
Martinsen also describes the application of evidence as a “freedom practice”, which 
entails that the clinician “[d]ears to encounter the patient’s vulnerability, affectedness, 
and shame” (Martinsen 2009: 125). Here, Martinsen addresses the clinician’s 
responsibility to understand and respond to the patient’s emotions. I do not agree that 
such a responsibility is unique to Martinsen’s “freedom practice”. On the contrary, the 
content of “freedom practice” seems synonymous with what any experienced clinician is 
able to do when in her clinical encounter with the patient. In EBP terminology, this is 
included in the integration of evidence in accordance with patient preferences and 
circumstances, which is considered a necessary element in the EBP process (cf. Chapter 2 
above). Specifically, the “freedom practice” of the clinician resembles what I have labelled 
individual clinical expertise, i.e., the use of personal judgment about that a therapy is 
effective for an individual (see section 2.4.3.2.2.). In any EBP encounter, in which evidence 
is integrated at the point of patient care, the knowledge, beliefs, and attitudes of the 
patient have to be interpreted by the clinician as explicit preferences regarding the clinical 
decision. On this basis, I see no essential differences concerning the content of “freedom 
practice” and the integrative practice of the EBP clinician.  
However, I disagree that this refers to evidence. Interpretation of the patient’s 
preferences and circumstances refers to an ability, not a piece of external evidence. All of 
Martinsen’s examples (e.g., to resonate to the patient’s subjective experiences, and to 
“come in tune” with the patient; cf. section 4.4.1.1.) refer to skills and abilities of the 
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clinician, and not to evidence. Thus, it seems that Martinsen conflate evidence as a basis 
for a clinical practice and the abilities necessary for such a practice.164 On this basis, I 
consider Martinsen’s alternative view on evidence to be of minimal relevance to the EBP 
debate. 
 
4.5.4. Critical analysis of criticism about that usefulness of evidence in EBP is considered 
minimal 
Criticism concerning the usefulness of evidence seems to be the main attention of all three 
critics. In essence, the Norwegian criticism states that application of biomedical (including 
epidemiologic) evidence-sources does not provide a useful basis for clinical practice at the 
point of patient care. As stated above (section 4.2.) Ekeli’s main aim is to critically review 
knowledge in EBP, in particular in relation to solving real-life health care issues (Ekeli 2002: 
5). She concludes that epidemiologic evidence-sources are poorly equipped for providing 
a basis for actual clinical decision-making, in particular with regard to complex health 
issues, such as fibromyalgia. Ekeland sees the main problem as the relation between 
research and practice, of which EBP, through its biomedical “context-free ideal”, 
underestimates the complexities of clinical practice (cf. 4.3.). According to Martinsen, the 
scientific scope of EBP is tantamount to an idea of a scientific clinical practice, i.e., a belief 
that practice is fully reducible to scientific knowledge. Such a belief is then described as 
                                                          
164 Not least, in a footnote in my interpretation of Martinsen’s alternative evidence above (section 
4.4.1.1.), I suggested that the highly metaphorical language in Martinsen’s examples seems to cohere with 
the main aim of her examination, which is to explore alternative ways of working with the problematic of 
evidence, demonstrating a stark contrast to the scientific terminology of EBP. In this, Martinsen succeeds 
quite well. At the same time, however, the metaphorical character of her descriptions makes them limited 
in terms of usability. While I am sympathetic to her phenomenological style of thinking, I do not consider 
such a phenomenological approach to be optimal in clinical practice at the point of patient care. On the 
contrary, the more rigorous five-step process suggested in EBP literature is easier to follow, and includes 
all the content of Martinsen’s (not so) alternative view on evidence.   
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an instrumentalist mistake and a feature of “evidentialism”, through which EBP 
proponents are not aware of the limitations of this kind of research knowledge (cf. 4.4.).  
Notably, most of their arguments tend to be very broad, addressing the usefulness of 
scientific knowledge in general. In the following subsections, I will discuss the relevance 
of the Norwegian criticism in four steps. Firstly, (in 4.4.4.1.) I will comment on the extent 
to which this criticism is comparable to the international criticism on the same topic (as 
discussed in 3.3.3. above). To this extent, the Norwegian claims are subject to the same 
criticism as well. Secondly, I will discuss three specific features in their criticism, which 
differ from the international criticism. These features will be presented as corrections to 
(4.4.4.2.) the discrepancy between the specificity of certain claims and the broad 
character of the arguments supporting these claims; (4.4.4.3.) the claim that “RCT is only 
about the average patient, not the individual patient”; (4.4.4.4.) Ekeland’s criticism of the 
limited usefulness of RCTs.  
 
4.5.4.1. Comparison of the Norwegian criticism and the international criticism on the 
limited usefulness of evidence in EBP 
As discussed in sections 1.4.1.2. and 3.3.3. above, the question of the usefulness of 
epidemiologic evidence has to do with external validity, which refers to the generalization 
of the research results about the effect found in a trial population setting to other 
populations in other settings. All the Norwegian critics’ claims concerning the limited 
usefulness of epidemiologic evidence-sources are variations of claims that such sources 
involve severe challenges to this generalizability when the evidence is applied in individual 
clinical practice. Formally, this is a valid kind of criticism, highly relevant in that it targets 
the main controversial feature in EBP: the application of evidence from clinical research 
in a clinical setting, in which epidemiological, outcome-based data are considered the 
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most reliable source of evidence for clinical interventions.165 In essence, their claims are 
variations of the international criticism of that application of evidence based on 
epidemiologic data alone leads to limited knowledge, and is therefore not always useful 
in clinical practice (cf. 3.3.3. above).  
The Norwegian criticism touches upon variations of the four central arguments in the 
international debate (cf. section 3.3.3. above):  
(1) That epidemiologic data exclude pathophysiologic principles, such as ‘‘soft data’’ 
distinctive to individual patients. 
(2) That RCTs have practical limitations, such as the dependency on additional 
pathophysiologic data). 
(3) That RCTs exhibit restrictive eligibility criteria; enrolling restricted populations. 
(4) That the results of randomized studies show comparative efficacy of treatment for an 
‘‘average’’ randomized patient, and ignores clinical features such as severity of symptoms, 
illness, and comorbidity.  
While argument (4) is easily recognizable in all the Norwegian criticism, the arguments (1)-
(3) are presented in broader terms than in the international criticism. In the Norwegian 
criticism, “soft data”, “additional data”, and attention to “eligibility criteria” are discussed 
more broadly and less precise, as “contextual knowledge”. Such knowledge is then 
discussed with regard to alleged methodological inabilities to relate to the complexities in 
clinical contexts, and to a corresponding lack of attention by EBP clinicians to the 
importance of contextual knowledge in clinical practice.  
                                                          
165 This is discussed in detail in Chapter 1. It is also a common kind of criticism in the international debate. 
See section 3.3.3. above for an analysis of this debate. 
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As discussed in section 3.3.3. above, the challenges to external validity in arguments (1)-
(4) are important and valid, but they are to a considerable extent mitigatable, e.g., by 
assessments of generalizability and applicability with regard to the target population. The 
Norwegian critics do not express awareness to any of these mitigating circumstances. Not 
least, the Norwegian critics seem unaware that that it is not necessarily the case that non-
RCT evidence always has higher external validity. Likewise, none of the Norwegian critics 
problematizes the fact that the problem of external validity is not unique to evidence in 
EBP but occurs universally to any evidence-source within any health care. 
 
4.5.4.2. Correction to the specificity of central claims in Ekeli and Ekeland  
At core, the Norwegian criticism about the limited usefulness of evidence in EBP is that it 
does not correspond to the necessary contextual knowledge in specific professional fields. 
In Martinsen’s case, the specific professional field she is addressing (nursing) is only 
apparent in her descriptions of her “alternative evidence” (see 4.4.1.1.) and does not 
affect her claims and arguments. This is not necessarily a weakness of her criticism, only 
a characterization of that her criticism exhibits a broad scope, with relevance across 
different fields within health care. 
The contextual knowledge in Ekeli’s and Ekeland’s criticism is more specific. In Ekeli’s case, 
her main attention is on the limited usefulness of epidemiologic knowledge with regard 
to understanding fibromyalgia patients and their complex and co-morbid disorders (Ekeli 
2002: 62).166 In Ekeland’s case, he specifies that the RCT has limited usefulness with regard 
to psychotherapy, considers as a “contextual science” (Ekeland 2009: 160). These are 
highly specified subject matters. Conversely, however, most of the arguments presented 
in support for the claims are very general, relevant to far broader claims about the limited 
                                                          
166 As remarked in a footnote in 4.2.3. above, the specific and general character of different claims can be 
difficult to separate clearly when reading Ekeli’s text, and may be interpreted in different ways. 
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usefulness of epidemiologic evidence in general. Thus, in Ekeli’s and Ekeland’s criticism, 
there is a certain discrepancy between the specificity of their main claims and the 
generality in the arguments supporting these claims. As such, both of their criticisms 
demonstrate a tendency to use disproportionate generality of argumentative support to 
address a highly specified problem.167 
When considered in isolation, regardless of their argumentative support, the claims are of 
minor relevance to the issue of usefulness of epidemiologic evidence-sources. In Ekeli’s 
claim, what is at stake is the understanding of fibromyalgia patients’ subjective 
experiences. As Ekeli correctly observes, this is a matter of understanding the phenomena 
of fibromyalgia. A flaw in her criticism, however, is that she interprets the clinical 
questions of EBP as being answerable by the same “reductionist standard” of 
epidemiologic evidence-sources exclusively. This is a fundamental misunderstanding of 
the content and application of questions in EBP. Through this misunderstanding, Ekeli 
ignores the fact that a question concerning understanding in EBP literature would be 
considered answerable through qualitative research methods (cf. 2.4.2. above). 
When Ekeli later claims that “To understand phenomena, especially sick people, or how 
treatment has effect on them, lies far beyond EBPs field of interest and capacity” (Ekeli 
2002: 58), this is based on a misinterpretation of what clinical questions in EBP amount 
to. In particular, Ekeli ignores the diversity of such questions, and that different questions 
are answered by different methods. With regard to Ekeli’s own example about 
understanding fibromyalgia patients, the EBP clinician would, in line with EBP literature 
(e.g., Straus et al. 2011), not consider this a question of outcome/effect, nor of therapy at 
all. When searching for research knowledge about understanding fibromyalgia patients, 
                                                          
167 As noted above, despite these initial specific claims, their main arguments are, similar to Martinsen’s, 
characterized by a considerably broader scope, addressing the generalization of “scientific knowledge” in 
general into “clinical practice”. Most of their arguments refer to both “scientific knowledge” and “clinical 
practice” in a generic way, with a content that is considerably broader and less specified compared to their 
initial contextual specifications of their initial claims. 
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epidemiologic evidence would therefore be deemed irrelevant for answering the clinical 
question. Instead, understanding patients pertains to questions that are typically 
considered best answered through qualitative methods.168 Consequentially, her line of 
argument concerning the limited usefulness of the clinical questions in EBP is based on a 
misperception of EBP literature.  
In effect, this also entails that her entire line of argument for that clinical questions in EBP 
demonstrates an “instrumentalist mistake” is erroneous as well. When Ekeli claims that, 
the conflation of “things” (outcome) and individual subjects is a categorical mistake, this 
mistake does not reflect what the clinical questions in particular, or EBP practice in general 
amount to. Rather, the mistake occurs inherent in her own line of argument, based on a 
misunderstanding of EBP and the scope of its different clinical questions. In effect, Ekeli’s 
argument is of no relevance to the EBP debate. 
Ekeland’s claim exhibits a similar irrelevance to the topic of usefulness of epidemiologic 
evidence-sources: To the extent to which psychotherapy is inseparable from its relational 
and dialogic aspects, the RCT would be considered of little use. This is completely valid 
and uncontroversial claim. To the extent that there is no external evidence of the effect 
of such interventions, Ekeland’s claim is of low relevance when debating the usefulness of 
RCT evidence.169  
                                                          
168 As discussed in section 2.4.2. above, this is described in common EBP literature as “background 
information”. 
169 It should be noted that there are RCTs providing information about the effects of psychotherapy 
interventions/treatments (e.g., Mahbobeh, Shala, & Shahnaz 2015). As analyzed in 4.3.4, Ekeland’s point 
is that much of the clinical psychotherapy practice is done in intimate dialogue with the patient, and that 
this dialogical character and the specific characteristics of each individual patient cannot be separated 
from the intervention. Because of this, information about the effects of such interventions are of little use. 
Such a claim may be debatable, but this exceeds the scope of my current analysis. Instead, I base my 
analysis on the assumption that Ekeli is correct in this case. 
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Of course, both Ekeli’s and Ekeland’s claims can be considered arguments in support of 
the claim that epidemiologic evidence, and RCTs in particular, is not always available, but 
such a claim would be even less controversial, and hence not relevant to the EBP debate. 
 
4.5.4.3. Correction to “RCT is only about the average patient, not the individual patient”  
All three critics claim that the transition from a population level to the individual level is 
extremely problematic. In Ekeli and Martinsen’s case, they seem to dismiss any 
justification of this transition from statistical research on a population to individuals. Both 
critics demonstrate rather extreme attitudes on this matter.  
Ekeli claims that there are no credible explanations for how statistical population research 
is able to constitute a basis for individual clinical care at all, and that RCTs fail to include 
the rationality of the practice field. Martinsen’s claim is essentially similar, stating that the 
estimates of average treatment effects do not apply to individuals, or that it is at least 
extremely problematic to do so. Ekeland presents a less extreme attitude, limiting his view 
of the translation from epidemiologic research results to individual care as a complicated 
matter (cf. Ekeland’s third argument against the usefulness of RCTs; see 4.3.4.).  
In essence, what these attitudes seem to amount to, is that epidemiologic data on average 
effects exhibit severely limited usefulness when applied to real-world circumstances, 
because average effects do not apply to individuals. As discussed in 3.3.3. above, there 
are indeed challenges to applying epidemiologic research results to individual patients, 
and the extent to which these challenges are mitigatable is the central relevant topic in 
the EBP debate. However, there is a tendency in the Norwegian criticism to interpret this 
categorically (i.e. without conditions), and in dichotomic terms, where knowledge of 
average effects on an “average patient” is considered in binary opposition to the 
“individuality” and “subjectivity” of the individual patient.  
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In Ekeli’s and Martinsen’s criticism, the dichotomies they describe are purely theoretical, 
based on binarities between propositional and non-propositional knowledge and of the 
“different logics” of scientific and practical realities (Ekeli 2002: 36) and between research 
knowledge and practical knowledge (Martinsen 2009: 96). In this way, instead of 
discussing the extent to which epidemiologic evidence-sources are useful in clinical 
practice in terms of generalizability and applicability,170 they tend to interpret the 
problems in a more theoretical way, by establishing a dichotomy between EBP and non-
EBP knowledge and practice. In the same manner as in the international criticism, I find 
the tendency to dichotomize between epidemiologic evidence and individual patient care 
rather extreme, because of an unnecessary exaggeration of the difficulties in applying 
epidemiologic evidence to an individual patient. As I note in 3.5.2. above, such dichotomic 
descriptions entail an approximation to a minimal conception of EBP, in which non-
scientific knowledge in EBP practice is excluded from the model. As such, the dichotomies 
do not reflect the moderate concept of EBP, common in most EBP literature. In effect, 
criticism that is based upon such dichotomies is not particularly relevant to the EBP 
debate.  
At the outset, Ekeli seems to have a stronger argument than Martinsen, in that Ekeli also 
provides empirical support for her claims, referring to her own case study, in which 
physicians are interviewed with regard to their clinical interactions with fibromyalgia 
patients (as analyzed in the latter part of section 4.2.4. above). The core message in this 
example is that physicians, rather than making use of scientific research findings, base 
their patient-interaction on personal experience. The reasons, however, for that the 
physicians make use of personal experience, is not a demonstration of limited usefulness 
of epidemiologic evidence. On the contrary, Ekeli explicitly states that such evidence is 
lacking. The kind of evidence that Ekeli and her interviewed physicians are in opposition 
                                                          
170 This is the main topics in the international criticism of the same topic; cf. sections 3.3.–3.3.5 above, and 
also in Ekeland’s criticism above. 
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to, is pathophysiologic evidence about biological mechanisms, which EBP proponents also 
would be careful to use as basis for recommendations.171  
Compared to Ekeli’s and Martinsen’s lines of arguments, Ekeland represents an alternative 
approach, referring to what he views as an essential difference between 
recommendations on population-level and individual clinical practice.172 This line of 
argument also implies a dichotomic relation between recommendations at population-
level and at the level of the individual, in clinical practice. Based on this dichotomic 
difference, Ekeland claims that outcome-based methods (and RCTS in particular) are 
useful only when pertaining to the “average patient” on population-level, not on the level 
of the individual, and only useful in “drug treatment” (i.e., recommending drugs to 
patients).173 
I find Ekeland’s approach more informative than the approaches of Ekeli and Martinsen. 
Through Ekeland’s approach, it is clear what he means for epidemiologic evidence to be 
useful within medical practice, and not within other professional clinical practices. Ekeli 
and Martinsen also state that they are not opposed to the idea that epidemiologic 
evidence is useful within medicine, but in their lines of arguments, this seems to contradict 
their general claim that epidemiologic evidence is dichotomously different from the 
“logic” of clinical practice. Perhaps, they imply the same difference between 
recommendations on population-level and clinical practice as in Ekeland’s view. 
                                                          
171 Another issue is the very format of her example: The case study she refers to is based on unstructured 
“depth interviews” with 15 female fibromyalgia patients and 7 randomly selected physicians (cf. Ekeli 
2002: 26). As such, neither the internal nor the external validity of her research can be considered 
particularly high. When Ekeli makes the conclusion that the interviews also demonstrate that the EBP ideal 
of standardization and objectivity does not cohere with the reality of clinical practice (ibid., 28), the 
generality of her conclusion does not at all cohere with the external validity of her own research results. 
172 At this point, my discussion of Ekeland’s approach only attends to his dichotomic structure. I will attend 
to Ekeland’s criticism in more detail in the subsequent section just below. 
173 Notably, Ekeland does not deny that generalizations from RCT-findings to the individual patient are 
possible, but states that it is a complicated matter and associated with “very high risk”, which can only be 
mitigated by the clinical expert, which according to Ekeland has been discredited in EBP.  
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To the extent these dichotomic claims are interpreted categorically,174 they are erroneous. 
As noted above, there is in fact several ways though which this challenge can be mitigated. 
Rather than stating the rather obvious observation that application of research results of 
average effects from research results is problematic, or the more extreme version that 
such application approximate the impossible, a more nuanced, more common, and more 
relevant criticism is that epidemiologic data on average effects is often not sufficient to 
generalize into real-world circumstances. In other words, the issue of usefulness is a 
matter of degrees, not of kind. The Norwegian critics’ tendency to dichotomize makes 
their criticism invalid. 
 
4.5.4.4. Corrections to Ekeland’s criticism of the limited usefulness of RCTs 
As described in 4.3., Ekeland’s main issue is the complex relations between research and 
practice, which in his view is deeply problematic with regard to the model of EBP. When 
arguing for this, Ekeland claims that the RCT is over-estimated as useful evidence in clinical 
practice. In particular, he presents three arguments for his claim (these are described in 
more detail in section 4.3.2.). 
His first argument is that internal validity does not imply external validity nor clinical 
usefulness. As discusses in chapter 3., this is not necessarily true. Here, Ekeland’s criticism 
is similar to the international criticism, in its tendency to assume that the RCT exhibits 
inherent weak external validity, without citing any evidence to support (see 3.3.3.). Due 
to this lack of empirical support to this assumption, I consider the argument to be rather 
weak. 
                                                          
174 Ekeland’s statement mentioned in the previous footnote may indicate a conditional statement, albeit 
very weak, due to the fact that clinical expertise is considered discredited. If Ekeland in his criticism 
discussed the extent to which the expert can or cannot mitigate the challenges pertaining to the 




Ekeland’s second argument is that EBP proponents often conflate what the RCT may or 
may not predict: While an RCT enables predictions with regard to how a clinical 
intervention is likely to have effect in a patient, the RCT does not enable prediction about 
that the effect of the intervention under testing will be reproduced in the future. His main 
point here is that prediction of the latter kind can only be interpreted in light of theories 
about the (pathophysiologic) mechanisms. While his main point may be true, his claim 
that EBP proponents often conflate these two kinds of predictions remains unsupported. 
I have not identified such a conflation in the EBP literature. Moreover, it is far from clear 
whether causal predictions would be more useful in practice. At this point, EBP 
proponents may reply by stating that predictions based on outcome-based research data 
of how a clinical intervention is likely to have effect in a patient, is of direct use in patent 
case,175 while the causal predictions of an assumed underlying pathophysiological 
mechanism does only provide indirect knowledge of its putative effect. 
His third argument claims that treatment recommendations are often only relevant to the 
average patient on population level, not on the level of the individual (cf. ibid., 158). 
Strictly speaking, such a claim is tantamount to claiming that RCTs primarily are relevant 
within epidemiology (relating to populations only), not clinical epidemiology (relating to 
individuals, in direct patient care; cf. section 1.1.1 above).176 His argument in support of 
this claim is that the problem of generalization is a complicated matter, which can only be 
accounted for by the clinical expert – which according to Ekeland has been discredited in 
EBP. The assumption that the clinical expert (and, hence, clinical expertise) has been 
discredited, is erroneous. 
                                                          
175 Provided, of course, that the prediction is based on trustworthy data. 
176 This kind of argumentation is comparable to Tonelli in the international criticism, who claims that there 
is a shift of attention away from individual patient care to “the care of populations”, fulfilling goals of public 
health but not of individual patient care (this is discussed in section 3.5.2. above). In my analysis of Tonelli’s 
criticism, I claimed that it erroneously implies an inherent dichotomy in EBP. The same criticism can be 
addresses to Ekeland’s argument. 
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At this point, Ekeland demonstrates a tendency to ignore the central role of clinical 
expertise in the EBP model. An implication of ignoring this is minimal attention to how and 
the extent to which the clinician may assess such evidence. Ekeland is correct that 
generalization of epidemiologic evidence to the individual patient is a complicated matter. 
As I have described in 1.2. and 3.3.3., any generalization (or in broader terms, any 
extension to practice) necessitates the clinician’s expertise and her ability to integrate the 
epidemiologic research knowledge into clinical practice. Thus, if Ekeland was correct that 
the clinical expert is discredited in EBP, he would be correct in claiming that these 
“complicated matters” would be difficult, if not impossible, to solve. Such an argument, 
however, approximates a minimal concept of EBP, in which clinical expertise is excluded 
from the EBP-model. This exclusion approximates a straw man fallacy: Ekeland addresses 
a simplified (and incorrect) image of EBP as including ‘evidence’ only (while excluding the 
clinical expert) – and then claims that the complicated matters of generalizing evidence 
into clinical practice depends on the clinical expert. 
In my view, all the arguments above demonstrate Ekeland’s ability to address relevant 
topics: The claims address issues which are controversial about the use of epidemiologic 
evidence-sources in EBP. As I have commented here, however the content in the 
arguments, though relevant, lacks empirical support. The third argument also 
presupposes approximation to a minimal concept of EBP, which makes the argument 
easily dismissible as a misinterpretation and a potential straw man fallacy. 
 
4.4.5. Critical analysis of the criticism that the roles of clinical expertise and patient 
autonomy in EBP are minimized 
In the Norwegian criticism, the arguments are closely connected to their view of the one-
dimensional scientific framework of EBP, which is said to minimize attention to expertise 
and patient preferences. At the outset, this is comparable to the international criticism. In 
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the international criticism, the ways in which expertise and patient preferences are 
minimized, are typically addressed by discussing the extent to which the values for 
individual patients are portrayed sufficiently and accurately (e.g. by Feinstein 1994), or by 
discussing whether epidemiologic evidence leads to under-representation of other kinds 
of knowledge (e.g. by Rogers 2002).177 The Norwegian criticism is tangent to such topics, 
but is also characterized by a broader scope, with a tendency to categorical claims 
addressing how application of epidemiologic research leads to minimization, or even 
elimination, of the roles of expertise and patients in EBP. Here, “minimization” must be 
understood in a superlative sense, i.e., as reduced to an absolute minimum, and not in a 
comparative sense, which would entail the extent to which attention to expertise and 
patients is reduced.178 The superlative sense of minimization can be exemplified in each 
of the three critics:  
In Ekeli’s view, the ideal of objective knowledge makes personal and contextual relations 
incompatible with the EBP model, and will lead to deterioration of the practitioner’s 
expertise and of the patient’s autonomy (cf. Ekeli 2002: 45f). Moreover, in the statistical 
research studies applied within EBP, “[t]he “human factor” is reduced to the minimal” 
(ibid., 38). In such research studies, patients are only present as test-groups and clinicians 
only as interpreters of the results. According to Ekeli, this demonstrates that de-
contextualization and fragmentation are preconditions for clinical practice in the EBP 
system. Ekeland claims that the narrow and non-contextual, “instrumental” methods of 
EBP will eliminate the autonomy of personal communicative practice, through which the 
individualization of both clinician and patient is ignored (cf. Ekeland 2009: 165). In 
                                                          
177 These examples are discussed in section 3.5.2. above. 
178 Comparative claims are typical in conditional claims in the international criticism. For example, the claim 
that application of pre-appraised evidence and guidelines can be problematic, and claims addressing the 
extent to which such use could minimize use of clinical reasoning and lead to automatic decision-making, 
are both implying a comparison to other kinds of reasoning, or a matter of degree to which clinical 
reasoning is minimized. These examples are discussed in section 4.4.3. above, but without attention to the 
distinction between comparative and superlative kinds.  
236 
 
Martinsen’s criticism, the autonomy of the clinician is replaced with scientific standards 
(Martinsen 2009: 94), and the patient is “instrumentalized” through statistical research, 
thereby omitting patient individuality (cf. ibid., 85). In all of these claims, there are no 
conditions with respect to the extent to which these challenges are problematic. On the 
contrary, the critics suggest that these challenges are fundamental, entailing that 
attention to clinical expertise and patient preferences is excluded altogether.  
Formally, the content of their criticism is comparable to the international criticism 
addressing the “standardization” of and the “cookbook approach” to clinical practice (as 
discussed in section 3.4.2. above). Notably, however, rather than discussing the extent to 
which attention to the clinician’s autonomy and patient preferences is lacking when 
following guidelines, the Norwegian critics replace attention to guidelines with their own 
concept of the “instrumentalist mistake”: That the roles of clinical expertise and patient 
autonomy in EBP are minimized (in the superlative sense) by being reduced to, or replaced 
by (i.e., mistakenly considered on the basis of) scientific research knowledge exclusively. 
In effect, attention to the clinician and the patient is minimized: Clinical expertise is 
replaced by scientific knowledge, and the patient is “objectified” through statistical 
research results. 
All three critics make use of “the instrumentalist mistake” in a similar manner: Ekeli states 
that the relational dimensions in practice is replaced by research evidence, at the expense 
of the relational aspects of clinical practice (Ekeli 2002: 60), whereas Ekeland claims that 
the mistake entails that individualization of both clinician and patient is ignored (Ekeland 
147f). Martinsen describes similar content, as that clinical practice through the 
instrumentalist mistake is “[r]educed to technique and controlled knowledge” (Martinsen 
2009: 137).  
In this criticism, it seems that their view of the one-dimensional scope of EBP evidence 
(which I argue is incorrect; cf. section 4.4.3. above) is extended to the application of 
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scientific knowledge in clinical practice, through which evidence is applied directly, with 
little to no attention to or input from the clinician or from the patient. The use of the 
“instrumentalist mistake” in the criticism of the limited attention to expertise and patient 
preferences in EBP is based upon an interpretation of clinical decision-making in EBP as 
excluding expert and patient knowledge, in which such knowledge is replaced with 
scientific knowledge exclusively. This implies a specific misunderstanding of what clinical 
decision-making in EBP entails.  
To commit an “instrumentalist mistake” includes reducing the patient to “objective”, 
scientific, knowledge. To provide an example of such a “mistake”: When a clinician bases 
her recommendation on findings from an RCT, the individual patient is reduced to the 
statistical knowledge of the average effect of an intervention, tested on a certain test-
population, selected through specific eligibility criteria (typically referred to as “the 
average person” by the Norwegian critics). In this case, the application of the RCT is 
conducted without any interference from the clinician nor the patient. The 
“instrumentalist mistake” of this application, then, is to apply epidemiologic evidence 
about the “average person” directly (i.e., without any input from the clinician nor the 
patient) when recommending a clinical intervention to an individual patient. The central 
core of the “instrumentalist mistake” is thus its implied criticism of the direct application 
of evidence at the point of patient care.  
In the remaining part of my analysis of their criticism, I will attend to how this view of 
“direct application” is problematic in all three of the Norwegian critics, in various ways. I 
will argue that their arguments not only approximate but indeed demonstrate minimal 





 “Direct application” in Ekeli’s criticism 
Central to Ekeli’s empirical argument above (section 4.2.4.), is her interpretation of 
Norwegian EBP literature. After describing the tripartite model of EBP, the EBP authors 
state, “The main message is nevertheless that one should use research as a knowledge-
source to a greater extent within professional practice” (Jamtvedt, Hilde, Risberg 2000: 
24).179 Ekeli interprets this statement in the following way:  
This [last statement] is indeed the main purpose of the EBP system altogether. But 
I have yet to identify believable explanations regarding how results from statistical 
investigations on large populations can provide “more certain” basis for clinical 
expertise with regard to individual patients in life-situations, which lack any 
similarity to controlled standard conditions (ibid., 60). 
 
According to Ekeli, this demonstrates the distinct priority of research-based knowledge in 
EBP, which minimizes (in the superlative sense) attention to expertise and patient 
preferences. When considered at face value, Ekeli’s “basis for expertise” implies that 
expertise is replaced by scientific knowledge – which is indeed what she also argues for 
(cf. section 4.2.5.). Consequentially, in such a practice, the only basis left would be 
scientific knowledge, on which recommendations of interventions in clinical practice 
would be based, exclusively. It is in this way that Ekeli’s conception of application of 
scientific knowledge in clinical practice understood, through which evidence is applied 
directly, i.e. on basis of scientific knowledge alone, without any interference from clinician 
nor patient.  
However, Ekeli’s interpretation of the EBP quotation, and thereby her basis for criticism is 
based on two misunderstandings: The first concerns the main purpose of EBP. The main 
purpose of EBP is not to use scientific research. By itself, evidence is a means to an end. 
Rather, as discussed in Chapter 2, the main purpose of EBP is to provide a model for clinical 
                                                          
179 Both the quotation and Ekeli’s interpretation is analyzed in more detail in 4.2.5. above. 
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decision-making, in which the clinician recommends clinical interventions to individual 
patients.180 The second misunderstanding is perhaps more technical, but of relevance to 
what “direct” application of evidence refers to in Ekeli’s criticism: She states that 
epidemiologic evidence “can provide “more certain” basis for clinical expertise”. This is 
incorrect:181 The goal of EBP is to provide an improved basis for clinical decision-making, 
not for expertise. 
 
 “Direct application” in Ekeland’s criticism 
In Ekeland’s criticism, a similar understanding of “direct” application of evidence is 
demonstrated, through his dichotomization between attention to epidemiologic, 
outcome-based knowledge and non-epidemiologic knowledge. According to Ekeland, the 
one-sided attention on “what works” (i.e., outcome-based knowledge) makes the EBP 
practitioner ignorant in relation to “in relation to what?” (i.e., non-epidemiologic 
knowledge) (cf. Ekeland 2009: 149). Thus, in Ekeland’s view attention to “what works” 
exclusively refers to epidemiologic knowledge, at the expense of any other kinds of 
knowledge, including both methodological and contextual knowledge.  
Taken at face value, the position Ekeland argues for is rather extreme: When 
epidemiologic evidence is to be applied as basis for clinical practice, then, the only 
information this basis provides is restricted to the average effects of outcomes in 
                                                          
180 See section 2.3.5. in particular. For instance, Guyatt et al. describes the main purpose explicitly in 
relation to the patient: “The proof of the pudding of evidence-based medicine lies in whether patients 
cared for in this fashion enjoy better health” (Guyatt et al. 1992: 2424; see also 2.4.3.1, where this is 
discussed). 
181 Strictly speaking, it is also nonsensical. In EBP, expertise is considered non-scientific knowledge, based 
on personal experience (cf. 2.4.3.). From an epistemological point of view (which Ekeli claims to take; cf. 
4.1. above), it does not make sense to say “my expertise about X is based on scientific knowledge” – if this 
was the case, expertise would not be based on experience. One could say, of course, that “My knowledge 
about X is based on scientific knowledge”, but in this case, knowledge would not refer to expertise.  
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epidemiologic trials. This is what “directly applied” means in Ekeland’s criticism. Through 
such a direct application of evidence into clinical practice, any other kinds of knowledge, 
e.g., pertaining the circumstances of the specific clinical scenario, including knowledge of 
the individual patient and her preferences, are deemed as something that the EBP clinician 
is ignorant of.  
This claim presupposes a dichotomization between “what works” and “in relation to 
what”, similar to the dichotomization discussed in section 3.5.2. above,182 implying a 
dichotomy or “gap” between epidemiologic research data and clinical care. Through such 
a dichotomization, attention to epidemiologic evidence (i.e., what works) correlates to a 
lack of attention to the role the clinician and the patient (i.e., in relation to what) in the 
EBP model. Such a description of EBP does not only approximates, but is tantamount to a 
minimal conception of EBP, in which non-scientific knowledge is excluded from the model 
(cf. section 2.4.4). In contrast, the moderate concept of EBP, representative of the EBP 
model in standard EBP literature, includes non-scientific knowledge as a necessary 
element. In this model, evidence is something that must be integrated by the clinician, 
according to patient preferences. Further, patient’s preferences carry greater weight than 
those of clinicians, to the point where the patient’s preferences may override the 
clinician’s recommendations of clinical intervention (cf. section 2.4.3.1. above). Ekeland’s 
criticism is thus, at best, relevant only to the minimal concept of EBP.  
Another problem with Ekeland’s dichotomization between “what works” and “in relation 
to what” is that it conflates research knowledge with the application of such research. 
Ekeland is correct in that outcome-based methods are non-contextual, in the sense that 
                                                          
182 In section 3.5.2., I described how several critics in the international criticism argue, often implicitly, for 
an inherent dichotomy in EBP due to, on the one hand, its attention to epidemiologic research, and at the 
other hand, the preferences of the individual patient. A notable difference in Ekeland’s version is that he 
also includes the clinical expert, who becomes alienated from what they do and from why they do it (cf. 
Ekeland 2009: 156; see also 4.3.5. above).  
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their primary attention is to the outcomes of an intervention.183 However, when such 
evidence is applied at the point of individual patient care, attention to the clinical context 
in general and the patient preferences in particular is considered necessary elements in 
an EBP practice (cf. Chapter 2). Ekeland’s criticism, primarily due to his view of “direct 
application “of epidemiologic evidence, ignores this essential difference between 
research knowledge and the knowledge necessary to apply it. By ignoring this, his criticism 
lacks relevance to the moderate concept of EBP, common in most EBP literature. 
 
 “Direct application” in Martinsen’s criticism 
In Martinsen’s criticism, she refers to “direct application” explicitly: “To directly 
recommend technologies or procedures for an actual practice on basis of research results 
leads to impelled instrumentalization” (Martinsen 2009: 96). This entails that EBP practice 
allegedly is based on scientific, non-contextual knowledge alone. As described as part of 
my analysis of Martinsen’s criticism (in section 4.4.3), she does not offer clarification of 
what she means by directly recommend technologies or procedures. However, from her 
arguments, it is clear that she views “direct application” of evidence as clinical 
recommendations without any sort of autonomous reflection from the clinician who 
makes use of such evidence (cf. 4.4.3).  
In essence, this is similar to Ekeland’s argument, exhibiting the same ignorance of the 
distinction between research knowledge and the application of such evidence when 
recommending interventions in clinical practice at the point of patient care.184 By ignoring 
                                                          
183 As discussed in the previous section, there are, however, a number of mitigating elements to outcome-
based research. Regarding the patient, one central mitigating element is the inclusion of patient-important 
outcomes, which measures outcomes that typically matter to patients: morbidity, mortality, symptom 
improvement, and quality of life (cf. section 1.4.1.2. above).  
184 A notable difference to Ekeland’s argument is that Martinsen attends to lack of attention to the 
autonomy of the clinician while Ekeland focusses on the autonomy of the patient. While this is an 
important nuance to their line of arguments, it is not a relevant distinction to the current analysis.  
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what EBP practice amounts to, Martinsen is also guilty of a straw man fallacy when stating 
that the non EBP- clinician “[m]ust be able to act reflectively [ettertenksomt] (as opposed 
to only act “knowingly”), in concrete situations which demand commitment” (cf. ibid., 
157f). To imply that the EBP clinician (and, indeed, any clinician at the point of patient 
care) does not act reflectively, is to depict what EBP practice amounts to, in a crude, over-
simplified and incorrect way.  
In a similar way, Martinsen’s reference to Glasdam’s research also demonstrates 
ignorance of what application of evidence in clinical practice amounts to. According to 
Martinsen, Glasdam claims that physicians apply personal expertise in their clinical 
practice, and that use of such expertise provides a basis for recommending a specific 
treatment, different from what kind of treatment that research may predict. In 
Martinsen’s view, this demonstrates an application that is beyond the scope of EBP (cf. 
ibid.). In EBP literature, however, such an aspect of evidence-application – in which 
evidence or guidelines are deemed insufficient or unwanted (e.g., by the patient’s 
preferences) is considered an essential element of patient care.185 There is nothing wrong 
with Glasdam’s research on expertise and evidence-application (except, perhaps, that the 
results Martinsen refers to are rather obvious and non-controversial), but it is erroneous 
to infer that such evidence-application is beyond the scope of EBP. 
All three of the Norwegian critics could argue that use of pre-appraised evidence and 
guidelines can be problematic, and discuss the extent to which such use could minimize 
use of clinical reasoning and lead to automatic decision-making – such as it is typically 
done in the international criticism – as discussed in section 4.4.3. above. In the same 
section, I described the main disagreement between proponents and opponents as being 
about whether such standardization leads to reduced autonomy or not. Such a discussion 
is an example of a constructive EBP debate. In contrast, the one-sided attention to “direct 
                                                          
185 This is discussed in a number of passages throughout chapter 2. See 2.4.3.1. in particular. 
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application”, the conflation between research evidence and application of such research, 
and the categorical statements about that expertise and patient preferences are excluded 
at the outset, are neither correct not constructive. 
In conclusion, the Norwegian criticism of the limited roles of clinical expertise and patients 
in EBP is closely connected their view of the one-dimensionality of evidence-sources in 
EBP: Their (mostly incorrect) view of evidence in EBP is directly extended to their 
understanding of what application of evidence in EBP amounts to. The main flaw in the 
Norwegian criticism of the minimal attention to clinical expertise and patient preferences 
in EBP, is the tendency to make categorical claims about that expertise and preferences is 
lacking. Thereby, the central claims and arguments in their criticism approximate a 
minimal conception of EBP, in which non-scientific knowledge is excluded from the model. 
Such an understanding of EBP does not reflect the moderate concept of EBP, which is the 
standard concept in EBP literature. Consequentially, their criticism of the roles of clinical 




4.6. Conclusionary remarks on the analysis of the Norwegian EBP debate 
 
In the analysis above, I have demonstrated that most of the Norwegian criticism tend to 
be insensitive to the necessary elements of the EBP model. In effect, many of their main 
arguments creates over-simplifications, leading to straw-man fallacies about EBP. 
In my view, the most problematic feature common to all three critics is their minimal 
attention to the tripartite model of EBP. Indeed, Ekeli is the only one of the critics who 
explicitly addresses the model at all. As noted in the analysis of Ekeli above (in section 
4.2.5.), she admits that attentions to ‘clinical expertise’ and ‘patient preferences’ are 
“important nuances”, but stresses that research-based knowledge is the main source, and 
indeed the main purpose of the “EBP system”. Ekeland rarely speaks of “expertise” in EBP 
at all. When he does, “expertise” is described as an element belonging at the bottom of a 
description of a hierarchical system of how EBP is organized (Ekeland 2009: 152f).186 
Regarding Martinsen’s criticism, the EBP model is not subject to her criticism. Rather, 
clinical expertise and patient autonomy are only discussed as elements which are ignored 
in EBPs “evidentialist” practice.  
Instead, the Norwegian critics focus their criticism exclusively on epidemiologic evidence, 
and on the challenges to the application of such evidence. Noticeably, all the challenges 
that are addressed have exclusively to do with challenges pertaining to the scope and 
generalization of population-based research, with no attention to how and the extent to 
which the clinician may assess and make use of such evidence in accordance with patient 
preferences and circumstances. The same tendency occurs in criticism concerning the 
roles of the clinician and of the patient, which is addressed, either by extending the 
                                                          
186 Notably, this description is not comparable to descriptions of evidence-hierarchies in EBP literature. 
Ekeland describes the “hierarchical logic of action [handlingslogikk] in EBP (cf. ibid., 153). In this hierarchy, 
“research literature” is ranked on top, with a “control-level” below, and the clinician at bottom level. This 
description is not part of his main claims.  
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criticism of the limited usefulness of the evidence or by the procedures following the 
application of scientific evidence.  
By ignoring two of the three necessary elements in the EBP-model, the Norwegian critics 
not only approximate but indeed demonstrate the minimal concept of EBP. In section 
2.4.4. above, the minimal concept of EBP is characterized by that non-scientific knowledge 
is external to the model, and thus subjugating EBP to clinical epidemiology. Indeed, this 
seems to be the standard interpretation of the concept of EBP in the Norwegian criticism. 
This interpretation has serious implications for their criticism of the usefulness of evidence 
and of the role of clinical expertise and patient autonomy in EBP. Consequently, a large 
part of the Norwegian criticism becomes less relevant to the EBP debate.  
Above all, the lack of attention to the tripartite EBP model, and the consequent tendency 
to reduce EBP to clinical epidemiology, leads to a simplified understanding of what EBP 
amounts to. When reading Ekeli, Ekeland, and Martinsen, one is presented with the 
description that EBP is “the direct application of research evidence in clinical practice”. 
As discussed in detail in Chapter 2, EBP is essentially an approach to clinical decision-
making, in which the clinician recommends clinical interventions to individual patients. As 
part of this decision-making, evidence sources are identified and assessed according to 
clinical epidemiology principles. An equally essential part is that this evidence then is 
integrated into clinical practice by a clinician, who, by making use of clinical experience, 
identifies, assesses and applies the evidence, in accordance with the patient’s preferences 
and circumstances (cf. 2.3.5. above). The Norwegian critics address the first part but not 
the second. Their depiction of EBP involves a simplified version of EBP including only the 
first part, onto which most of their arguments address the lack of the second part. As such, 
their arguments tend to constitute straw-man fallacies more than relevant arguments. 
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Not least, their categorical claims and arguments are seldom nuanced, and do not 
contribute to the EBP debate by addressing the extent to which patient preferences are 
accounted for in EBP, nor to which extent the autonomy of the individual patient in EBP 
decision-making is maintained.  
Compared to the international criticism the central claims presented by the Norwegian 
critics resemble the categorical versions, essentially claiming that clinical expertise and 
patient preferences are rejected or minimized to the point of total omission. As discussed 
in 3.4., such claims can be easily dismissed by reference to any EBP definition. Through 
their categorical arguments, the Norwegian critics seem to ignore the two additional 
elements of the EBP model. Connected to this, they also ignore the “second principle of 
EBP” – “evidence alone is never sufficient to make a clinical decision”,187 which refers to 
that clinical decision-making in EBP is constituted by three equally necessary elements – 
evidence, patient preferences and circumstances, and clinical expertise.  
In sum, central parts of the Norwegian EBP debate are based on misunderstandings, 
thereby providing minimal relevance to the EBP debate.  
 
  
                                                          






This treatise has presented analyses of the concept of EBP and of the EBP debate, the 
former analysis being a prerequisite for the latter. As stated in the introduction, the 
degree of adequacy in the EBP debate has fundamentally to do with understanding of the 
basic terminology in the EBP literature. The analysis of the concept of EBP has been 
conducted by clarifying the central scientific background of EBP and of the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for the EBP model, regarding both scientific and non-scientific 
knowledge, both equally necessary to the concept of EBP. On this basis, the epistemic 
structure of EBP was highlighted, through which EBP consists of three main elements – 
evidence, clinical experience, and patient’s preferences and circumstances. Further, based 
on the possible combinations of scientific and non-scientific dimensions of knowledge, it 
is theoretically possible to differentiate between three theoretical concepts of EBP: 
“Maximal”, “minimal”, and “moderate” EBP, which differ relative to the extent to which 
non-scientific knowledge is taken into consideration. In light of the analyses in chapter 1 
and 2, only moderate EBP is justifiable. 
In turn, these clarifications provided the necessary basis for an adequate analysis of the 
EBP debate. In Chapter 3 and 4, the main arguments against EBP was identified, and 
discussed with respect to their validity and relevance. The analysis demonstrated how the 
criticism can be categorized into four main topics, addressing: (1) the conceptual unclarity 
in the concept of EBP; (2) the scope and application of evidence; and the extent to which 
(3) clinical expertise; and (4) patient preferences are adequately accounted for in 
evidence-based practice. Through the analysis of the EBP debate, it was demonstrated 
that the essential controversial point in the EBP debate has to do with the use of evidence 
from epidemiologic research in a clinical setting. In particular, the confidence in and the 
application of epidemiologic evidence-sources constitute the core controversial elements. 
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These elements have to do with the methodological presuppositions of EBP such as they 
are developed through clinical epidemiology.  
The analysis showed that the validity and relevance of the criticism are related to whether 
the critics address methodological and controversial presuppositions concerning evidence 
in EBP, as rooted in its clinical epidemiology framework. The non-scientific elements of 
the EBP model – expertise, and patient preferences and circumstances – are not 
controversial in and of themselves, but rather become controversial when discussing the 
extent to which the use of expertise and patient preferences and circumstances are 
compatible with the methodological features of clinical epidemiology. Conversely, 
criticism that does not separate clearly between the methodological presuppositions from 
the model of EBP in general, generate irrelevant criticism. Examples of irrelevant criticism 
include categorical claims that EBP in general only includes epidemiologic evidence 
sources and that the EBP model excludes clinical expertise and patient preferences. These 
are examples of misinterpretations of what EBP is, due to erroneous inferences from the 
model of clinical epidemiology to the model and practice of EBP. Such categorical claims 
approximate a minimal concept of EBP, and are thus dismissible as erroneous. In Chapter 
4, the critical analysis of the Norwegian criticism showed that most of the critical claims 
are comparable to the international debate. However, several of the central arguments 
imply a tendency to theoretical approaches when interpreting EBP, which in turn 
demonstrate a tendency to view EBP as a minimal concept, which excludes clinical 
expertise and patient preferences at the outset. Such an argumentation is unnecessarily 
theory-laden, over-simplified and based on misinterpretations of several elements in the 
EBP model.  
These findings are what I consider to be most important in the analyses presented in this 
treatise. Based on these findings, I will conclude by discussing the future possibilities of 
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the EBP debate, by addressing the question about whether it is possible to identify a 
better, more constructive basis for the EBP debate.  
What kind of recommendations, then, based on the above analysis of the EBP debate, may 
be suggested to EBP opponents, so that the debate would be more constructive? 
Conversely, what recommendations can be given to EBP proponents, so that their 
descriptions of EBP as well as their response to criticism would be consider constructive?  
A first recommendation is to avoid categorical interpretations of the concept of EBP. What 
is perhaps the most apparent and least constructive issue throughout the above analysis 
of the EBP debate, is the occurrence of categorical claims, based on erroneous 
interpretations of the EBP model, which exclude expertise and patient preferences and 
circumstances at the outset. Such erroneous interpretations are demonstrations of what 
has been labelled a minimal concept of EBP. As stressed on several occasions throughout 
the analysis of the EBP debate, such interpretations are both unnecessary and unfortunate 
in the EBP debate, as they contribute only to over-simplifications and straw man fallacies, 
and thus do not contribute to a constructive debate. 
As discussed in Chapter 3 and 4, categorical claims also occur with respect to evidence, 
where erroneous interpretations include that the scope of evidence in EBP relates to 
epidemiologic evidence exclusively and that evidence and evidence-hierarchies only 
address therapeutic questions. In the same vein, categorical claims stating that EBP only 
include epidemiologic evidence, or in the even more extreme version, stating that EBP is 
restricted to RCT exclusively, based on erroneous interpretations of what evidence in EBP 
refers to, should also be avoided. A considerable part of EBP criticism would be 
considerably less extensive, and less aggressive, if categorical claims were omitted.  
A second recommendation is to distinctively separate between what is and is not 
controversial in EBP. As discussed in Chapter 3, the inclusion of expertise and patient 
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preferences and circumstances are not controversial in and of themselves. Rather, these 
elements become controversial when discussing the extent to which the use of expertise 
and patient preferences and circumstances are compatible with the methodological 
features of clinical epidemiology. Likewise, the central tenet of EBP that clinical practice 
should be evidence-based, i.e., based on best available evidence in support of a clinical 
decision, is not controversial by itself. Rather, the subject of controversy relates to what 
particular kinds of evidence that are considered as best. 
In general, the EBP debate should be concerned about whether or not the EBP model 
provides an adequate basis for clinical decision-making. The essential controversial points 
in this regard are the use of and confidence in evidence from epidemiologic research in a 
clinical setting, including how evidence is ranked hierarchically relative to each other. 
These issues have to do with principles based on clinical epidemiology. In addition, there 
are non-controversial principles addressing challenges to how expertise and patient 
preferences are to be included in EBP clinical practice. These latter principles are common 
to any model for clinical decisions, EBP and non-EBP alike. The former set of principles has 
to do with clinical epidemiology methodology principles, and the latter has to do with 
taking the EBP model seriously. An adequate understanding of the difference between 
these sets of these principles should be considered a minimum requirement for partaking 
in the EBP debate. 
A third recommendation relates to terminological and argumentative accuracy. A more 
constructive basis for the EBP debate has to do with increased conceptual precision of 
claimsand arguments. In the EBP debate, the subject matter primarily concerns specific 
evidence-sources, typically the RCT. When addressing alleged shortcomings pertaining to 
specific evidence-sources, critics should also identify what kind of evidence that exhibit 
attributes with less shortcomings. At the very least, critics should express awareness of 
that evidence-sources promoted by EBP proponents are not considered optimal in 
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principle, a priori superior in any clinical situation. Rather, ‘best evidence’ in EBP translates 
to ‘the best available source of information, with the least degree of deficiency, compared 
to other available sources’. Following this, critics should not only address the 
shortcomings of a particular evidence-source, but also present what kind of evidence, in 
their opinion, that would be considered a better alternative. For instance, criticism about 
limitations of an RCT in relation to a specific clinical situation is not sufficient for claiming 
that the use of RCTs should be avoided. In addition, an alternative source of evidence 
should be suggested, that is arguably less limited in the clinical situation in the same 
clinical situation. Without this addition, the criticism is of less relevance. Conversely, by 
presenting an alternative source of evidence, allegedly better for a specific clinical 
situation, the debate between opponents and proponents would be constructive and 
important. 
The controversial features of EBP can and should be discussed in terms of internal and 
external validity. With regard to internal validity, critics should present their criticism on 
basis of the more or less established current disagreement, related to the criticism from 
Worrall and others, addressing the central claims in favour of the superiority of 
epidemiologic evidence-sources, such as the benefits of randomization. Worrall presented 
his highly relevant criticism in early 2000. There have been some relevant response to this 
criticism, mostly by philosophers of science (e.g., from Howick), but EBP literature should 
reflect this kind of criticism to a larger degree. For instance, claims about that 
randomization in an RCT controls for confounders, both known and unknown, should be 
presented with considerable more reservations than what is often the case in current EBP 
literature. 
With regard to external validity and the issue of the usefulness of applying population-
based research as evidence in individual clinical practice, there is a tendency that critical 
arguments lack precision. Firstly, as discussed in Chapter 3, there are a number of 
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methodological tools designed to mitigate the challenges of external validity, e.g., 
pragmatic and n-of-1 trials, as well as the development of the GRADE system, which are 
equipped to mitigate risk of external validity, and thus reduce the severity of these 
problems. In the criticism, there is a tendency to ignore such mitigating features, and to 
address the issue of external validity in a simplified manner. Secondly, there is a tendency 
to ignore the fact usefulness also has very much to do with the role of expertise and 
patient preferences, i.e., the clinician’s assessments of the clinical situation and the 
patient’s preferences at the point of patient care. An increased precision with regard to 
such mitigating factors would serve as basis for a more constructive debate between 
opponents and proponents.  
Regarding proponents of EBP, suggestions for providing a better, more constructive basis 
for the EBP debate, also have to do with conceptual clarification. 
Firstly, as I have suggested above, in the analysis of the criticism concerning conceptual 
unclarity of EBP definitions, there should be consensus on a singular standard definition 
of EBP, exhibiting the necessary and sufficient requirements for a clinical practice to be 
evidence-based. As discussed in chapter 3 and 4, the lack of such an operational definition 
makes the EBP debate unnecessarily imprecise at the outset.  
Most definitions of EBP include the three main elements – evidence, expertise, and 
patient preferences and circumstances – but provide little to no information with regard 
to how these elements are to be combined. In many definitions, the term “integration” is 
meant to remedy this, by connoting to the dynamic character of how the elements are to 
be combined. This is not, however, sufficient to clarify the significance of each element. 
The definition suggested in section 2.3.5. above, demonstrates a way to clarify the 
specificity of the elements and their relations in a more thorough way, through which both 
the methodological criteria (implicating its clinical epidemiology framework) and the 
practical criteria at the point of patient care (implicating the specific roles of the clinician 
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and the patient) are included. This suggested definition of EBP may serve as an example 
of a definition that highlights the specific elements and their relations in a more clarifying 
manner. In effect, critics responding to the definition would have to target their criticism 
in a more specified manner, potentially leading to a more constructive basis for the EBP 
debate. 
Secondly, the methodological terminology should be presented in a more clarified 
manner. In particular, EBP literature should increase attention to clarifying the concept of 
validity, with regard to what “internal” and “external” validity connotes to, with respect 
to how they are fundamental to evidence assessment (typically through the Critical 
appraisal schemes) and, by extension, to the evidence hierarchies. A large part of the 
debate concerning EBP hierarchies would be avoided if descriptions of each hierarchy 
included accurate information about whether and how the ranking of evidence-sources 
was based solely on internal validity or in combination with external validity.  
In turn, this would provide a better basis for debating the benefits and impediments of 
particular evidence-sources (most typically, of the RCT). For instance, it would enable the 
EBP proponents to nuance between critics addressing the methodological principles of 
evidence-sources (e.g., such as it is presented in Worrall’s criticism) and the practical 
advantages and disadvantages in clinical practice (e.g., such that it is presented in most of 
Tonelli’s criticism).  
Thirdly, EBP literature should increase attention to explain and differentiate between its 
scientific framework and its pragmatic orientation toward the patient at the point of 
individual patient care (similar to the distinction between scientific and non-scientific 
knowledge in EBP, which has been discussed in Chapter 2). More concretely, this is 
related, on the one hand, to what can be conducted on basis of the methodological 
terminology, and, on the other hand, what must be assessed by the individual clinician in 
addition to information about the validity of a particular piece of evidence.  
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This latter point has to do with what has been discussed in Chapter 2 as assessment of the 
“usability” of evidence at the point of patient care. Explicit differentiation between the 
methodological concept of external validity and the context- and patient-sensitive 
assessment of the usability of the evidence would make claims about that EBP ignores 
expertise and patient preferences less common. If such claims were to occur, EBP 
proponents could reply more accurately with regard to the specifics of the erroneous 
character of the claim. In turn, such a reply would be preferable to the less constructive 
counter-claim that the critic has misinterpreted what EBP amounts to. 
 
Towards a more a more constructive basis for the EBP debate 
The above list is far from complete, and only tentative in nature. Nonetheless, the 
suggested recommendations demonstrate some the possibilities that can contribute to a 
more constructive basis for the EBP debate. At the very least, if the content of the above 
recommendations would be realized to a greater extent than is currently the case, the 
tendency to approximate minimal concepts of EBP would be minimized. This, in turn, 
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